

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES:

Between Pragmatism, Principism and Neoliberalism

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES:

Between Pragmatism, Principism and Neoliberalism

Rafael Velazquez Flores
Alejandro Simonoff
Martha Ardila
Oscar Vidarte Arévalo
Editors

Prologue by
Guadalupe González



**FONDO
EDITORIAL
PUCP**



**Universidad
Externado
de Colombia**

EDUCACIÓN
PÚBLICA
Y GRATUITA



UNIVERSIDAD
NACIONAL
DE LA PLATA



México, 2022

“This book was peer reviewed by experts on Latin American foreign policy”

Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Pragmatism, Principism and Neoliberalism

First edition: May 2022.

© Rafael Velazquez Flores, Alejandro Simonoff, Martha Ardila, and Oscar Vidarte Arévalo

The characteristics of this publication are the property of the Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales (AMEI), Centro de Enseñanza y Análisis sobre la Política Exterior de México (CESPEM), Universidad Externado de Colombia, Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP), Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), and the Universidad Autónoma de Baja California (UABC).

ISBN: 978-607-99598-2-1

Partial or total reproduction by any means is prohibited, without written authorization from the owners of the economic rights.

Printed and made in Mexico.

Contents

Prologue	9
<i>Guadalupe González</i>	
Acknowledgments	15
<i>The editors</i>	
CHAPTER 1	
Neoliberalism and Autonomy in International Insertion	
Programs of Argentina (2015-2020)	17
<i>Alejandro Simonoff</i>	
CHAPTER 2	
The Foreign Policy of Jair Bolsonaro in Three Moments	29
<i>Miriam Gomes Saraiva and</i>	
<i>Felipe Leal Albuquerque</i>	
CHAPTER 3	
Chilean Foreign Policy in Times of Change	49
<i>Alberto Van Klaveren</i>	
CHAPTER 4	
The Foreign Policy of Uruguay:	
Ideas, Principled Beliefs, and Regional Cooperation	71
<i>Isabel Clemente</i>	
CHAPTER 5	
The Traditional Principles of Bolivian Foreign Policy (2006 - 2021):	
Ideologization before Pragmatism	91
<i>Andrés Guzmán Escobari</i>	

CHAPTER 6

Colombian Foreign Policy: Dependence, Pragmatism and Ideologization (2010-2022)	113
<i>Martha Ardila</i>	

CHAPTER 7

Neoliberalism in Peruvian Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatism and Dogmatism	131
<i>Oscar Vidarte Arévalo</i>	

CHAPTER 8

Venezuela's Foreign Policy in the Era of "Chavism" (1999-2021)	147
<i>José Briceño-Ruiz</i>	

CHAPTER 9

Principled Pragmatism in Mexico's Foreign Policy under a Leftist Administration 2018-2021	163
<i>Rafael Velázquez Flores and Alejandro Monjaraz Sandoval</i>	

About the autors	197
------------------------	-----

Prologue

Guadalupe González González
El Colegio de México

This book is a conceptual and empirical contribution to the foreign policy analysis on Latin American countries in various senses. It offers a comparative perspective of ten Latin American cases through a well-crafted research design based on process tracing and various qualitative methodologies, transcending the traditional single case study approach dominant in the literature. As an edited book coauthored by recognized Latin American scholars, it clearly reflects the advances in meaningful academic collaboration in the field of international relations across the region, a very stimulating and promising trend. Given the wide range of cases and issue areas covered by this volume, it is also a very useful and long needed teaching tool.

Another strength of this collaborative work is the chosen time frame for the analysis, since it focuses on the current period of turbulence and uncertainty since 2019, characterized by the convergence of changes at domestic, regional and systemic level. At domestic level, a long political-electoral cycle accompanied by the proliferation of popular mobilizations led to the reconfiguration of regional alignments and coalitions. Simultaneously, the process of power transition at international level driven by the increasing competition between the United States and China since the Trump administration accelerated by the outbreak of the pandemic, forcing Latin American policy makers to adapt and respond to a new and changing international environment. Therefore, these years are particularly relevant for understanding patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies, and how domestic and international factors interact in the decision-making process.

At the beginning of the 2020s, several countries in Latin America changed presidential administration. Once they were in power, these new governments projected different perspectives on foreign policy. On one hand, their international relations were based on ideological principles, such as Non-Intervention, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Self-determination, and others. Thus, cooperation and multilateral decisions would be a first option for their foreign affairs ministries. On the other hand, they launched a foreign policy driven by pragmatic considerations. In other words, their governments would try to

defend and promote their national interests. At the same time, the notion of neoliberalism also influenced their external links. That is, these new administrations would continue with a policy of free trade and foreign investments attraction.

In this context, the main purpose of this book is to analyze the foreign policy of key Latin American countries through the pragmatic, principled, and neoliberal approach. The argument is that those new administrations resorted to these three perspectives in their external nexus in order to cope with domestic and external conditions, and further national development. For each case, there were also patterns of change and continuity in their foreign policy. Therefore, the book examines these tendencies in the new administrations. The countries that are included in the book are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. They are representative nations in terms of economic power, political stability, geographical size, number of population, and importance in the regional power structure.

The authors of each chapter are Latin American experts on foreign policy. Some of the texts were discussed in several academic conferences, such as the congresses of the Mexican International Studies Association (AMEI in Spanish), the International Studies Association (ISA), and the International Relations Institute of the National University of La Plata. Besides, each chapter was reviewed by two foreign policy experts to ensure scholar quality of the book. In terms of methodology, each author examined both the domestic and external dimension of each country and explained key foreign policy decisions through the pragmatic, principled, and neoliberal perspective.

This book is mainly oriented to students of International Relations and Political Sciences, but it is also suitable for people who are interested in Latin American issues and Social Sciences. The text will also be useful for professors and researchers on Latin American foreign policy topics. Moreover, diplomats, foreign policy decision makers, journalists and general public could be interested in this subject. The main contribution of the book is that each chapter analyzes regime changes, economic policy, norms and ideas that shape the foreign policy decision-making process in those Latin American countries.

The book is divided into nine chapters. The first one analyzes Argentinean foreign policy under the neoliberalism and autonomy concepts. In his work, Alejandro Simonoff states that the oscillation between projects of international insertion imbued with neoliberal and autonomist ideology in Argentina are long-standing. Despite this, the chapter focuses on the last two administrations (Mauricio Macri and Alberto Fernández) and questions about conceptual aspects for a better understanding of the Argentinian foreign policy process. The idea is to unravel the structure and dynamics of the country's international ties.

The second chapter centers on Brazilian foreign policy, emphasizing principled beliefs, pragmatism under the Bolsonaro government. In their text, Miriam Gomes Saraiva and Felipe Leal Albuquerque point out that the arrival of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency brought many changes in Brazilian foreign

policy. From their point of view, many consolidated patterns of the country's international behavior were put at risk, and then were replaced by statements and/or actions that caused not only frictions with international partners, but also with domestic actors. The chapter discusses the contrast between a basically ideological (or principled beliefs) dimension of Bolsonaro's government foreign policy and reactions with a pragmatic nature that seek to defend specific interests of domestic actors that participate at governmental coalition, and the politicization of foreign behavior as well. The chapter's aim is to identify the changes in Brazilian foreign policy based on political and ideational factors and its impact in foreign policymaking and foreign outcomes.

In the next chapter, Alberto Van Klaveren analyzes Chilean foreign policy in times of change. The author argues that, after the restoration of democracy in 1990, pragmatism has been the dominant element in the Chilean foreign policy, combining a commitment to regional cooperation in Latin America and the strengthening of links with the United States, the European Union, and the Asia-Pacific region. According to Klaveren, Chile has also incorporated a particularly active trade policy into its traditional foreign policy interests, although in the last years some ideological elements have made their inroad into Chilean foreign policy. In sum, the chapter analyzes Chile's foreign policy considering its external and domestic sources, its present priorities, and its main challenges. It focuses on contemporary administrations and the relevant past, dealing with the most salient issues and relevant geographic areas, attitudes towards globalization, political and economic dimensions, and Chile's relations with global and regional powers. Finally, the author considered two specific variables; on the one hand, the degrees of continuity and change between different administrations and, on the other, the greater or lesser presence of ideological factors and pragmatism in foreign policy definitions.

Chapter four is about Uruguayan foreign policy. In her text, Isabel Clemente asserts that, although the change of government in 2020 in Uruguay brought about important changes in several policy areas, continuity has prevailed in foreign policymaking with a few exceptions related to relations with the US, the most important of which was the vote for Mauricio Claver Carone as president of the IDB, breaking with a long-standing tradition of promoting Latin American candidates for that position. The purpose of the chapter is to present an analysis of the foreign policy directions of the Uruguayan government in office since the 1st of March 2020. To achieve this aim, Isabel Clemente examines the role of ideas and principled beliefs in policy formulation, the process of agenda setting, and the structure of decision-making. The author's analysis focuses on three levels of foreign policy making: bilateral relations, relations at the regional level in Mercosur, and international relations including Uruguay performance in the multilateral system and in interregional relations framed into the Mercosur-EU agreement of 2019.

The next chapter discusses the traditional principles of Bolivian foreign policy between 2006 and 2021. In the text, Andrés Guzmán claims that in the last

15 years, as a result of the ideologization and extremism of Bolivian foreign policy, different governments have relegated historical principles based on geopolitical conditions, in order to adopt pragmatic measures that, in any case, privileged national interests. According to Andrés Guzmán, in the last fifteen years, that is, in the Morales, Áñez, and Arce administrations, this relegation has occurred, in some cases, without even taking into consideration Bolivia's national interests. This situation, as is shown in the chapter, is the result of the ideologization and extremism of Bolivian foreign policy, which was maintained even in the transitional administration of Jeanine Áñez that lasted for almost a year, between Evo Morales' resignation and the electoral victory of Luis Arce.

In the same token, chapter 6 reviews contemporary Colombian Foreign Policy under the conceptual notions of dependence and pragmatism. Here, Martha Ardila examines the changes and continuities of the governments of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and Ivan Duque (2018 -2022), pointing out the role played by political elites, the relationship with the United States and the preferences and motivations of the head of state. The chapter emphasizes the search for multilateralism and the presence of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. According to the author, the United States is the main referent for Colombian foreign policy, and security issues are a priority. This multidimensional security concept includes mainly drugs and migration topics, but it also incorporates peace and crime themes. Martha Ardila points out that, in the bilateral relationship, U.S. interests center on economic-commercial-financial issues, and Colombian interests focused on the viability of a domestic agenda promoted by political and, to a lesser extent, economic elites.

Oscar Vidarte is the author of the next chapter. He explores Peruvian foreign policy using the concepts of neoliberalism, pragmatism, and dogmatism. The text tries to demonstrate that neoliberalism has constituted an ideological framework that was influential in the Peruvian foreign policy in the last 30 years. At the beginning of the 1990s, it an unquestionable expression of a pragmatic foreign policy. However, in the 21st century, it became an expression of a dogmatic foreign policy. Oscar Vidarte concludes by saying that pragmatism was the best choice to get out of the economic crisis of the 1980s. Nevertheless, Peru began to show the need for changes in the face of a neoliberal model that seemed to be running out. Finally, the author asserts that Peru has managed, on the one hand, to consolidate a solid relationship with the United States and, on the other hand, to develop a fruitful rapprochement with China in recent times, based on its consolidation as a world power.

Next chapter focuses on Venezuela's foreign policy in the era of Chavism between 1999 and 2020. In his text, José Briceno-Ruiz points out the changes in Venezuelan foreign relations since the arrival of Hugo Chávez in 1999 at the Miraflores Palace. According to the author, Venezuela was traditionally a close U.S. ally in the Western Hemisphere. However, the Chávez administration fostered a new multipolar world, reactivated the idea of a Bolivarian integration, and made of the fight against neo-liberalism a component of the new foreign

policy. Similarly, Venezuela developed an oil-diplomacy and furthered initiatives of South-South Cooperation to increase its presence in Africa and in the Middle East. These changes in foreign policy were radicalized after 2004, when Chávez adopted an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist discourse. After the death of Chávez, such a foreign policy has been continued during the Nicolás Maduro administration. In the Chavist era, Caracas adopted a soft balancing strategy based on a social diplomacy to balance the U.S., especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, Venezuela became a close ally of other revolutionary states such as Cuba, Libya, and Iran, but also with revisionist powers in the contestation of the global order.

The last chapter analyzes Mexican Foreign Policy under a leftist administration. Rafael Velazquez and Alejandro Monjaraz indicate that the beginning of a new government in Mexico in 2018 brought up great expectations about change and continuity in domestic and foreign policy. According to the authors, it was particularly significant because, for the first time in the Mexican political system, the president came from a leftist political party. Besides, the elected candidate, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), won the election by an ample margin. Therefore, the new president obtained an important democratic legitimacy once he took office. In this context, the main purpose of the chapter is to analyze Mexico's foreign policy under the new administration of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. The key argument is that, in his first year in power, AMLO's foreign policy has had three key characteristics. First, there has been a pattern of change and continuity. In other words, his administration has maintained some international policies that were implemented by past governments and, at the same time, has transformed others. Secondly, the new administration has imprinted a pragmatic approach and, at the same time, has developed a foreign policy based on Mexico's traditional tenets, such as Non-Intervention, Self-Determination, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, among others. Thirdly, the first three years of the AMLO administration has combined a pattern of conflict and cooperation, particularly regarding the United States.

Acknowledgments

The editors of the book would like to express gratitude to all the people and institutions that made this publication possible. First of all, we want to thank all the authors of the book. Their contribution was important to guarantee enough quality of each chapter of the book. In a special way, we acknowledge the Mexican Association of International Studies (AMEI), and the Center for Teaching and Analysis of the Mexican Foreign Policy (CESPEM). These two institutions facilitated the publication of the book. We also want to recognize the Autonomous University of Baja California in Mexico, the National University of La Plata, in Argentina, the Colombian University of Externado in Colombia, and the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. They, as well, supported the project.

We also want to thank Guadalupe Gonzalez, from El Colegio de Mexico, for writing a generous prologue for the book. She is a leading expert on Latin American foreign policy and we appreciate very much her comments. The editors also want to acknowledge all observations and feedback we received in different congresses and meetings, such as AMEI, Redintercol, and ISA, as well as the various webinars, research seminars, and focus groups, on which we participated.

We hope that this publication, in addition to research and reflection, would become a book of training and debate for our students.

*The editors
April 2022*

CHAPTER 1

Neoliberalism and Autonomy in International Insertion Programs of Argentina (2015-2020)

Alejandro Simonoff

Introduction

Insertion projects in Argentina have long swayed between those imbued with a neoliberal ideology and those embodying autonomy. Following a similar logic, this chapter will focus on the last two administrations (those of Presidents Mauricio Macri and Alberto Fernández). We intend to delve into some conceptual aspects that should help us better understand the foreign policy process and thus disentangle its structure and dynamic. The inauguration of Alberto Fernández as Argentine president in December 2019 again brought to the fore the swings in Argentine politics. This is no new phenomenon, nor is it confined to the country's foreign relations –it had already been described by Juan Carlos Portantiero about the Cold War, when he reported that society was being held to a draw.¹

By appointing heterodox² economists, the new Argentine administration is reorienting the model towards an industrial neo-developmental³ project. As the President claimed in his opening speech, his administration will look to “a growing and inclusive Argentina … with incentives to production instead of

¹ The Argentine sociologist defined the period of instability reigning from the 1950s onwards as a “draw” between the dominant classes and the popular classes, a state of affairs due to the fact that neither party could get itself to veto the other one's projects, “both lacking the necessary resources to impose their own in any lasting way” (Portantiero, 1977, p 531). From 1976 on, whereas the former projects were geared towards a financial accumulation model, in close partnership with the agricultural sector, the latter promoted a more diversified economy centered around the manufacturing industry.

²The appointment of neo-Keynesian economists like Martín Guzmán in Economy and Matías Kulfas in Productive Development, among others, pointed in that direction.

³ According to Bianco and Porta, industrial neo-developmentalism seeks to favor “accelerated growth and productive diversification as proper ways to reach development”. It differs from classical late-50s developmentalism in that it encourages “inclusion of open-economy criteria and prioritizes developing value chains around finished goods and services” (Bianco and Porta, 2005, pp 35-36).

speculation" (Fernández, 2019). This therefore underlines the difference with the rentier financial model⁴ that characterized President Mauricio Macri's administration,⁵ whose outcome was massive capital flight causing an exponential growth in indebtedness⁶ and a near-constant GDP decline. Besides promoting speculative deals, its material bases lay in a boost of a commodity-export model, in which the highlight was the soy agribusiness system, followed by extractive mining.⁷

For the conservative president this option meant the "potential to get a foothold in the world's supermarkets" (Macri, 2016). However, Argentina's trade with the world as from 2015 fell short of the expectations raised, since "there was no export drive but measures of market deregulation and trade liberalization, which resulted in a boost on imports..." (Wainer, 2020). With the new administration and the pandemic, though, as pointed out in *Página 12* economic supplement, the economy continued to fall:

... in Argentina's three main trade partners: China, Brazil, and the United States. There was a significant contraction in sales to Brazil, Argentina's neighboring country, falling by 16% in March and 57% in April. Sales to the United States, in turn, shrank by 35% and 25% respectively. Brazil's situation proved particularly significant, since ... it is especially worrying for Argentina, Brazil being its main destination for local manufacturing exports. Compared to their performance one year back, exports to Brazil plummeted by a dramatic 58% last April (Wainer, 2020).

Argentina's repositioning of its trade balance in favor of Beijing could be a provisional situation for the government, in as much as "Brazil's crisis was at an all-time high over the period while China recovered and started to grow again" (Beldyk, 2020, p 13). Macri's last turnaround in the financial accumulation model since the end of the Argentine currency board ("convertibility") rested on the break-up of the alignment between the industrial sector and the state. Meanwhile, this coalition had taken shape via a shift away from the 90s neoliberal economic paradigm and towards a fresh heterodox one. A competitive exchange rate, the use of the existing idle capacity and the high commodity prices at the time led to a phase of economic growth. Lack of access to international markets, though, -the outcome of default- was offset both by recovering industrial installations and by achieving a two-fold surplus in fiscal policy and trade balance.⁸

⁴ Following Mario Rapoport and Carlos Spiguel (2003), rentier financial accumulation models such as those in current use during the last military rule and President Menem's government in the 1990s were marked by the enactment of market hegemony in resource allocation, the restriction of State participation and the opening of international competition from imports against locally produced goods. The benefits of this model were reaped by the agrarian elites, the big local economic and financial groups and the middlemen in international finance and trade.

⁵ The electoral coalition was underpinned by the support of not only the agricultural and financial sectors but also of wide urban middle-class sectors that rejected Kirchnerism.

⁶ Official data prove that the debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 52.6% in 2015 to 90.2% in 2019 (*Argentina Unida*, 2020).

⁷ Mining was already enjoying considerable benefits with Kirchnerism and continues to do so today.

⁸ These changes necessarily entailed a break away from the path of the 1990s consensus between the

However, once the total installed capacity was fully taken up, the need for an increased capital flow became apparent. In addition, international commodity prices registered a fall, there were lags in the US dollar exchange rate and, though underestimated at first, the 2008 global financial crisis raged. This situation back then took a toll on the model, which started to veer towards an autarky-like model.⁹ In addition, that same year, Cristina Fernández's administration pushed a bill to alter the tax base of the extraordinary agricultural income, which came up against unanimous rejection from the farming sector. The decision strengthened an alliance with the middle-class urban sectors and further made a break in the productive bloc that had been gradually built since 2002.

Disputes over ways of relating to the world

The dispute over models stretched over to Macri's and Fernández's administrations, which can be seen in the ways their respective relations to the world were established. President Mauricio Macri defined international insertion as the task of "adapting to the new realities of global interdependence" (Macri, 2016). Such an approach resulted in Argentinean interests being externalised and, hence, coming to be shaped by what "the world" expected from Argentina rather than the other way around; and this so to the extent of reducing them to a state of little or no self-determination. Moreover, this take on "interdependence" on the part of *Cambios* was marked by a vision of the world as a homogenous whole led by the USA-Western Europe-Japan triad, which in turn ignored the effects of the rise of China.¹⁰ As Cervo noted, in these groups: "national interests fade into in the agenda set by the multilateral nature of international relations, the so-called global governance. Foreign policy has turned into an old-fashioned notion, a mere ornament to state action since it is no longer in charge of any definite interests" (Cervo, 2003, p.18).

The latter approach was observed in the dangerous increase in the country's vulnerability, as reported by Bloomberg.¹¹ On the issue of the insertion model adopted, Jonathan Joseph outlines the traits to be expected as "a modern version of combined and uneven development to the extent that aspiring

farming, industrial and financial sectors and led to a new power arrangement whereby the production-related sectors steered clear of the previous policy prescriptions and sought a new legitimacy during the Kirchner governments.

⁹ It is a model intended to boost domestic consumption by producing a redistribution shock. However, external restrictions worsened the situation.

¹⁰ This is no oversight, but the result of strong bonds with the Western financial sector, which fostered business during the *Cambios* administration.

¹¹ According to *Página/12*, Bloomberg Agency brought out a ranking for emerging countries, with Argentina featuring as one of the most vulnerable countries, based on five factors, namely: a 40.5 % ratio between short-term foreign debt and GDP; a staggering 35.8 deviation between the government's stated inflation goal and the actual rate; low hedge reserves in the range of 85.9%; a 2% current account deficit in relation to GDP; and a poor 0.16 rating on "government efficiency" (*Página/12*, 26 July 2019, pp. 2-3).

countries are confined to the social conditions of their own developmental stage, though they are subject to the strategies and techniques of the advanced liberal countries that dominate the dealings of the main development organizations (Joseph, 2011, p. 59). By contrast, Alberto Fernández characterized the ties with the world in the following fashion: “an Argentina fitted into a globalized world but rooted into Argentinean national interests: no more no less than what all developed countries promoting well-being for their inhabitants will do” (Fernández, 2019).

This definition comes closer to those offered by autonomist writers, such as Helio Jaguaribe, who defined the construction of foreign policy as “the optimization relation of a country’s main interests on the global level, taking account of both its internal and external conditions and the means of action at its disposal” (Jaguaribe, 1974, p. 104). The administrations adopting a heterodox autonomy approach during the Cold War (such as, Perón’s, Frondizi’s, Illia’s, Cámpora’s and Alfonsín’s) typically promoted a strategy centered around the regional priority and adhered to an economic model that might or might not match the central powers’ expectations. Nonetheless, they would never go beyond the bloc’s strategic guidelines and they were able to tell when it was their own interests that were at stake and when it was those of the hegemonic power (Puig, 1984). On the other hand, supporters of the Western Bloc thought that the country had little room for maneuver and, therefore, had better accommodate to the agenda set by the bloc leaders.¹²

Once this bipolar view of the world came to an end, the latter turned globalist; and, as Amado Cervo points out, “they found in the root liberalism present in the making of their nations, as well as in domestic agreements and external recommendations, the inspiration to elaborate and program the enforcement of a neoliberal paradigm of international integration...” (Cervo, 2003, p. 18). What is more, from the 1980s to the first decade of the new millennium, a geopolitical triangle had come into being (Argentina-Brazil-the USA), which showed signs of strain since the beginning of the new millennium. Tensions were apparent in relations with Washington -resulting from the impact of its security agenda after 9/11- and with Brasilia -due to its international repositioning. After the 2008 crisis and with the rise of China, this triangle gradually gave way to a new rhombus-like structure that superseded it (Busso, Actis and Novello, 2017).

Argentina’s international agenda

The breakdown in the currency board system in December 2001 also affected the foreign policy of the administrations following the crisis. This, in turn, resulted in some regularity as to the topics on the agenda, such as a novel shift towards international security (an important issue for Washington), the regional priority

¹²In general, military regimes were more likely to opt for this strategy.

(especially with Brazil and Mercosur) and Argentina's international economic insertion (meaning closer ties with China), which lasted until President Macri came into power in 2015. As for the first topic, Argentine administrations from 2002 onwards had avoided direct commitment to Washington's policies, aiming for multilateral mechanisms, peacekeeping mission maintenance and enhancement (UNSTAMIH), the search for certain linkages with the fight against terrorism –given the 1990s Israeli Embassy and AMIA bombings– while distancing themselves from unipolarism. Still, some changes started to be seen as from 2008 when President Barak Obama was elected president, such as, for instance, the explicit criticism of Western guidelines on the Middle East or the endorsement of the memorandum of understanding between Argentina and Iran in 2013. Such instances signaled here a change of direction away from the stage begun in 2002.

In 2015, on Macri taking office several commitments were made on three levels: globally, by adhering to the characterization of *Hezbollah* as a terrorist organization, regionally, by supporting policies undermining President Maduro's rule in Venezuela, and locally, by blurring the difference between security and defense in order to enable the armed forces' meddling with domestic matters.¹³ On the global level, even if *Hezbollah* continued to be characterized as a terrorist organization,¹⁴ in July 2020 the Argentine president appreciated the 2013 Memorandum (Niebieskikwiat, July 17, 2020, p. 1), which was meant by President Cristina Fernandez's administration as a move to unlock the riddle of the 1990s bombings. The failed attempt turned out to be a break in the customary approach to the bombings issue as a linkage with the War on Terror spearheaded by the USA.

On the regional agenda, Venezuela features as the main topic. Even when Argentina continued to be a member of the Lima Group, it distanced itself from the Group's agenda by not endorsing any statement. Its strategy also caused some tension within the Group, as could be inferred from the three goals regarding this topic: no intervention, a peaceful solution and full involvement from all the group members.¹⁵ As pointed out by Chancellor Solá: "in the current context, economic sanctions and blockades can only worsen the effects of the pandemic and, from a political viewpoint, mediation efforts within the blockade have only

¹³ On the latter point, President Fernández pointed out that his administration shall foster "no participation of the armed forces in domestic security matters" (Fernández, 2020a).

¹⁴ This was evidenced in President Fernández's first official trip to Israel, a rarity in itself, in which there was a sense of continuity in the fact that –as desired by both Netanyahu and Trump– he wouldn't change the characterization in question: "We are not going to make any changes that may pose any problem to Argentina whatsoever, we've already had more than enough", asserted Chancellor Felipe Solá (*Clarín*, December 13, 2019, p. 14). Washington's role was actually considered crucial for a successful debt restructuring process, Argentina's major priority until the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

¹⁵ The Lima Group was characterized by setting a highly interventionist agenda, fostered by Trump's USA, that ruled out no forcible solutions nor an exclusion of Chavism in the Venezuelan future political order.

As part of this new path, in August 2020 Argentina joined the International Contact Group, which sought a rapprochement with Venezuela. The Group members are representatives from the European Union, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico and Costa Rica.

polarized the situation, deterred dialogue and led Maduro's regime to shield itself into a military-like resistance" (*Observatorio del Sur Global*, 2020).

This position found its way into the Commission on Human Rights in July 2020 through Argentine Ambassador Federico Villegas Beltrán, who, while condemning the violation of human rights, opposed the sanctions and the blockade, and made the following appeal: "our region is set to intensify its efforts to find a peaceful, political and negotiated solution to this grave multi-dimensional crisis, it is Venezuelans themselves that must work towards such solution, by means of inclusive, transparent and credible elections" (Villegas Beltrán en Beldy, July 16, 2020). Many of the media that had been giving biased coverage to this issue talked of a change in the Argentine position, to which Felipe Solá claimed: "Don't you change my words about what Argentina said about Venezuela in Brussels" (*Observatorio del Sur Global*, 2020).

It is important to note that Argentina found a delicate balance on this matter, which was praised by several sources of the State Department, such as Venezuelan representative Elliot Abrams¹⁶ or Secretary Mike Pompeo¹⁷ himself. Yet, such delicate balance was disturbed by the Argentinian Ambassador to the OAS, Carlos Raimundi, who downplayed Bachelet's report over the situation in Caracas and forced Buenos Aires to overact, by taking a vote in favor of the report at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Niebieskikwiat, October 7, 2020). The restructuring of the Argentine debt conducted by President Alberto Fernández and his Economy Minister Martín Guzmán was an important milestone in Argentina's relations with the world, as pointed out by the Argentine President himself at the United Nations: "Argentina has managed to reach a significant agreement with almost all its private external creditors, becoming one of the countries to meet the challenge of addressing the restructuring of its sovereign debt in the context of the pandemic" (Fernández, 2020b).

The agreement reached 99% adherence of private US bondholders both under foreign and local legislation, with a reduction in the amounts due, a decrease in the average interest rate from 7% to 3% and extensions of payment terms, despite the high degree of skepticism underlying the entire process (Valli, September 5, 2020, p. 12). This has been the first step in a broader process involving the International Monetary Fund that Argentina is soon to address: "with responsibility, honoring the commitments taken on, while not jeopardizing the conditions that enable economic reactivation and the construction of an inclusive and sustainable development path" (Fernández, 2020b). The Argentine President went on to restate his negotiation guidelines: "no country can pay its sovereign debt at the expense of its people's health, education and security, nor of its ability to progress. It is also essential to maintain a balance and prioritize human rights above all else" (Fernández, 2020b).

¹⁶ When consulted regarding the so-called "change" in Argentina's position, this official stated that "none of that comes as a surprise to us. Argentina is a democracy" (Lugones, July 29, 2020, p. 26).

¹⁷ Trump's Secretary of State referred to Argentina's role as a "bridge" between the parties in the conflict (Lugones, April 4, 2020, p. 9).

The regional priority was a distinguishing mark of the new millennium policies, within which Mercosur was its main instrument of international insertion. But for President Macri, another priority got in the way of the regional strategy, that is, the relations with the central “traditional” powers (the USA and the European Union) and some sense of disdain for the rising economies (China, Russia as well as other BRICS members). Accordingly, the regional market was initially confined to being a gate to the European Union and to the Pacific Alliance –both intermediate hubs to reach the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade (TAFTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreements– which eventually turned into proper final terminals themselves in the wake of the new international direction taken with Trump’s presidency.

President Macri’s electoral urgency and his foregone concurrence with President Jair Bolsonaro’s take on the regional market as a bridge to hyperglobalization¹⁸ gave rise to the signing of the agreement with the European Union. The new Argentine government, though, has given few signs in this respect. As highlighted by EFE news media and on the occasion of the 2030 Automotive Strategic Plan launch, Alberto Fernández pointed out that “we don’t mind engaging in foreign trade with the European Union, as long as we do it jointly with Mercosur, and that so, as long as such decision does not have a negative impact on our national industry”. He also considered that Mercosur should be understood as “the common ground from which to face up to globalization”, the latter being “an irreversible fact” to be “wisely” acknowledged (EFE, 2019).

There was some ambiguity about President Fernández’s statement since it could be interpreted both as endorsement for and the rejection of the negotiated trade agreement. Still, we believe the limits of his pragmatism may lie in the answer to this question. On that note, *La Nación* newspaper reported that the Argentine government dislikes the agreement and is trying to build a reasonable amount of domestic consensus to go back on it, but, at the same time, President Bolsonaro is pushing for Argentina to work towards it (Jueguen, 2020). All the same, there is in fact some degree of ambiguity in Buenos Aires as to the future of the agreement for, as Solá explained, “there can be a lengthy [political] discussion, but it cannot address changes in the points previously agreed on; that is, the agreement should be accepted or rejected as it is: it cannot be modified, as that is the way it has been signed by the former government” (*Observatorio del Sur Global*, 2020).

Argentinean Chancellor Felipe Solá criticized that upon signing the agreement the Macri administration had not sought the views of the private sectors nor provided any impact estimates. He also “claimed that the agreement needs to be accepted and honored because the legal continuity of the State must be guaranteed” (*Observatorio del Sur Global*, 2020). Another core aspect is that of Argentina’s relation with China. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s decision to endorse the Comprehensive Strategic Alliance (AEI in Spanish) with China in

¹⁸ Following Dani Rodrik, the term refers to “the international integration of markets for goods and capital (but not for labor) [and went on to become] an end in itself, overshadowing local political agendas” (Rodrik, 2011, p. 96).

2014, though not free from contradictions,¹⁹ brought about the most significant change in Argentine foreign relations since 1983. Indeed, the relevance of this alliance rested on the fact that Beijing turned into a significant variable, just like Brasilia and Washington.

President Macri's initial decision to update the Comprehensive Strategic Alliance turned his most ideological lines on Argentine foreign policy on their head. There was actually a contradiction between the guidelines laid down to access the world and the material foundations underlying that strategic alliance, according to which Argentina was driven closer to Beijing rather than to the Western block. When Peronist President Alberto Fernández came into office, China's relevant role in Argentine foreign policy frequently came up in his speeches. Now then, this situation poses the following question: will this relation be subject to the same constraints observed in other areas? The fact that the tensions between China and the USA force Argentina to watch out for moves on both sides of the Pacific Ocean is no minor detail. Relations with Beijing are being strengthened thanks to the cooperation offered by China during the pandemic,²⁰ an \$8 billion dollar extension of the currency swap program, the beginning of talks with Huawei "and its intention to deploy a 5G network all through Argentina" (*Infobae*, July 8, 2020).

Secretary for International Economic Relations, Jorge Neme, noted that "Argentina needs to have respectable, respectful and mutually convenient relations with both the USA and China" (Beldik, July 18, 2020, p. 13). Moreover, Buenos Aires seeks investment "without conditionality", a particularly important move today, even more so than that which can be made by the West. Yet, the latter's support may eventually be crucial to core issues such as the sovereign debt restructuring.

Concluding remarks

The idea of an Argentina that swings back and forth in its political decisions and whose sway has impacted the country's global insertion stems from a long-

¹⁹ On signing this alliance, the industrialist narrative of the Kirchner governments clashed with Argentina's historical role as a raw material supplier and met with the limitations this new relation imposed on Argentina's aspirations.

²⁰ It was the so-called "mask diplomacy", Beijing turning into a relevant actor for Argentina. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that his country would aid Argentina to the extent possible (Xinua, 2020). This has been reflected in a series of more than 30 shipments from China so far. Thirteen tons of medical supplies were flown from Shanghai to Argentina via Auckland for fear of passing through American territory and risking confiscation. These shipments were supplemented by sea transportation: five ships docked in Argentina between June and August carrying "millions of supplies for hospitals and health services in the province of Buenos Aires." Among the supplies were: 6 million facemasks, 83 thousand goggles, 700 thousand face shields and 12 million pairs of disposable gloves (González, 2020, p. 22). According to Juan Luis González, the generosity displayed by Beijing has two goals among others: securing pork sourcing –the supply of which was struck by the African swine fever that killed 250 million pigs– and finding an alternative source –a matter which has been widely opposed by Argentine environmentalists (González, 2020, p. 22).

standing dispute of entirely opposing economic models. It is also the result of their respective agents' failure to assert the hegemony of the model they represent over the other one. However, as Juan Carlos Puig posits, it all becomes clearer if we focus on the notion of autonomy as a conceptual framework. This might allow us to "understand the underlying structure by selecting some relevant and meaningful variables that will allow us to at least outline underlying trends and appreciate failures and successes with a view to gaining greater autonomy in the country" (Puig, 1984, I, p. 91).

Along those lines, autonomy can be considered a key concept to make this process intelligible, since: "a heuristic correlation emerges that with some degree of consistency explains the so-called swings in Argentina's foreign policy, and in any case, the reasons that underpin its proximity to or distancing from the margin for potential autonomy" (Puig, 1984, I, p. 93). Further to this reasoning, it can be argued that President Macri's recent short conservative period will surely have profound consequences and will pose a great challenge to President Alberto Fernández has set a clear course of action, albeit with some pragmatic moves, but it will be his task to strengthen the much-needed autonomy every nation requires to safeguard the national interests and finally break the tie once for all.

References

Argentina Unida. (2020). *Presentación gráfica de la deuda* [Graphic representation of the debt] <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia/finanzas/presentaciongraficadeudapublica>.

Busso, A., Actis, E. and Novello, M. R. (2017). La geometría de la Política Exterior Argentina (1989-2015). Fin del diseño triangular e irrupción de un nuevo vértice: las relaciones con Estados Unidos, Brasil y China [The geometry of Argentine foreign policy (1989-2015). The end of the triangular design and the emergence of a new vertex: relations with the United States, Brazil, and China]. In Busso, A. (Coord.) *Modelos de desarrollo e inserción internacional: aportes para el análisis de la política exterior argentina desde la redemocratización: 1983-2011, actores y temas de agenda* [Development and international insertion models: a contribution to the analysis of Argentine foreign policy since the redemocratizing period: 1983-2011, actors and issues] (T2, pp. 11-51). UNR Editora. Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario.

Beldyk, M. (2020, July 16). El Gobierno apuesta a saltar la grieta chavista impulsando el voto de la diáspora [The government bids to span the Chavism divide]. *Perfil*. <https://www.perfil.com/noticias/actualidad/venezuela-fernandez-apuesta-saltar-grieta-chavista-impulsando-voto-diaspora.phtml>.

Beldyk, M. (2020, July 18). Tenemos que estar conectados con el mundo que no es lo mismo que abierto [We must be connected to the world, which is not the same as being open to the world]. *Perfil*, p. 13.

Cervo, A. (2003). Política exterior e relações internacionais do Brasil: enfoque paradigmático. *Revista Brasileña de Política Internacional*. 46, (2), pp. 5-25.

Clarín, (2019, December 13). "El gobierno mantendrá a Hezbollah en el listado de grupos terroristas [The goverment will keep Hezbollah on the terrorist group list]." *Clarín*, p. 14.

González, J. L. (2020). Relaciones Carnales II [Carnal Relation II]. *Noticias*, Año XXX, N° 2277, 20-25.

EFE. (2019, December 17). "Fernández avala el acuerdo Mercosur-UE si "no afecta" a la industria argentina [President Fernandez endorses Mercosur-EU agreement only if it 'does not affect' Argentine industry] ". Buenos Aires, Agencia EFE.: <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/economia/fernandez-avalva-el-acuerdo-mercosur-ue-si-no-afecta-a-la-industria-argentina/20000011-4134547>.

Fernández, A. (2019). Asunción Alberto Fernández: discurso completo del nuevo presidente [President Fernandez's inauguration: the new president's complete opening speech]. *Clarín*. Buenos Aires, Argentina. https://www.clarin.com/politica/asuncion-alberto-fernandez-discurso-completo-nuevo-presidente_0_fxJxjVYE.html.

Fernández, A. (2020^a). Discurso del presidente Alberto Fernández al encabezar la apertura del periodo 138 de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso de la Nación [President Alberto Fernandez's opening speech on the inauguration of the 138th period of regular sessions of Congress]. *Casa Rosada*. Buenos Aires, Argentina. <https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/discursos/46746-discurso-del-presidente-alberto-fernandez-al-encabezar-la-apertura-del-periodo-138-de-sesiones-ordinarias-del-congreso-de-la-nacion>.

Fernández, A. (2020b, September 22). Palabras del presidente de la Nación, Alberto Fernández, en el 75 período de sesiones, de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, a través de videoconferencia [President Alberto Fernandez's message by video-conference on the opening of the 75th sesion of the UN General Assembly]. Buenos Aires. <https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/discursos/47157-palabras-del-presidente-de-la-nacion-alberto-fernandez-en-el-75-periodo-de-sesiones-de-la-asamblea-general-de-naciones-unidas-a-traves-de-videoconferencia>.

Infobae. (2020, July 8). El Gobierno promueve un acercamiento tecnológico y financiero con China que sorprendió a la Casa Blanca [The Argentine government prompts a technological and financial rapprochement with Chinathat surprised nthe White House]. *Infobae*. <https://www.infobae.com/politica/2020/07/08/el-gobierno-promueve-un-acercamiento-tecnologico-y-financiero-con-china-que-sorprendio-a-la-casa-blanca/>.

Jaguaribe, H. (1974). *Desarrollo económico y político* [Economic and political development]. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Joseph, J. (2011). Governmentality of What? Populations, States, and International Organizations. In Kiersey, N. and Stokes, D. *Foucault and International Relations*. New Critical Engagements (pp. 51-65). Routledge.

Jueguen, F. (2020, March 10). Industria. El plan de Alberto Fernández para el acuerdo entre el Mercosur y la Unión Europea [Industry. Alberto Fernandez's plan to reach an agreement between Mercosur and The European Union]. *La Nación*. <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/industria-el-plan-alberto-fernandez-acuerdo-ue-nid2341934>.

Lugones, P. (2020, April 30). Mensaje de EE. UU.: "La Argentina puede ayudar en la crisis de Venezuela [A message from the USA: Argentina can help the Venezuelan crisis]". *Clarín*, p. 9.

Lugones, P. (2020, August 8). "Estamos dispuestos a ayudar a la Argentina en la negociación con el FMI [We are ready to help Argentina in its negotiation with the IMF]". *Clarín*, p. 4.

Macri, M. (2016). "Discurso completo del presidente de Argentina ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York [President Macri's complete speech in New York before the UN General Assembly]". *Clarín*. http://www.clarin.com/politica/Discurso-completo-Mauricio-Macri-ONU_0_1654034706.html.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto. (2020, January 5). Informe para la Prensa N° 005/20: La Argentina hace un llamado a recuperar la normalidad democrática en Venezuela [Argentina calls to restore normal democratic order in Venezuela]. <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/la-argentina-hace-un-llamado-recuperar-la-normalidad-democratica-en-venezuela>.

Niebieskikwiat, N. (2020, July 17). El presidente defendió el Pacto con Irán que firmó Cristina y antes criticaba [The President no longer criticizes the Agreement with Iran signed by Cristina and now defends it]. *Clarín*, p. 1

Niebieskikwiat, N. (2020, October 7). El Gobierno cambió su postura y condenó a Venezuela en la ONU. *Clarín*, p. 20.

Observatorio del Sur Global (OSG). (2020, July 18). Definiciones del Canciller Argentino Felipe Solá. *Política exterior y negociaciones comerciales*. <http://observatoriodelsur.com.ar/politica-exterior-y-negociaciones-comerciales-definiciones-del-canciller-argentino-felipe-sola/>.

Página/12. (2019, July 26). Argentina, la más vulnerable del mundo [Argentina, the most vulnerable in the world]. *Página/12*, pp. 2-3.

Porta, F. y Bianco, C. (2005). Las visiones sobre el desarrollo argentino. Consensos y disensos. Secretaría de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva del Ministerio de Educación [Visions on Argentine development. Consensus and dissent. Secretary of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation, Ministry of Education]. In: *Bases de un Plan Estratégico de mediano plazo en Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación. 2005-2015* [Fundamentals of a middle-term Strategic Plan in Science, Technology, and Innovation. 2005-2015]. (pp. 9-57). Imprenta Oficial.

Portantiero, J. C. (1977). "Economía y política en Argentina: 1958-1973 [Economy and politics in Argentina: 1958-1973]". *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, vol. 39, núm. 2, abril-junio de 1977, pp. 531-565.

Puig, J. C. (1984). *América latina: políticas exteriores comparadas* [Latin America: comparative foreign policies]. GEL.

Rapoport, M. y Spiguel, C. (2003). Modelos económicos, régimenes políticos y política exterior argentina [Economic models, political regimes and Argentine foreign policy]. In Sombra Saraiva, F. (Ed.). *Foreign Policy and political regime* (pp. 169-235) Instituto Brasileño de Relaciones Internacionales,

Rodrik, D. (2011). *La paradoja de la globalización. Democracia y futuro de la economía mundial* [The globalization paradox. Democracy and future of the global economy]. Antoni Bosch.

Xinua. (2020, April 10) China está dispuesta a seguir ayudando a Argentina en combate a COVID-19, dice Xi [“China is ready to continue helping Argentina in its fight against COVID-19, says Xi”]. Xinuanet. Spanish.xinhuanet.com/2020-4-/10/c_138964670.htm.

CHAPTER 2

The Foreign Policy of Jair Bolsonaro in Three Moments¹

Miriam Gomes Saraiva
Felipe Leal Albuquerque

Introduction

What exactly is Bolsonaro's foreign policy? The literature has addressed many possibilities of change in foreign policy, its quality, breadth, time-lapse, and frequency. One way to analyze the changes is to focus on intermediate stages of the foreign policy decision-making process or the adoption of certain strategies for the achievement of certain objectives. An alternative way is to understand the changes as a final manifestation of foreign policy, a phenomenon resulting from disputes within the State, and empirically observable in the relationship with other international actors, based on bilateral relations, interaction with regional partners, or in multilateral forums. Also, the interpretation of when a change occurs depends on theoretical lenses that state the choice of levels of analysis and respective explanatory conditions.

Since the end of the military regime, foreign policy has been incorporating new actors and ideas, as well as more complex agendas. The engagement of different domestic actors has been progressively growing while new issues directly linked to both the internal and external dimensions have been incorporated into the foreign agenda. Thus, it becomes difficult to understand and explain a foreign policy pointing only to its results,² as well as to its principles and values. The analysis of the foreign policymaking process, which often happens in the Foreign Policy Analysis sub-area (Allison, 1971; Hudson, 2005; Milner, 1997; Wight, 2006), is fundamental for understanding this policy, but not enough.

While some approaches reflect the dichotomy between levels of analysis, especially between the domestic and international dimensions, we reinforce the need to develop an integrative approach to understanding foreign policy

¹ The chapter was delivered for publication in April 2021. This research received funding from the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development and Rio de Janeiro State University (Pro-Science Program).

² As the History of International Relations most often does.

(Haesebrouck & Joly, 2020; Rodrigues, Urdinez & Oliveira, 2019). Not only can levels of analysis and explanatory factors be interrelated, but they can also vary according to the context. Thus, change is part of the decision-making process and can also be detected as a final manifestation of foreign policy.

Breaking with the tradition of continuity, the foreign policy of Jair Bolsonaro, in power since 2019, has introduced new ideas, a new road map of the world, and new partnerships, putting in check patterns that have guided Brazilian foreign policy for a long time. Differently from the campaigns of other presidential candidates, Bolsonaro's foreign policy occupied a relevant place in his electoral campaign, in many cases seeking to meet the demands of specific political or social groups – many of them not necessarily belonging to the country's traditional elites. The formulation and implementation of foreign policy reflected an increasing fragmentation of the decision-making process with the divergence of interests between actors with an ideological foreign policy and with segmented pragmatic interests.

Our aim in this chapter is to understand Jair Bolsonaro's foreign policy from its three dimensions, namely: the ideas that supported foreign policy; the policymaking; and the practice of this policy that includes its implementation and results. With this aim, the text is divided into four sections and the conclusion. The first section deals with changes in foreign policy. The second is oriented to an overview of the ideas that influence Jair Bolsonaro's foreign policy. Then, the chapter looks at the dismantling of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fragmented foreign policymaking process. The fourth section examines the implementation of this policy with a focus on some examples that we consider to be paradigmatic. In conclusion, the text presents the general features of the change and some of its effects on Brazil's place in the international arena.

Redirecting Foreign Policy

One of the most common ways of studying changes in foreign policy is to approach them as a gradation of intensity that ranges from none or little to scenarios of drastic changes. Hermann (1990) points out four levels of change: adjustment, or changes in style or intensity, in which foreign policy objectives are maintained; program changes, in which methods and strategies to achieve certain objectives are modified, with the objectives remaining the same; goal changes, when changing the objectives; and international orientation changes, which involve the complete redirection of a country's foreign policy. Saraiva (2020) argues that changes can occur from a paradox that accommodates, at the same time, continuity in objectives and changes in intensity, priorities, or strategies. The intermediate stages are changed but the foreign policy orientation is maintained, which opens room for situations of "changes in continuity" (Fonseca Jr., 2011). In other situations, patterns of behavior in foreign policy can undergo significant changes even without the definition of a deliberate option

on the part of policymakers, as pointed out by Holsti (2016), or, according to Gustavsson (1999), due to a setting of crisis, real or imagined.

Changes in foreign policy, especially when they involve several issue areas and occur in a short time, imply high political costs and, therefore, are less common and usually involve specific themes or sectors (Hagan and Rosati, 1994). According to Welch (2005), changes are expected in three circumstances: in authoritarian states with poorly formalized bureaucracies and with less resilience, which reduces institutional continuity; when there are failures in the implementation of a specific strategy, which leads to its re-evaluation; and when there is a perception or anticipation that the choices will imply losses. Inertia would therefore be the most common paradigm. In Albuquerque's (2020) point of view, inertia in foreign policy occurs when courses of action persist even in a scenario in which changes in fundamental explanatory factors are observed. Thus, changes in domestic factors, such as the political party in power, the permanence of a foreign minister, the predilection of the leader for international issues and the economic situation, and in international factors, such as the systemic arrangement and the perceptions of other actors concerning the country's behavior, may not be enough to change the direction of the country's foreign policy.

Hermann (2001) argues that foreign policy is developed by a myriad of actors with varying capacities for agency and that, because of this, the decision-making unit involved in the decision-making process can change the nature and direction of this foreign policy. Such actors include prime ministers, presidents, parties, committees, military boards, offices, bureaucracies, interagency groups, and domestic coalitions. Hermann identifies three types of decision-making units: predominant leader; single group, in which its members collectively select a course of action; and a coalition of multiple autonomous actors who by themselves cannot decide or force the agreement of others. Reality shows that these three decision units can coexist, especially in cases of fragmentation of the decision-making process, which can cause erratic decisions and a lack of coherence.

Besides the more general debate on change and continuity in foreign policy, some authors rely on analyses of specific explanatory factors. Kaarbo (2017), for instance, studies how there can be continuity in foreign policy even in countries with cabinets made up of different parties with veto power and multiple interests. The prime minister has a key role in overcoming possible disagreements. Gustavsson (1999) also highlights the figure of the leader, given that he or she can control the political agenda, form coalitions with groups or colleagues, and manipulate the decision-making process to maintain his or her preferences. More focused on the Brazilian and Latin American case, respectively, Cason and Power (2009) and Malamud (2015) point out the centrality of the figure of the president as a key variable for the formulation, implementation, and change in the course of foreign policy.

Individuals and their cognitive maps, especially in cases of predominant leaders, can accelerate or prevent changes in foreign policy (Axelrod, 1976). In

seminal work, Jervis (1976) argues that crucial political decisions cannot be understood without considering the beliefs of decision-makers and the images they have of their peers. Similarly, Gustavsson (1999) explains that foreign policy changes, especially in the case of more lasting ones, occur when the belief systems of leaders are also changed. Ideas matter for the formulation, implementation, and reflection of foreign policy. Along with interests, they clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships, which can be rooted in certain institutions responsible for the international insertion of a country (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).

Breuning (2013) explains that the adoption of international norms by relevant actors in the bureaucracy, who she calls gatekeepers, depends not only on their ability to adapt them to the domestic reality, but also to create coalitions with national political actors. Her view is similar to Allison's (1971) bureaucratic policy model because she identifies foreign policy as a result of political bargaining between actors strategically and hierarchically positioned within the government. The selection of actors considered relevant, and the structure of the bargains depend not only on explicit and implicit rules but also on the perceptions that one actor has of the other.

Works such as that of Rodrigues, Urdinez and Oliveira (2019) point out how the ruling political party can implement an ideological or pragmatic dimension that causes changes in the pattern of a country's international insertion. Other domestic actors such as epistemic communities, civil society organizations, and the Legislative can also influence foreign policy, promote changes, minimize, or prevent them, depending on their ability to bargain with the government and bureaucracies and/or mobilize public opinion against these same groups. The weight of these and other factors tends to be circumstantial, given that they may have a greater or lesser capacity for influence depending on the context, which moves away from deterministic interpretations.

In addition to domestic explanatory factors, authors such as Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014) and Volgy and Schwarz (1994) argue that the structure of the international system influences patterns of continuity and change in foreign policy. If multi-polar structures favor greater flexibility, scenarios marked by bipolarity would be more restrictive. At the same time, states dissatisfied with the status quo would be more susceptible to changes than those in line with prevailing normative and regulatory frameworks. In the Brazilian case, inertia in foreign policy supposedly occurred on certain agendas – notably at the multilateral level – even in the transition between the presidencies of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018). This occurred due to the permanence of certain bureaucratic staff, with a special emphasis on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) as the core of foreign policymaking, which maintained the memory of the country's positions and the respective ministerial agendas. The inertia was to end with the election of a president supported by ideological groups with no tradition of influencing foreign policy and critical of the Brazilian diplomatic canon, the subsequent dismantling of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, and the uncoordinated fragmentation of the decision-making process, as we discuss in the next section.

Ideas and Foreign Policy: the Bolsonaro-Araújo Moment

Since the 1990s, Brazilian diplomacy has revolved around axes of predominant ideas that alternate: institutionalists and autonomists within the framework of diplomacy;³ epistemic communities; and economic liberalization vs. developmentalism in relation to the economy. Concerning the guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy, there has been a common perception in the preference for multi-lateral solutions, proactive action in international political organizations, advocating for the peaceful settlement of disputes and valuing the efficiency of Brazilian diplomacy.

Institutionalists espoused a moderate liberalization of the economy and, in relation to political parties, were identified with the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party). The group defended Brazil's formal support for the international regimes of the current liberal order and identified the rules of international politics as a framework that could benefit Brazilian economic development. They suggested an international insertion for Brazil supported by new meanings of concepts such as autonomy and sovereignty, where the values of the liberal order should be defended by all Western countries. From the perspective of institutionalists, autonomy would be compatible with a country integrated into the international order that would behave within the parameters of existing international institutions.

The autonomists, in turn, defended the idea of Brazil siding with other countries of the South, emerging or with fewer resources, to counterbalance the power of the consolidated Western powers, and this would serve as a basis for Brazil's international performance on the global stage. If on the one hand coalitions with emerging partners would contribute to leverage the country's actions in international politics, on the other, it would be important to seek both a kind of international leadership with an individual character and the strengthening of global action, with a focus on the review of rules of current international institutions.

In a break with previous policies, Bolsonaro's foreign policy was ideologically based on other criteria such as anti-globalism and conservatism. Casarões and Saraiva (2021) point to anti-globalism, anti-communism, and religious nationalism as the ideological cement for Bolsonarist policies. "In the words of current ex-Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo, with Bolsonaro's victory in the 2018 elections, 'Brazil suddenly redefined itself as a conservative, anti-globalist, and nationalist country'".⁴

³ On institutionalist and autonomist currents of thought, see Saraiva (2010).

⁴ *Inaugural speech as Brazil's Minister of Foreign Relations*, January 2, 2019, <https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/index.php/ministros-de-estado-das-relacoes-exterieiros?id=317> Quoted by Casarões and Saraiva (2021).

Shortly after being elected, Bolsonaro chose a young diplomat with strong ties to Eduardo Bolsonaro called Ernesto Araújo to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁵ Both are strongly influenced by the self-styled philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, a writer with strong ties to the American alt-right.⁶ Ernesto Araújo, for his part, once chosen as the minister, stated that “there are countries that resist the demonization of national sentiment, the crushing of faith (mainly Christian), that reject the emptying of the human soul and its replacement by anemic dogmas that serve only the interests of world domination by certain elites”.⁷

Religious nationalism, according to Casarões (2020), is a trait that has been standing out among current conservative forces. It is characterized by making full belonging to society the option of a particular religion or belief. It influences foreign policy by imprisoning its agenda based on moral and religious precepts. Since the beginning of his term, Bolsonaro's government has linked Brazil's international projection and votes in multilateral organizations to Christian values. “Our votes at the United Nations will be following the Bible”, said the president to an audience of evangelical leaders (Casarões and Saraiva, 2021).⁸

Religious nationalism is directly linked to conservatism. By upholding conservative values such as the defense of the family and of life since gestation, Bolsonaro serves conservative and Christian leaders who supported his candidacy (Lopes, 2020). In the president's words, “Brazil is a Christian and conservative country and has its base in the family. God bless you all”.⁹ Bolsonaro sought to become close to other conservative leaders, such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, who came together in the International Alliance for Religious Freedom. Ernesto Araújo, co-working with Eduardo Bolsonaro, sought to form a Liberal-Conservative Alliance, in opposition to the São Paulo Forum and other left movements. Conservatism also echoes the Bolsonarist view of the West. In Araújo's words: “The West is not necessarily what certain Western countries defend in the United Nations or elsewhere. We consider ourselves part of the

⁵ “Eduardo is the great – and one of the only – supporter of Ernesto,” said an ambassador. “Da luta contra o Foro de SP ao voto com islâmicos sobre mulheres, o novo Brasil de Ernesto Araújo”, *BBC News*, July 17, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-48805562>. This proximity became clearer in March 2021, when the minister was openly questioned by deputies and senators and asked to step down.

⁶ About Olavo de Carvalho, Araújo (2019a, p. 5) says: “Since the mid-1990s, in parallel with an ascendance of an atheistic, corrupt regime (back then still in the making), strange new ideas started to circulate in the books and articles of Olavo de Carvalho, a Brazilian philosopher, perhaps the first person in the world to see globalism as the result of economic globalization, to understand its horrific purposes and to start thinking about how to topple it”.

⁷ “Futuro chanceler propôs a Bolsonaro pacto cristão com EUA e Rússia”, *Folha de São Paulo*, December 16, 2018, <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2018/12/futuro-chanceler-propos-a-bolsonaro-pacto-cristao-com-eua-e-russia.shtml>

⁸ “Bolsonaro diz que Brasil passou a votar na ONU seguindo a Bíblia”. *O Globo*, April 11, 2019, <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/bolsonaro-diz-que-brasil-passou-votar-na-onu-segundo-biblia-23591655>, quoted by Casarões and Saraiva (2021).

⁹ “Bolsonaro defende na ONU gestão da pandemia e diz ser vítima de 'campanha brutal de desinformação' sobre queimadas; veja os principais pontos”. *O Globo*, September 22, 2020. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/bolsonaro-defende-na-onu-gestao-da-pandemia-diz-ser-vitima-de-campanha-brutal-de-desinformacao-sobre-queimadas-veja-os-principais-pontos-24653146>

West and have a voice in saying what the West is, isn't it? And one of the things that we think is that the West is you, in this case, do not sexualize childhood. It is one of the things that are part of Western ethics".¹⁰

The opposition to the São Paulo Forum shows how anti-communism is also an important brand.¹¹ The crusade against global "cultural Marxism" and leftist governments seeks to connect voters –many of them dissatisfied with the former PT presidency– with conservative, religious and authoritarian ideology. The government's interpretation is that anti-communism would be a pillar in voters' minds. Bolsonaro and Araújo defend "the liquidation of Bolivarianism in the Americas".¹² For instance, in 2020, the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), which has always been an academic arm of the Itamaraty as a space for debates of ideas, organized an event with a suggestive title: "Castro-Chavism: organized crime in the Americas". FUNAG also published on its website an article by Araújo (2019b) where the minister states that the "communist project is current" and "wants to strangle us again" by returning to government in Latin America.

But the mainstay of the ideas that guide the foreign policy of the Bolsonaro government is globalism. Contrary to the tradition of Brazilian diplomacy, Araújo defended, in an article published in 2017, the role of Donald Trump as the defender of a West that, according to him, was under threat (Araújo, 2017). In this article, he describes Western civilization as a set of traditional ideas from the West that could disappear, surrounded by the bureaucracy of multilateral institutions that he calls "globalism". This bureaucracy allegedly constituted an international elite contrary to traditional values, which would control all international institutions and based on "cultural Marxism", would seek to crush concepts such as the nation and the Christian faith.¹³ According to him, in his speeches or on his weblog,¹⁴ there is a struggle between faith and its absence, and it is up to Brazil to adopt a foreign policy to recover its Western destiny. He defended the need for a "Brazilian (meta) foreign policy", through which Brazil would be part of this fight against "globalism" to defend traditional "Western values" (Araújo, 2019a).

¹⁰ "Da luta contra o Foro de SP ao voto com islâmicos sobre mulheres, o novo Brasil de Ernesto Araújo". *BBC News*, July 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/amp/brasil-48805562?_twitter_impression=true

¹¹ Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, Jair Bolsonaro stated that "The São Paulo Forum, a criminal organization created in 1990 by Fidel Castro, Lula, and Hugo Chávez to spread and implement socialism in Latin America, is still alive and has to be fought". "Leia a íntegra do discurso de Jair Bolsonaro na ONU". *Folha de São Paulo*, September 24 2019. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/09/acompanhe-ao-vivo-o-discurso-de-bolsonaro-na-onu.shtml>

¹² "Futuro chanceler propôs a Bolsonaro pacto cristão com EUA e Rússia". *Folha de São Paulo*, October 16, 2018. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2018/12/futuro-chanceler-propos-a-bolsonaro-pacto-cristao-com-eua-e-russia.shtml>

¹³ "Araújo prega fé cristão e família como bases da diplomacia". *O Globo*, March 13, 2019. It should be noted, however, that Araújo's conception of the West concerns a dimension of conservative Western thought that has been overcome in time.

¹⁴ The blog is called Metapolítica 17: against globalism. <https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com/>

Furthermore, “climatism”¹⁵ –identified as a belief that the planet is undergoing climate changes caused by the emission of polluting gases– is identified as an ideology that would defend the supposed need to act politically to reduce the impacts of climate change (De Orte, 2019). According to “climatism”, the climate would victimize Brazil for having most of the Amazon Forest in its territory. As said by Araújo “climate change should be studied in a serene, rational way, but it was also captured by an ideology” (quoted by Zanini and Mello, 2019).

Therefore, unlike pragmatic institutionalists and autonomists, the foreign policy of the Bolsonaro government espouses a conception of autonomy and freedom that is established despite the current international order. While institutionalists defend participation in the dominant normative frameworks and autonomists seek to change aspects of this framework without essentially questioning it, Bolsonaro’s cognitive map adopted a rhetorical confrontation strategy, a set of ideas directly connected with the “people’s” wishes –a reductionist concept common to authoritarian populist governments– that would be used to confront a “corrupt system”.¹⁶ In short, this is the cement of the ideological dimension of the foreign policy of Jair Bolsonaro and Ernesto Araújo.

The dismantling of the MRE and the fragmentation of the foreign policy decision-making process: the institutional change moment

The set of ideas guiding Bolsonarist thinking was combined with changes in the diplomatic corps, identified as having little affection for national interests and propagating “globalism” in the domestic political arena. The dismantling in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the breaking of a bureaucracy whose administrative standards historically served as resistance to innovations within the institutionalist and autonomist views, was a necessary condition for the government to move forward with changes both in foreign policy and in its decision-making process, contributing for its greater fragmentation. In the words of Minister Araújo in his inaugural speech: “Itamaraty exists for Brazil, it does not exist for the global order. Itamaraty exists for Brazil, it does not exist for itself. Are we the home of excellence?”.¹⁷

On his first trip as the minister, Araújo introduced to President Bolsonaro the mission of “reconfiguring” Brazilian society in favor of a “transcendence” that would value the nation and the spiritual dimension. In the various speeches that have followed since then, criticisms of “globalism”, “cultural Marxism” and “climatism” have always been present, permeated by a heavy

¹⁵ A word of Araújo's dictionary.

¹⁶ “O sentido da política externa de Ernesto Araújo, segundo ele mesmo”. *Nexo*, February 22, 2021. <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/entrevista/2021/02/12/O-sentido-da-pol%C3%ADtica-externa-de-Ernesto-Ara%C3%BAjo-segundo-ele-mesmo>

¹⁷ *Inaugural speech as Brazil's Minister of Foreign Relations*, January 2, 2019, <https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/index.php/ministros-de-estado-das-rela%C3%A7oes-exteriores?id=317>

load of ideology and defending conservative customs of the Christian faith.¹⁸ He is, therefore, completely different from all the ministers who preceded him.

In his first days in office, Jair Bolsonaro issued a provisional measure that changed some of the ministry's rules concerning the hierarchy, paving the way for a reform of the Itamaraty which, in turn, allowed the rise of younger diplomats to key positions to the detriment of more experienced ones. Besides, it extinguished secretariats and created new departments, privileging bilateral relations, as is the case with the United States department, and reduced the centrality of multilateral issues in the organogram, now submitted to the newly created Secretariat for National Sovereignty and Citizenship Affairs. Agribusiness, one of the government's support bases, was provided with its department, and the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-Brazil) was maintained in the ministry's structure, which reflected the interest in trade liberalization and promotion of Brazilian products abroad.¹⁹

Once the restructuring of the traditional diplomatic corps began, the minister gradually changed the ambassadors of the country's main embassies and left a generation of diplomats in limbo at the peak of their careers. The profile of the Rio Branco Institute has been modified, with an impact on the training of diplomats. Araújo, with few followers, sought to create a new generation of bureaucrats through appointments and changes in the public tender and curriculum of the Rio Branco Institute. The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) ceased to be a channel for reflection and debate and became a means for the minister to publicize Bolsonarist ideas. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs undergoing disintegration, the foreign policymaking and the implementation of foreign policy became even more subject to competition between bureaucracies, personalities and autonomous groups with influence over the government.

In recent times, as a result of re-democratization and the inclusion of new areas in the foreign policy agenda, the number of actors involved in foreign policymaking has grown, encompassing the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government agencies (many of which have an undersecretary for international relations), subnational governments and, to a lesser extent, political parties, interest groups, non-governmental actors and public opinion.

The initial coalition in support of Bolsonaro was formed by a variety of groups, new to the Executive and autonomous among themselves. In addition to coinciding with changes on the international stage, notably the presence of nationalist governments captained by the United States, the beginning of Bolsonaro's term reflected a change in domestic political forces. The government brought together very different sectors and with different views, which seek to influence segments of foreign policy (those of the alt-right, such as Ernesto

¹⁸ Amizade proveitosa. Aproximação entre Trump e Bolsonaro gera expectativa de avanços em agenda bilateral. *O Globo*, January 21, 2019. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/aproximacao-entre-trump-bolsonaro-gera-expectativa-de-avanços-em-agenda-bilateral-23387899>

¹⁹ Decreto que reformula Itamaraty cria secretaria de Soberania e Cidadania. *Folha de S. Paulo*, January 10, 2019. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/01/decreto-que-reformula-itamaraty-cria-secretaria-de-soberania-e-cidadania.shtml>

Araújo, conservative evangelicals, liberals in the economy, military, and rural commodity exporters). However, coordination between them is unstable and occurs only around the president and their expectations *vis-à-vis* the administration.

Thus, a government was formed that: would defend economic liberalization (albeit with many snags); has an anti-democratic profile in constant conflict with existing institutions; uses strong oratory violence, especially on social media; and has a conservative mindset. This division of groups is reflected in foreign policy and the making of foreign policy. According to Hagan (1994), this scenario would correspond to a fragmented state, which would, in turn, be fertile ground for radical changes in foreign policy.

In Gardini's (2011) model, an ideological foreign policy starts from a cognitive map and is associated with specific personalism, and administrations focused on doctrines and principles, prioritizing the compatibility of alternatives to such doctrines and principles, to the detriment of their practical consequences. This does not mean, however, that the conduct of foreign policy occurs unequivocally and without reactions at the domestic level, given the plurality of actors with bargaining power and their ability to exert influence. Gardini and Lambert (2011) recognize that the tension between the search for ideas and their practical consequences is a frequent phenomenon in Latin America. In the Brazilian case, there is a mixture of tension and conciliation between the ideas of the alt-right and the populist rhetoric of Jair Bolsonaro, with pragmatism with a view to short-term gains among different sectors involved with foreign policy.²⁰ This is the case, for instance, of denialists and evangelicals, who are often counterbalanced, in specific segments of foreign policy, by pragmatic groups, such as the active military and agribusiness.²¹ In areas where the president can obtain electoral benefits, the ideological dimension of foreign policy tends to prevail.

With an initial glance at the correlation between electoral supporters and areas of interest, it is possible to attribute: the relevance of the partnership with Israel and conservative votes at the United Nations Human Rights Council to evangelical groups; the denial of environmental defense to land grabbers, gold prospectors and loggers in the Amazon region; the identity with the Trump administration and the fight against multilateral organizations to anti-globalists; maintaining good relations with China and the Arab countries to commodity exporters represented in the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply; the rhetoric of fighting corruption and renewing the country's image to the supporters of Operation Carwash; and the negotiation of free trade agreements through MERCOSUR and joining the OECD to liberals, represented in the Ministry of the

²⁰ The two phenomena would be complementary – a policy guided only by ideology would tend to utopia, whereas one guided only by pragmatism would tend to be immediate and opportunistic (Gardini, 2011, p. 13-14).

²¹ For Gardini (2011), a pragmatic foreign policy would be based on the usefulness and practicality of its ideas, where the weight of the consequences of each action exceeds the appreciation for one or the other principle.

Economy. According to Lopes (2020), the “international insertion of Brazil is today a by-product of the electoral convenience of Jair Bolsonaro”.

The family nucleus, especially the role played by Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, should also be highlighted in relation to foreign policy. In addition to comments on social networks and to having chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo was listed as an ambassador to Washington and went on trips as a government representative, despite not formally joining it (Casarões, 2021). Seen as a “parallel foreign minister” by some, he favored partnerships of an ideological nature. When he left the committee chairmanship, for example, he thanked Orbán and Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman.²²

For its part, Congress sought to play a balancing role through, above all, the Speaker of Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo Maia. Though he did not proceed with an impeachment process, he did contradict Bolsonaro’s bellicose rhetoric in dealing with external partners. Even though he was more aligned with the government, his successor, Arthur Lira, tried to articulate channels of dialogue with China and asked for inputs and vaccines amid the escalation of cases and deaths from COVID-19 in Brazil.²³

The pandemic opened up channels for the participation of new actors. In addition to parliament, it has exacerbated the external role of subnational governments and civil society organizations. Contrary to Bolsonaro’s actions in responding to the pandemic and criticized by him for measures of social isolation, governors and mayors organized themselves in consortia to purchase vaccines and increase the pressure on the presidency and the Ministry of Health.²⁴ Within a logic of confrontation federalism and amidst the crowding of intensive care units and an increase in the number of cases and deaths, local governments also turned to the Judiciary for support.

In short, with a foreign minister from an ideological group with little space in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the dismantling of its rules and traditions, Itamaraty ceased to occupy a central role in the formulation of foreign policy and to place itself as an undisputed actor in Brazil’s dialogue with the outside world. The process of involving different actors in foreign policy was segmented and, in many circumstances, brought about situations of internal differences or even paralysis and lack of management in the country’s international behavior. As

²² The presidency's special advisor for international affairs, Filipe Martins, also echoed the Bolsonarist thought on foreign policy. “Em troca em comissão da Câmara, Aécio assume com contraponto à política externa, e Eduardo Bolsonaro agradece a Orbán e Bin Salman”. *O Globo*, March 12, 2021. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/em-troca-em-comissao-da-camara-aecio-assume-com-contraponto-politica-externa-eduardo-bolsonaro-agradece-orban-bin-salman-1-24922127>

²³ Em carta a embaixador da China, Lira pede ‘olhar solidário’ para ajudar Brasil a superar pandemia”. *GI*, March 9, 2021. <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2021/03/09/em-carta-a-embaixador-da-china-lira-pede-olhar-solidario-para-ajudar-brasil-a-superar-pandemia.ghtml>

²⁴ This is the case of the National Front of Mayors (FNP), the National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM), and the Northeast Consortium. “Bolsonaro abre novo confronto com governadores”. *DW*, March 7, 2021. <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/bolsonaro-abre-novo-confronto-com-governadores/a-56798748>

will be seen, reactions were common and had different intensities. These reflected the various domestic interest groups, which contributed to the politicization of foreign policy.

The Practice of Foreign Policy: the Moment of the Break with Tradition

In addition to the rhetoric, the foreign policy of the Bolsonaro government has caused changes in Brazil's international insertion at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. In just over two years, his government changed priorities and strategies, breaking with the diplomatic standard of maintaining dialogue with traditional partners, managing MERCOSUR-based regional integration, and seeking engagement with multilateral institutions. Although autonomy in foreign policy –an objective common to governments during the democratic period and the military dictatorship– is defended in speeches and official statements, what has been seen so far, in practice, is an automatic and unrewarded alignment with the United States. Furthermore, this objective was confused with others, such as the fight against "cultural Marxism" and the defense of a model of nation and society.

Bilaterally, except for the United States and Japan, there was distancing from traditional partners and an effort to strengthen relations with countries with similar worldviews. It can be said that in the Bolsonarist reading, ideological proximity and support for Washington's initiatives, then under the Trump administration, would bring about gains for Brazil. In the context of visible challenges to the multilateral system, questioned by nationalist-oriented regimes, alignment with the US government would not only promote Brazil as an essential partner but also meet the wishes of part of the government's electoral base. As Araújo explained, "Trump managed to see us as we want to be, a great nation built on the principle of freedom, and on that basis, we created a historic partnership between the two countries".²⁵

However, the Brazilian expectation was not only not met, but also accompanied by the removal of Brazil from the list of developing countries by the Department of Commerce, following Brasilia's abdication of special and differential treatment at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, there was the elimination of visas for US citizens visiting Brazil (without reciprocity), Washington's ambiguous behavior regarding Brazil's bid to join the OECD, the increase in the quota for US ethanol entering Brazil tariff-free and the Technology Safeguards Agreement, allowing the use of Alcântara air base.

Proximity with Israel, which involved the promise to move the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, repeated Washington's gestures and occurred to the detriment of the relationship with partners in the Arab world and of

²⁵ O sentido da política externa de Ernesto Araújo, segundo ele mesmo. *Nexo*, February 22, 2021. <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/intervista/2021/02/12/O-sentido-da-pol%C3%ADtica-externa-de-Ernesto-Ara%C3%BAjo-segundo-ele-mesmo>

the interests of agribusiness and the military. Of symbolic importance to Bolsonaro's foreign policy, Israel is seen as an ally in the contestation of "globalism", which represents a nod to the Olavist base,²⁶ and in defense of religious dogmas, which dialogues with the wishes of the evangelical electorate, especially of Pentecostal and Neopentecostal churches.

In the European bloc, relations with Germany and France were strained mainly due to criticism of wildfires in the Pantanal (wetlands of western Brazil) and deforestation in the Amazon, which between August 2019 and July 2020 reached the highest rate since 2008.²⁷ Bolsonaro challenged the comments, interpreted as attacks on national sovereignty, while favoring aid from countries such as Colombia, the United States, and Israel. In the same context, Germany and Norway's contributions to the Amazon Fund were interrupted after changes in the mechanism's management. Another turning point was the closeness with countries that are not very representative of Brazil's foreign policy and trade agenda, but with a communion of ideological positions, such as Hungary and Poland. With the post-Brexit UK, under the leadership of the Conservative Party, the government sought to maintain a "historic partnership".²⁸

With China, Brazil's top trading partner, bellicose rhetoric was supported by the Olavist groups in government, undoing the gradual enhancement of relations between the two countries since the 1990s. Bolsonarists took the view that the Chinese Communist Party represented a threat to the idea of "freedom" defended by the government and embodied the greatest threat to Western thought led by Washington. Targeting the domestic audience, Eduardo Bolsonaro and Education Minister Abraham Weintraub accused Beijing of benefiting from the pandemic to expand its international presence and of using 5G technology as an instrument of espionage. Still, during the campaign, then-presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro visited Taiwan, a disruptive noise that was overcome with support for the "one China" principle during the 2019 protests in Hong Kong.²⁹

As for Argentina, Bolsonaro interfered in the country's domestic affairs and expressed support for the re-election of Mauricio Macri, defeated by Alberto Fernández. With this, plus Fernández's ideological closeness to Cristina Kirchner and expression of support for Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the distance between Bolsonaro and Fernandez led to an absence of high-level dialogue and weakened bilateral relations between the two countries. In part of 2020, Brazil ceased to be Argentina's main trading partner. Besides the conflictive rhetoric, the dissonant action of the two governments regarding the coronavirus pandemic and the diffe-

²⁶ Olavo de Carvalho's followers.

²⁷ Desmatamento anual da Amazônia cresce 9,5% e bate novo recorde. *DW*, November 11, 2020. <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/desmatamento-anual-na-amaz%C3%A3nia-cresce-95-e-bate-novo-recorde/a-55779949>

²⁸ "Bolsonaro parabeniza Boris Johnson e fala em manter histórica parceria". *Folha de S. Paulo*, January 15, 2020. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2020/01/bolsonaro-parabeniza-boris-johnson-e-fala-em-manter-historica-parceria.shtml>

²⁹ "Depois de visitar Taiwan na campanha, Bolsonaro defende integridade territorial da China". *Folha de S. Paulo*, November, 25, 2019. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/10/depois-de-visitar-taiwan-na-campanha-bolsonaro-defende-integridade-territorial-da-china.shtml>

ring views on regional integration initiatives have also contributed to changing the partnership's history.

Bilateral relations with Venezuela also reflected more general changes in Brazilian foreign policy. Under Bolsonaro's leadership, Venezuela was identified as a corrupt, illegitimate regime based on degenerate practices such as drug trafficking and terrorism.³⁰ The diplomatic discourse gained hostile contours and identified in Maduro a counterpoint to the Brazilian model of the nation espoused by Bolsonaro. As with Argentina, the Brazilian president interfered in the internal affairs of the neighboring country, received opponents of Maduro, and recognized Juan Guaidó as president of Venezuela. The change in emphasis in the bilateral relationship also followed more general guidelines of Washington's foreign policy, as observed in contacts with China and Israel, and endorsed positions of the Organization of American States and the Lima Group.

At the regional level, Bolsonaro's administration favored the Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (PROSUR), created in 2019 and made up of governments with right and Centre-right orientation in countries such as Macri's Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. Seen as an alternative to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), established in a context of the predominance of Centre-left and left-wing governments in the region, PROSUR sought to isolate Venezuela, complementing this aspect of Brazilian foreign policy. Unlike UNASUR, where it exercised leadership, Brazil lost relative space on the South American stage with PROSUR, captained by Chile.

In this sense, Brazil did not seek to assume the position of a regional leader, nor did it encourage the institutional and normative consolidation of integration experiences. This position, not exclusive to the Bolsonaro government and identifiable even under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, was visible in the search for a loosening of MERCOSUR rules, towards extra-regional trade agreements and revision of the common external tariff, by the suspension of participation in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and for its unwillingness to develop technical cooperation initiatives with neighboring countries. Like PROSUR, MERCOSUR was also used as an instrument of antagonism with neighbors, in this case with Argentina, and as a way of serving the interests of groups that defended the liberalization of the Brazilian economy.

Behavior in the multilateral dimension echoed the set of world views held by Bolsonaro and Araújo and the groups they represent, marking a clear difference with the conduct of foreign policy until then.³¹ There was the perception

³⁰ "Itamaraty diz que regime de Maduro é baseado no tráfico de drogas e de pessoas e no terrorismo". *G1*, January 17, 2019. <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/01/17/itamaraty-diz-que-regime-de-maduro-e-baseado-no-trafico-de-drogas-de-pessoas-e-em-terrorismo.ghtml>

³¹ To a lesser extent, the presidency also used the BRICS and G20 summits, both in 2020, to respectively attack European countries, critical of Brazilian environmental policy, and to aggrandize components of the cultural war got into by the government, saying that "tensions between races are imported and foreign to our culture". "Em discurso no G20, Bolsonaro diz que tensões entre raças no Brasil são importadas e 'alheias à nossa história'". *G1*, November 21, 2020. <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/11/21/em-discurso-no-g20-bolsonaro-diz-que-tensoes-entre-racas-no-brasil-sao-importadas-e-alheias-a-nossa-historia.ghtml>

that multilateralism had not been bringing advantages to the country and that the world was moving towards a reinforcement of unilateral solutions. In the words of the minister, Brazil's multilateral action is organized "around the defense of freedom, fundamental human rights such as the right to life and freedom of expression, and the primacy of national sovereignty".³²

In practice, there was no lack of criticism of the multilateral system and the United Nations, such as that of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its transparency in the treatment of the pandemic (Araújo, 2020). According to Araújo, "many people say that, in our government, we have reduced our multilateral presence. That's not it. (...) We don't see that, necessarily, the best solution is always the one that goes through the UN" (*idem*, 210).

Despite criticism, the Bolsonaro government maintained Brazil in multilateral institutions, albeit with a more aggressive and reactive political profile. Unlike the Trump administration, which abandoned the United Nations Human Rights Council and UNESCO and blocked the appointment of judges for the WTO dispute settlement system, the Bolsonaro government expressed its dissatisfaction mainly at the rhetorical level. For instance, the government threatened to abandon the Paris Agreement, which it never did, despite domestic setbacks on environmental issues,³³ and used the General Assembly to advocate that the UN could not become the "Organization of the Global Interest" (Bolsonaro, 2019).

Like the US president, however, Bolsonaro made use of multilateral institutions, trying to shake the sense of multilateralism from the inside. At the same time, he considered them instruments for the manifestation of a defensive foreign policy, like Brazil's behavior towards the human rights regime during the end of the military dictatorship. The target of criticism from civil society, UN rapporteurs, and other countries for his actions and inaction on topics such as climate change, human rights, fighting hunger, and action in the face of the pandemic, the government used institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council to counter "politically motivated narratives".³⁴

Reactions

Mainly marked by virulent speeches, the foreign policy of the Bolsonaro government had practical consequences, which in turn generated reactions from domestic interest groups. While some of these formed the government's base and actively contributed to its continuity, others were opposed not only domesti-

³² "O sentido da política externa de Ernesto Araújo, segundo ele mesmo". *Nexo*, February 22, 2021. <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/entrevista/2021/02/12/O-sentido-da-pol%C3%ADtica-externa-de-Ernesto-Ara%C3%BAjo-segundo-ele-mesmo>

³³ "Bolsonaro diz em Davos que o Brasil, 'por ora', permanece no Acordo de Paris". *Estadão*, January 22, 2019. <https://sustentabilidade.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,bolsonaro-diz-em-davos-que-o-brasil-por-ora-permanece-no-acordo-de-paris,70002690135>

³⁴ "50 anos depois, Brasil volta a ser alvo sistemático de denúncias internacionais por violações de direitos humanos". *El País Brasil*, March 10, 2020. <https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-03-10/50-anos-depois-brasil-volta-a-ser-alvo-sistematico-de-denuncias-internacionais-por-violacoes-de-direitos-humanos.html>

cally, but also on the international arena. Especially at the beginning of the term, these reactions were uncoordinated and promoted in an ad hoc manner, in response to initiatives and inactions. With the advance of the pandemic and already at the end of the first quarter of 2021, they gained some coordination, though still incipient. Just as much as not all Bolsonarist foreign policy was ideological, we do not assume that every response to it was pragmatic. But it is noteworthy that, in most cases, besides the defense of its agendas, the maintenance of traditional courses of action by Brazilian diplomacy, predictability in dealing with partners and the defense of normative and regulatory frameworks of the current order, were also requested.

In the bilateral dimension, actors such as the agribusiness sector, Congress, and the vice-presidency acted so as to “encapsulate crises” and mitigate the damage caused mainly by the president and his son, the foreign minister, and other Olavist ministers. In the case of China, for instance, Vice President Hamilton Mourão served as a counterpoint to Bolsonaro and Araújo, being recognized as such by President Xi Jinping. Mourão adopted a conciliatory tone, having worked for the re-creation of the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Commission, paralyzed since 2015. Besides commercial dependence and technical cooperation, the need to develop good relations with China, amplified by the lack of inputs and vaccines against COVID-19, brought about the Legislative's active involvement in the bilateral relationship.

Similar behavior of domestic interest groups was also observed in the relationship with Europeans, seeking to act as a “rational” counterpoint to Bolsonaro, to resume the financing of the Amazon Fund, and to continue negotiating the MERCOSUR-European Union agreement. Regarding Venezuela, they acted to minimize possible voices that called for military intervention, in a context of crisis in the country. Regarding Argentina, they spoke up when Fernández took office to ensure an agenda of cooperation, even if minimal. As for Middle Eastern partners, there was the resistance of commodity exporters and military personnel to the transfer of the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem.

Governors and mayors have gained greater prominence due to the deepening of the health crisis and the absence of participatory federalism, what Abrucio *et. al* (2020) called “Bolsonarist federalism”. The role of the military, more specifically the Army, is ambiguous: while on the one hand they gave institutional support to the government and were complicit in its response to the pandemic, on the other, they sought to dissociate themselves from Bolsonarism and avoid further damage to the forces' image. This is the case with Mourão's vice-presidential diplomacy and Operation Welcome, which received the flow of Venezuelans on the northern border.

The performance of civil society entities in opposition to the government was vocal and more visible in the multilateral sphere, especially in the United Nations Human Rights Council. These actors sought to sensitize other organizations, parliamentarians, personalities, foreign governments, media outlets, employees of multilateral organizations, and academics about topics such as

inequality, regulation of arms and ammunition, the rights of indigenous peoples and environmental policy, freedom of expression, policies for the LGBTI+ people, sexual and reproductive rights, gender violence, and prevention of torture, besides the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country.

Final remarks

We have examined Brazilian foreign policymaking and implementation during slightly over half of Bolsonaro's term. We have pointed out how consolidated patterns of Brazil's international insertion were questioned and modified, mainly through inflammatory rhetoric, but also by initiatives that went against the diplomatic canon. More than in the past, foreign policy reflected domestic disputes and helped to exacerbate them, fragmenting the decision-making process, and diminishing the relative importance of Itamaraty.

Aided by a foreign minister without the support of the main groups of thought within his ministry and by his son, Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, the president was able to politicize foreign policy and use it as an instrument of a cultural war and to reproduce Olavist ideas. Even though it was not entirely "ideological", foreign policy was conceived of in the short term, and as just another ingredient in a broader logic of promoting permanent conflict. The change in direction and strategies, and the lack of clear objectives in foreign policy have confused interlocutors and, replicating the Bolsonarist behavior in domestic policy, produced uncoordinated international initiatives. These initiatives served the interests of various domestic actors, notably those who formed the government's support base: evangelicals, Olavists, economic liberals, the military, and agribusiness.

The intended lack of coordination, however, has rendered it impossible to formulate a coherent conception of Brazil's place in the world. In situations of conflict between interest groups, the government tended to favor the most faithful and ideological support base, alienating pragmatic options and affecting bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations. The cases of China, MERCOSUR, and the UN are illustrative, affecting the image of Brazil's professional diplomacy and of the country as a cooperative actor.

The decision-making process resembled a configuration made up of a predominant leader (Bolsonaro) without control of decision-making and with no interest in establishing minimal articulation between multiple autonomous actors. This was followed by reactions, also uncoordinated and with varying degrees of intensity, from groups represented by the vice-president, commodity exporters and, to a lesser extent, the economic elites. The "rebellion" of these autonomous groups is not only a consequence of the impact of Bolsonaro's foreign policy, but also reflects the power play on the domestic political arena. Also, they are joined by the National Congress, the Judiciary, subnational governments, and civil society organizations.

The erosion of this way of governing became clearer in the first months of 2021 when the “rebellion” of the autonomous groups was accentuated by the turbulent national political context. At that moment, the pandemic spread, vaccination was delayed, and the 300,000 deaths milestone from COVID-19 was reached, which was questioned by a denialist government. Economic stagnation with rising inflation and the election of new speakers of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate –who, despite having been supported by Bolsonaro, started to demand more space in the cabinet, appointments and budget earmarks- further strained the president’s position. It is also worth mentioning the proximity of the 2022 electoral process, which was revitalized with the possibility of Lula da Silva’s candidacy. Externally, the election of Democrat Joe Biden as US president caused Bolsonaro and Araújo’s Brazilian foreign policy to lose the main guarantor of its “anti-globalist” profile. This loss of support bases, with more dissatisfaction with the government being gradually voiced, was to lead to the replacement of the foreign minister. After a clash with the Senate, he was replaced by Ambassador Carlos Alberto França, then head of the presidency’s ceremonial office.

References

Abrucio, F.L., Grin, J.E., Franzese, C., Segatto,C.I. & Couto, C.G. (2020). Combate à COVID-19 sob federalismo bolsonarista: um caso de descoordenação intergovernamental, *Revista de Administração Pública*, vol.54, n.4, p.663-677.

Albuquerque, Felipe Leal (2020). Neither revisionism nor status quo: a comparative analysis of Brazil's foreign policy in multilateral regimes. Ph.D. thesis. Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, 274p.

Allison, Graham T. (1971). Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little Brown & Co.

Araújo, Ernesto (2017). “Trump e o Ocidente”, *Cadernos de Política Exterior*, v.3, n.6 p.23-357.

Araújo, Ernesto (2019a). “Now we do. On politics and religion in Brazil after the recent presidential election”, *The New Criterion* vol 37 n.7.

Araújo, Ernesto (2019b). Para além do horizonte comunista. *Revista Terça Livre*, December 18, 2019. http://funag.gov.br/images/Nova_politica_externa/ME_TercaLivre_NPE.pdf.

Araújo, Ernesto (2020). *Política externa, soberania, democracia e liberdade: coletânea de discursos, artigos e entrevistas do ministro das relações exteriores*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Axelrod, Robert. (1976). Structure of decision: the cognitive maps of political elites. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Bolsonaro, Jair Messias (2019). Discurso de abertura da 74ª Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/09/24/politica/1569340250_255091.html.

Blavoukos, Spyros & Bourantonis Dimitris (2014). “Identifying parameters of foreign policy change: An eclectic approach”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 49, n. 4, p.483-500.

Breuning, Marijke (2013). "Roles and realities: when and why gatekeepers fail to change foreign policy", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 9, n. 3, p. 307-325.

Casarões, Guilherme (2020). "O Brasil a caminho das Índias e o triunfo do nacionalismo religioso". *O Estado de São Paulo*, January, 26. <https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,analise-o-brasil-a-caminho-das-indias-e-o-triunfo-do-nacionalismo-religioso,70003172473>.

Casarões, Guilherme (2021). "Párias em Jerusalém". *O Globo*, March, 11 <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/artigo-parias-em-jerusalem-24919645>

Casarões, Guilherme & Saraiva, Miriam G. (2021) "El populismo y la política exterior de Jair Bolsonaro". In A.Betti, S.Gratius & A.Rivero (eds.), *La política exterior del populismo* Madrid: Tecnos (forthcoming)

Cason, Jeffrew W. & Power, Timothy J. (2009). "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era", *International Political Science Review*, vol. 30, n. 2, p. 117-140.

De Orte, Paula (2019). "Araújo critica Foucault, Lacan e Rosa Luxemburgo e ataca 'climatismo' em palestra nos EUA". *O Globo*, September, 11. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/araujo-critica-foucault-lacan-rosa-luxemburgo-ataca-climatismo-em-palestra-nos-eua-23942149>.

Fonseca Jr., Gelson (2011). "Política externa brasileira padrões e descontinuidades no período republicano", *Relações Internacionais*, vol. 29, p. 15-32.

Gardini, Gian Luca (2011). "Latin American foreign policies between Ideology and Pragmatism: A framework for analysis". In G.L.Gardini & P.Lambert (eds.). *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan p.13-34.

Gardini, Gian Luca & Lambert, Peter (2011), "Ideology and pragmatism in Latin American foreign policy". In G.L.Gardini & P.Lambert (eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan (p. 1-11.).

Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O. (1993). Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions and political change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gustavsson, Jakob (1999). "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 34, n. 1, p. 73-95

Haesebrouck, Tim & Joly, Jeroen (2020). "Foreign policy change: from policy adjustments to fundamental reorientations", *Political Studies Review*. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1478929920918783>

Hagan, Joe D. (1994). "Domestic political regime change and foreign policy restructuring: framework for comparative analysis". In J.A. Rosati, J.D. Hagan & M.W. Sampson (eds.), *Foreign Policy Restructuring. How governments respond to global change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, p. 138-163.

Hagan, Joe D. & Rosati, Jerel A. (1994) "Emerging issues in research on foreign policy restructuring". In J. A. Rosati, J.D. Hagan & M.W. Sampson (eds.), *Foreign Policy restructuring: how governments respond to global change*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, p. 265-279.

Hermann, Charles F. (1990). "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, n. 1, p. 3-21.

Hermann, Margareth G. (2001). "How decision units shape foreign policy: a theoretical framework", *International Studies Review*, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 47-82.

Holsti, Kalevi (2016). "Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory". In *Kalevi Holsti: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, History of International Order, and Security Studies*. Cham: Springer, p.103-119.

Hudson, Valerie (2005). "Foreign policy analysis: actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol.1, n. 1, p. 1-30.

Jervis, Robert (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Karboo, Juliet (2017). "Coalition politics, international norms, and foreign policy: multiparty decision-making dynamics in comparative perspective", *International Politics*, n. 54, p. 669-682.

Lopes, D. Belém (2020). "Política externa ou campanha eleitoral por outros meios?" *O Globo*, June, 26. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/artigo-politica-externa-ou-campanha-eleitoral-por-outros-meios-24500664>

Malamud, Andrés (2015). "Presidentialist decision making in Latin American foreign policy: examples from regional integration processes". In: J.I. Domínguez & A. Covarrubias (eds.), *Routledge handbook of Latin America in the world*. New York: Routledge, p. 112-123.

Milner, Helen (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: domestic politics and international relations. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rodrigues, Pietro; Urdinez, Francisco & Oliveira, Amâncio de (2019). "Measuring international engagement: systemic and domestic factors in Brazilian foreign policy from 1998 to 2014", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 15, n. 3, p. 370-391.

Saraiva, Miriam G. (2010). "A diplomacia brasileira e a visão sobre a inserção externa do Brasil: institucionalistas pragmáticos x autonomistas", *Mural Internacional*, vol.1 n.1, p.45-52.

Volgy, Thomas J. & Schwarz, John E. (1994). "Foreign policy restructuring and the myriad webs of restraint: some conceptual and theoretical issues". In: J.A. Rosati; J.D. Hagan; M.W. Sampson (eds.). *Foreign policy restructuring: how governments respond to global change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, p. 23 - 24.

Welch, David A. (2005). *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wight, Colin (2006). Agents, structures, and international relations: politics as ontology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zanini, Fábio & Mello, Patrícia Campos (2019). "Em congresso conservador, Araújo afirma que Brasil é vítima do climatismo". *Folha de São Paulo*, October, 12. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/10/em-congresso-conservador-araujo-afirma-que-brasil-e-vitima-do-climatismo.shtml>

CHAPTER 3

Chilean Foreign Policy in Times of Change

Alberto Van Klaveren

Introduction

Latin American foreign policies have traditionally combined pragmatism and ideology, with variable degrees of intensity (Gardini, 2011, 13). In the case of Chile, it can be argued that pragmatism has been the dominant element. Even during the ideologized period of the Unidad Popular Government (1970-1973), one of the analyses of the time coined the concept of “principled pragmatism” to describe President Allende’s foreign policy (Fortin, 1975). After the restoration of democracy in 1990, Chile’s foreign policy can be characterized as profoundly pragmatic, combining a commitment to regional cooperation in Latin America with the strengthening of links with the United States, the European Union, and the Asia-Pacific region. During the 1990s Chile also incorporated a particularly active trade policy into its traditional foreign policy interests, which had been concentrated on its sensitive relations with its neighbors, links with the United States, adherence to International Law and its participation in the multilateral system. During the last years some ideological elements have made their inroad into Chile’s foreign policy, whereas human rights violations and revelations involving the Presidential office are affecting Chile’s international reputation. At present, in a climate of increasing polarization questions arise concerning the balance between continuity and change in Chilean foreign policy and the main challenges that it is facing in the new political context which is emerging in Chile.

Explaining Chilean foreign policy

The well-known “two-level game that characterizes foreign policy, that is, the simultaneous play of the game of domestic politics and the game of international politics (Putman, 1988) is essential to understand the evolution of Chilean foreign policy. Against a historical background dominated by relations with its neighbors, the presence of major global powers of the time and participation in

nascent international organizations, Chile's foreign policy has been shaped by external and domestic factors. The structure of the international system, especially the global distribution of power, has influenced Chile's insertion in the world. During the Cold War, Chile not only sided with the United States, sometimes rather reluctantly, but also became a scenario of a Cold War political confrontation in Latin America, which ended tragically with the breakdown of its democracy (Harmer, 2011). During the unipolar moment, which coincided with the restoration of democracy in the country, Chile joined enthusiastically the crusade for the expansion of democracy and human rights in the world (Fuentes-Julio, 2020; Vargas, 2012; van Klaveren, 2015), and deepened its commitment to an open economy, following the main tenets of the Washington consensus and promoting the insertion of the country into the globalized world. Chile's foreign policy has also been shaped by regional trends in Latin America, and agreements and relations with major regional powers. Last but not least, relations with neighboring countries have inevitably caught the attention of Chilean foreign policy makers, considering the sequels of a major war with Perú and Bolivia during the nineteenth century and complex border differences and territorial aspirations of some of its neighbors. Although several of these issues could seem rather anachronistic, they have required considerable attention and tend to attract the attention of domestic politics and public opinion.

Domestic factors have also been relevant in the shaping of Chile's foreign policy. The nature of the regime itself has been a central part in any analysis of its foreign behavior. The Pinochet dictatorship, which lasted between 1973 and 1990, put an end to a long tradition of moderation and balance which characterized the country's foreign policy. The authoritarian regime pursued a policy of vitriolic anti-communism and became a virtual pariah in the international community (Muñoz, 1986). Chile's isolation contributed to the aggravation of historical rivalries and border disputes with its neighbors. The restoration of democracy in 1990 marked a profound change in Chile's foreign policy and led to a new consensus around the international insertion of the country. However, the Chilean case points to still another dimension of the relationship between political regime and foreign policy. During a long period before the 1973 coup, Chile's democratic tradition not only influenced its foreign-policy processes and outcomes but also became in itself a national capability and a projection of soft power. The brutality of the Pinochet dictatorship made of Chile a symbol of the international struggle in favor of human rights and redemocratization. Accordingly, the recovery of democracy was followed by the international community with special sympathy and support, favoring several foreign policy objectives and contributing to an international presence based more on prestige than on objective power assets.

Chile's development strategy or economic model represents another domestic variable which is fundamental to explain its foreign behavior, especially in the area of trade and investment policies. Since the late 1970s foreign policy has performed the role of an engine for growth through export promotion and

the attraction of foreign investment. In contrast, in the previous period, foreign policy was supposed to advance economic autonomy, projecting import substitution, controlling foreign investment, advocating for a new international economic order, and facilitating participation in economic integration schemes which embodied these orientations.

A third domestic variable focuses on a distinct foreign policy culture, which stems from a historical tradition that has permeated the state's external behavior and which has shaped perceptions and misperceptions of the foreign policy establishment and public opinion (van Klaveren, 1996, 47). Images and visions of Chile's direct neighbors and of great powers tend to be prominent in these perceptions.

Internal sources of foreign policy also include actors, decision-making processes, and domestic influences that intervene in the foreign-policy arena. Considering the power wielded by the presidency in Latin American foreign policies (Amorin Neto and Malamud, 2015; Amorin Neto and Malamud, 2019), it will not come as a surprise that presidents have traditionally played a prominent role in Chilean foreign policy. However, Chilean presidents can be distinguished by their more or less active inclinations in the field of foreign policy (Wilhelmy, 1986), ranging from activists which assume leadership functions to institutionalists or arbiters who tend to rely on the foreign ministry and additional bureaucracies involved in foreign policy decisions. Economic negotiations, which have been especially relevant during the last decades, involved the interplay of different ministries: foreign, economic, and sectoral. Parliament has also been active, either in its function of approving international agreements or overseeing the Executive in the conduction of its competences in the field of foreign relations. Political parties also participate in the decision-making process and have developed links with ideologically similar parties of other countries in Europe and the Americas. Non-governmental organizations have had an active role in the areas of human rights, environmental protection, gender, and indigenous rights, whereas the business sector has been actively involved in trade negotiations.

Consensual foreign policy

The restoration of democracy in 1990 inaugurated a period of virtually three decades of broadly consensual foreign policy in Chile. Between 1990 and 2010, the center-left coalition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* or simply *Concertación*, governed for four consecutive presidential terms. During this period, the *Concertación* developed a strategy for reinsertion in a post-Cold War world, reestablishing damaged or weakened bilateral, regional, and global relations, and highlighting commitment to human rights and democracy and multilateralism. After the end of the military regime in 1990, Chile's first democratic government quickly ratified all major international and regional human rights

treaties and reactivated its participation in international human rights institutions. For more than twenty years since, Chile engaged in strengthening international institutions protecting human rights; for instance, it has been active in negotiations for the newly created United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, as well as sponsoring or cosponsoring important UN resolutions on issues, such as the right to truth, the protection for all persons against enforced disappearance, and the optional protocol to the convention against torture, among many other initiatives (Fuentes-Julio, 2020). Chile presented a generally consistent voting behavior when it came to resolutions on massive human rights abuses within the UNHRC, although in specific country cases it has been more cautious, opting to balance its human rights commitment with other interests. Defense and promotion of democracy was also incorporated as a foreign policy principle, leading to support initiatives at the Organization of American States (OAS) and other regional institutions aimed at the defense and strengthening of democracy (van Klaveren, 2012). Chile supported the inclusion of democratic clauses in regional organizations in order to condition the participation of member states in their organs to the maintenance of democracy; it also favored the application of these clauses in some of its trade and association agreements. Democratic activism was projected through its participation as founding member of both the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a Nordic led international organization, and the Community of Democracies, a United States led initiative to foster democracy worldwide. Chile focused on the country's soft power, touting its democratic credentials as a key to its influence and agency in world affairs (Tulchin, 2016, 123).

Relations with Chile's direct neighbors have always been a central element of its foreign policy, and a particularly sensitive one, usually attracting the attention of domestic politics and public opinion. After the restoration of democracy, the challenge was to develop an agenda of cooperation which could prevail over a historical agenda marked by past conflicts, border disputes and rivalries. In the case of Argentina, the challenge was met. Bilateral relations were transformed through the negotiation of most pending border issues and the development of close political relations. Even the arbitration of a border dispute, Laguna del Desierto, in 1994, which many felt was unfair toward Chile, was calmly received (Fernandois, 2011, 40). Confidence building measures led to increasing cooperation between the military of both countries, including the creation of a joint permanent brigade, *Cruz del Sur*, as well as joint patrolling in the Antarctic Sea, despite the overlapping territorial claims of the two countries.

Economic relations also flourished, especially through major Chilean investments in Argentina and the initial provision of Argentine natural gas in Chile through various pipelines which were constructed. Although the gas provision run into difficulties, causing tensions in 2004 (Huneeus, 2007), efforts were made to encapsulate the problem and avoiding transforming it into a general bilateral crisis. In the case of Peru, a similar process of rapprochement took

place, leading to increasing economic and political relations, and the adoption of some confidence building measures. The initiation by Peru in 2008 of a maritime dispute against Chile before the International Court of Justice represented a major challenge to the process, considering its historical background, which Peru traced back even to the Pacific War which took place in the nineteenth century, and its impact on local public opinion. However, the dispute was peacefully settled in 2014, and the Court's decision was implemented in record time, setting an example which was highlighted by The Hague Court. Both countries successfully encapsulated the dispute, which did not affect substantial Chilean investments in Peru nor the integration of a growing Peruvian community in Chile. In fact, during the dispute both countries concurred to the formation of the Pacific Alliance, an integration initiative which also included Colombia and Mexico.

With Bolivia, things were more difficult. Formal diplomatic had been severed by La Paz since the 60s, with a short resumption in the 70s, and Bolivia never renounced its aspiration to recover a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory, which it had lost in the Pacific War. After 1990, the democratic governments of both countries essayed several initiatives to establish a common agenda and strengthen political dialogue and bilateral cooperation. However, periodic incidents soured these efforts, and it was difficult to keep up the momentum. In 2013 Bolivia decided to file a claim against Chile before the International Court of Justice, arguing that Chile had contracted a legal obligation with Bolivia to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The case before the Hague Court was accompanied by a diplomatic and communications offensive led by the Bolivian Government which severely deteriorated bilateral relations, suspending any progress. The case was settled in favor of Chile in 2018 and only very recently are there signals of a resumption of a light dialogue between both countries.

Relations with the rest of Latin America included increased economic relations and political dialogue. Trade agreements were negotiated with almost all countries of the regions, and Chilean investments expanded from Argentina and Peru to Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay. Close political relations were developed with regional powers such as Mexico and Brazil, as well as with other regional partners. Venezuela became a country of special attention since the advent of the Bolivarian regime, inaugurated by President Chavez and followed by his chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro. Bilateral relations with the new regime were never close but were conducted with certain caution until the second mandate of President Sebastián Piñera. In contrast with his first mandate, in which he even personally paid his respects to the deceased President Chavez attending his funeral, in 2019 Piñera traveled especially with President Duque of Colombia to the border town of Cúcuta to support a failed insurrection against the Maduro regime. On the contrary, relations with Cuba have remained stable and respectful, despite initial contrasting ideological alignments of Chilean political forces which even divided the old *Concertación*.

At the regional level, since the restoration of democracy, successive governments participated actively in Latin American regional institutions, including the Rio Group, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Both UNASUR and CELAC have been seen by observers as representatives of post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism (Sanahuja, 2009, 2010; Riggiozzi and Tussie, 2012), meaning the partial displacement of dominant forms of U.S.-led neoliberal governance. What these initiatives had in common was their aim to prioritize political cooperation among like-minded Governments, to bolster the bargaining power of Latin America *vis-à-vis* its main external partners, and to speak with a common voice in the global arena. Trade, which had played an important role in traditional regionalism in Latin America, was relegated to a secondary role, if not directly eliminated from the new schemes. In addition, the new wave of regionalism not only excluded the United States and Canada but was also presented as an alternative to hemispheric regionalism. Chile joined these mainly political groupings for pragmatic rather than for ideological reasons, viewing them with some skepticism but assuming that it could not remain on the margins of a major regional trend. On the other hand, Chile advocated the convergence of subregional trade schemes, a topic which would remain present in Chilean foreign policy until the end of the 2010s (van Klaveren, 2017).

Chile could have adhered immediately to the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which was established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the subregional integration scheme included Chile's most significant economic and political partners in Latin America, Santiago opted instead for an association agreement, which was signed in 1996. The association formula allowed Chile to avoid a common external tariff which in fact was significantly higher than the national tariff average, and to maintain its freedom to engage individually in trade negotiations with other partners. Chile also returned as an associate member to the Andean Community in 2007, a subregional integration process which it helped to establish thirty years earlier and which it had left in 1976.

Although some academics or experts would have preferred to view Chile returning as a full member of either integration process, no significant political initiative was adopted in that direction. Rather, parliamentarians of the agricultural regions expressed their fears towards competition coming from MERCOSUR countries and demanded special measures for the protection and promotion of their interests.

Significant consensus was also extended to Chile's relations with its major partners in the world. Relations with the United States were normalized after a rocky period during the last years of the dictatorship. Memories of U.S. intervention in the overthrow of the Allende government were not allowed to mar relations with the principal hemispheric and world power. In 1994 Chile was invited by the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America, to initiate negotiations for joining the then North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA). However, domestic considerations in the United States stalled trade negotiations with Chile, and in the end only in 2001 both countries started negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement, which was signed in 2003, the same year of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which Chile opposed as a rotative member of the United Nations Security Council (Bywaters, 2014).

Traditionally, relations with Europe have had broad support along the Chilean political spectrum and society. Europe has been a source of inspiration for many institutions and policies, and different political groups felt closer to European political traditions and models of economic and social organization than to other external referents. Chilean political parties and NGO's developed strong links with their European counterparts, and Presidents and other high authorities paid and still pay frequent visits to European capitals. Against this background, the negotiation and signature in 2002 of an ambitious Association Agreement with the European Union was followed with sympathy and received strong support across the political spectrum. The agreement consisted of three main pillars, covering strengthened political dialogue, free trade, and cooperation. More than a decade later, Chile proposed the modernization of the agreement to incorporate new areas of cooperation and to take account of state-of-the-art trade and investment disciplines.

Chilean relations with the Asia Pacific region represented a new frontier for its foreign policy. Chile was a “pioneer in promoting [...] ties with the Pacific Rim” (Oyarzún, 2018, 283). It has a network of free trade agreements which include South Korea, China, Japan, most member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Hong-Kong, Australia, and New Zealand. Chile was the first South American country to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and with Vietnam, the first South American host for the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2004, and the first non-Asian country to sign a free trade agreement with China in 2005. It also signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in 2016. Together with Mexico and Peru, Chile is a member of the three Pacific economic institutions: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC, created in 1980), the business forum Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, created in 1967), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, created in 1994). It has also attempted to portray itself as a gateway for Latin America's relations with the Asia-Pacific, although with rather modest results (Jenne, 2020; Schulz and Rojas-de-Galarreta, 2020). Chile's opening to the Pacific Rim has historical roots but received a boost during the dictatorship years and was deepened by the succeeding democratic governments.

The governments of the democratic transition also identified multilateralism as a basic foreign policy principle. Multilateralism is also often highlighted as a typical middle or small state strategy whereby states promote specific policies, norms, and ideas to serve their interest as small actors in the international system (Evans, 2011). In the past, Chilean multilateralism had a more defensive orientation, attempting to contain pressures from major powers and

to promote initiatives identified with the Third World and North-South relations, but it also served to further specific interests such as the recognition of a 200-miles maritime exclusive economic zone in the new Law of the Sea, or the establishment of a special regime for the Antarctic continent, which could protect Chile's claim to a part of its territory.

In the case of Chile, the practice of multilateralism led to active participation at both the global and regional levels (Somavía and Oyarce, 2018). Globally, attention was given to the United Nations system and related organizations; regionally, the focus was both the Inter-American System and Latin American regional institutions. Several Chilean diplomats and politicians identified with the *Concertación* and the brief coalition that succeeded it, the *Nueva Mayoría*, were elected or appointed to leading positions in international organizations: Ambassador Juan Somavía at the International Labor Organization, former Minister José Miguel Insulza at the Organization of American States, and former President Michelle Bachelet, first at UN Women, and after as High Commissioner for Human Rights.

During the *Concertación* years, Chile filed its application to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Although this decision meant an important change in Chile's traditional profile as a country of the Third World committed to a new international economic order, admission to what was seen as a rich countries club was received calmly by Chilean political sectors, with little opposition and a certain pride.

Although the dictatorship and sectors of the right had been critical of the practice of multilateralism, after the democratic restoration it became a consensual principle. Peacekeeping was also considered as an instrument to signal Chile's international responsibility and commitment to multilateralism. In the past, Chile had only participated modestly in international peacekeeping missions. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, Chile contributed to several UN missions in countries like Cambodia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Ecuador-Peru, Iraq, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. In 2004, after a request of several world leaders, Chile decided to join the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). For the first time, Latin American countries took up the leadership of a UN mission in their region. Chile supplied troops along 13 years and two distinguished Chilean former ministers of foreign affairs were appointed as special representatives of the UN Secretary General and heads of the Mission in Haiti.

Commitment to multilateralism also involved Chilean participation in groups of like-minded countries formed to promote cooperation in specific areas, ranging from human rights and democracy to human security, from the Cairns group to friends of fish at the World Trade Organization. After the restoration of democracy, one of the major objectives of Chilean foreign policy pointed to the advancement of preferential economic relations with its four main external partners: Latin America, North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. Successive governments accepted the basic assumptions of an open economy: export-driven growth, a favorable climate for foreign investments, the relevance

of a balanced budget, and strict fiscal policy. Accordingly, Chile followed the policy of seeking special trade and other economic relations with as many countries or trading blocs as possible, without viewing them as mutually exclusive. The result was a dense network of 28 association agreements, free trade, and partial trade pacts with 64 countries or economies which included all relevant trading partners. Although many in Chile would now label this policy as neoliberal and neo-extractivist, at the time that it was pursued it received wide support. Chilean authorities defined the policy as open regionalism, a loosely defined concept which was first used in the Asia Pacific area, especially at APEC meetings, and which was later adopted in Latin America, including the UN Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1994). Chile used the term to allay criticism that it was more interested in relations with the rich countries than with its fellow regional partners. Regional agreements were deemed extremely helpful in promoting the integration of national markets and permitting the expansion of trade and investment, but it was essential that regional agreements develop within the discipline of a strong multilateral system and that they did not imply barriers to goods and services imported from outside or to trade negotiations with third countries.

Similar policies were applied in the area of foreign investment. The idea was to guarantee foreign investors at least equal treatment as national investors. Initially, this was done through the negotiation of a series of bilateral investment treaties. Later, the rather generous provisions of these agreements were replaced by more balanced investment chapters which were negotiated in the framework of the free trade or association pacts.

During the second Bachelet government, Chile proposed a process of convergence between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance, which would include almost all South American countries. The idea did not imply unifying the two integration nor engaging in tariff negotiations. Rather, respecting the differences between both schemes, it was aimed at the promotion of mutual cooperation and of pragmatically aligning the two blocs, especially *vis a vis* their main external partners (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014).

Trade policy was fairly consensual during almost thirty years in Chile. To be sure, there was some criticism, mostly from the extra-parliamentary left and some academics. But both government and opposition, center-left, and center-right coalitions, Executive and Congress, shared the conviction that foreign trade was the engine of economic growth in the country and that trade agreements were useful, if not essential, to guarantee access to external markets and to attract foreign investment. Some analysts argued that trade policy was not enough (Oyarzún, 2013), others that Chile had a “soft misplaced regional identity” (Wehner, 2020), and still others that concepts such as open regionalism turned into “zombie” categories (Fuentes, 2021), but rather than questioning the specific contents of trade policy, these criticisms were directed towards the excessive weight assigned to trade in foreign policy, the presumed neglect of other foreign policy priorities or the lack of clear definitions of some policies.

Winds of Change

Chilean foreign policy is now feeling the winds of change. External and domestic forces are questioning some of the principles and policies which were established during the 1990s and which were upheld during the ensuing years. External sources are not necessarily directed towards Chile, but they obviously have an impact on its foreign policy. They include the growing economic importance of China, which has become by far Chile's main trading partner, as well as a growing source of foreign investment, often originating from Chinese state-owned enterprises. Chile is also one of a few countries in the world to maintain a trade surplus with China. In 2018 Chile signed a co-operation agreement with China on that country's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), along with agreements to streamline customs procedures and update protocols for the bilateral trade of agricultural products. Chile's early decision to join the BRI stands in contrast with a certain reluctance of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. A year before, it also initiated the procedures to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which culminated with its incorporation as a non-regional member in 2021. Outgoing Chilean president Michelle Bachelet also proposed in 2017 that China's government build a trans-Pacific fiber-optic internet cable linking China and Chile. It would be the first of its kind between Asia and South America. However, amid a U.S. pressure campaign to keep China out of global telecommunication projects, the tender for the laying of the submarine cable favored a Japanese proposal, consisting of an undersea fiber-optic cable that would stretch roughly 13,000 km across the Pacific Ocean, pass through New Zealand and then arrive at its terminus in Sydney. Although the Chilean government explained that this route was based on cost and feasibility (Asia. Nikkei, 2020), it is widely assumed that U.S. pressure may have played a role in the decision.

Chile is part of the general global strategy of China in Latin America, but it does not seem especially significant. It is relevant as a supplier of copper and agricultural products. Bilateral relations have had also a certain symbolic value because Chile was the first South American country to recognize the mainland Chinese government, and the first Latin American country to negotiate a free trade agreement with the People's Republic. But the emphasis is above all economic and commercial, and relations have not expanded markedly to other fields. Chile has also been part of the Chinese policy to establish "strategic partnerships", but it shares this status with several other countries of the region, and it has not led to a sort of special relationship.

However, the changing distribution of power at the global level places new pressures on a foreign policy which was used to cope with only one global and hemispheric power, the United States. Obviously, Chile is striving to keep opportunities open in all directions. To that end, it seeks to balance its relations and avoid having to take sides between the US and China. Chile provides a good example of Latin America's growing economic dependence on China (Stallings, 2020). In the future, the US could subject Chile to greater pressure. It could push

the country to make a choice between the two great powers, conditioning its military relations to a stronger commitment to a US led world order, and threatening with the application of economic sanctions or other forms of coercion to specific companies or state entities that are involved in economic relations with China. On the other hand, despite its strong commitment to human rights and the promotion of democracy, Chile has been extremely cautious with respect to China's lamentable human rights record, generally omitting any official criticism.

The idea that the world is again splitting into spheres of influence (Brands and Hedel, 2018) may be exaggerated in a multipolar or *multiplex* (Acharya, 2014) world. But historically the US has striven for preeminence in the Western Hemisphere – first by running other European powers off much of the North American continent and then by pushing them out of Latin America. Over the succeeding generations, Washington worked to achieve military dominance in that area, to tie the countries of the Western Hemisphere to America geopolitically and economically, and to promote its values and political preferences across the Hemisphere. Although China has not directly challenged the US in Latin America, it is perceived in Washington and in Europe as a rival (Nolte, 2018). How should Chilean foreign policy cope with this reality is already a matter of debate in Chile. Assuming that the US-China rivalry may lead to a Second Cold War, three analysts propose a policy of “active non-alignment”, through the strengthening of regionalism and the preservation of policy space and policy instruments that would allow the countries of the region to define and implement their own national development models (Fortín, Heine, Ominami, 2020).

The proposal may seem attractive, but the reference to the now discredited Non-Alignment Movement seems anachronistic, whereas trust in the strengthening of Latin American regionalism at a moment in which it is at one of its lowest points in history appears as little more than an act of faith. Other authors prefer the notion of “strategic autonomy”, probably borrowed from Europe, although they also stress the need for pragmatism and caution with regard to great power rivalry (Bywaters C., Sepúlveda Soto, Villar Gertner, 2021: 371). The conundrum faced by Chilean foreign policy is certainly not exceptional and mirrors the situation of other countries of the region. It also evokes the enduring Latin American aspiration for greater autonomy, which has led to extensive theorizing especially in the region (Miguez, 2022), as well as to the need of agency, denoting actor's ability to act upon and transform structural constraints (Acharya, 2018). And rather than following attractive catchwords, the response may well consist of a less epic policy of muddling through and tactic maneuvering, simultaneously hedging, balancing, and bandwagoning.

Latin American regionalism and its ups and downs represent another external source of Chilean foreign policy. Historically, Chile was an early supporter of Latin American integration, becoming one of the founding members of the Andean Pact, which was supposed to become a model for subregional integration. Support for regional integration vanished during the dictatorship

and reappeared in a much lighter version after the return of democracy, emphasizing political cooperation and *Concertación* rather than custom unions or deep integration projects. Chile participated enthusiastically in the golden age of summity, which developed between 2004 and 2012 and which included 144 summits in 9 years (Portales, 2014, 56). Although Chile was not a particularly active member of the group of left-wing governments which became known as the Pink Tide in Latin America, it became a founding member of UNASUR and CELAC which, as we have seen, became identified with post-hegemonic regionalism. However, the golden age faded away. Latin American regionalism is in a critical condition and has been afflicted by deep ideological divisions and polarization, symbolized by the recognition of a parallel government in Venezuela. UNASUR, to which Chile adhered more out of pragmatic considerations than of ideological convictions (Flisfisch, 2011), was dismantled and became a rare example of an international organization which was not able to survive. CELAC had to suspend several of its yearly summits and its bi-annual summit with the EU due to internal irreconcilable differences among its members concerning the Venezuelan crisis. Instead, it has opted for a low-profile agenda, maintained by its rotative *Pro-Tempore* Secretariat. The Pacific Alliance, which aimed to promote the “deep integration” of economies through the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, and to strengthen ties with the world and the Asia-Pacific region in particular, has stagnated as a consequence of differing views and expectations among its participants.

At the time of its creation, UNASUR was the product of a coalition of governments with ideological affinities. But governments changed, the Pink Tide lost power, and UNASUR not only lost interest but was rejected by the region’s conservative governments. The revanche (Ominami, 2021) was the launch of the Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (PROSUR), an initiative taken by Presidents Sebastián Piñera of Chile and Iván Duque of Colombia, for the creation of an integration body to replace the Union of South American Nations, which was presented as a South American coordination mechanism for public policies and the defense of democracy. The Venezuelan crisis also led to the creation of the ad hoc Lima Group, which was established in 2017 in the Peruvian capital with the participation of 12 mostly conservative countries of the Hemisphere in order to facilitate a solution for the grave ongoing crisis in Venezuela. The Group has also been affected by changes of governments in the participating countries.

The Organization of American States (OAS), which represents the leading institution of hemispheric regionalism, that is including the US and Canada, has not escaped from this trend towards political polarization, as attested by the militant positions adopted by different member states and especially by its Secretary General, Luis Almagro.

In this context of division and polarization the possibilities for the revival of regionalism in Latin America do not seem remarkably high. Of course, a new Pink Tide, along the lines of the Puebla Group, a coalition of left-wing leaders

and movements from Latin America and Spain, could facilitate the resurgence of some form of regionalism, but it would probably exclude governments from the other side of the political spectrum, and it would be little more than a temporary political alliance of like-minded governments. In order to succeed, the process of establishing common rules, regulations, and policies which is typical of the more advanced forms of regionalism, requires overcoming Latin American frequently changing political cycles.

Thus, although many political forces and academics in Chile assert their Latin American identity and their commitment to a strengthened regionalism, it remains to be seen how this feeling can be channeled. The answer, probably, will depend on the joint efforts of Latin American leaders to engage in “a lengthy process of establishing common rules, regulations, and policies. It is these rules, regulations, and policies, based either on specific treaty provisions or derived over time from the general principles and objectives written into integration treaties, which will translate the aspiration for regional prosperity into reality” (Mättli 2013, 3).

Kaarbo’s (2015) argument that domestic politics is a major component of foreign policy analysis and must be considered whenever addressing how bilateral and regional relations are shaped and developed is also valid for the Chilean case. The remarkable continuity of the country’s foreign policy during the *Concertación* years extended to the first government of conservative President Piñera as well as to the second mandate of President Bachelet, under a broader coalition which included the Communist Party. However, to some extent this sequence was disrupted by the second Piñera government, especially in the multilateral area. Departing from a tradition of prudence and circumspection in regional and hemispheric relations, Chile adopted a militant policy regarding the Venezuelan regime, denouncing human rights violations by the Maduro government, recognizing the then President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as President of the Republic, supporting a failed insurrection in the country, and signing a joint request to the International Criminal Court to initiate an investigation on crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Venezuela.

Neo-sovereignism made inroads into sectors of the second Piñera government. In 2019, Chile promoted a joint communication to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which was also signed by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay, launching “an unprecedented attack against the Inter-American human rights system, denouncing the Court’s intrusive case law and demanding that the Court grant states a “margin of appreciation” (Contesse 2021, 368-369). The communication represented an effort towards restricting the role of the Inter-American Human Rights System, based on the recognition of states’ sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity, referred to in the American Convention on Human Rights (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile 2019). After leading the negotiations for the first-ever Latin American treaty on environmental issues, the Chilean government deci-

ded not to sign the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Escazú Agreement), arguing that its text was ambiguous and that it could lead to a loss of sovereignty. Echoing arguments of the far right in the United States and Europe, in 2018 Chile also pulled out of the non-binding and entirely voluntary the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, alleging without any legal ground that “it incentivizes illegal migration” and that it affects Chilean sovereignty (*El Libero*, 2018). As in the case of Escazú, Chile had participated in the negotiation of the Compact, only to announce its withdrawal on the eve of the signing ceremony. Retreat from multilateralism was not necessarily total. In 2019 Chile joined the “Alliance for Multilateralism” launched by the French and German Foreign Ministers as an informal network of countries united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is a guarantee for international peace and security, and for facing global challenges such as climate change, respect for human rights, sustainable development, and digital transformation, through dialogue and cooperation. Chile also co-chaired between 2017 and 2019 the Equal Rights Coalition (ERC), an intergovernmental body of 42 Member States dedicated to the protection of the rights of LGBTI persons.

Neo-sovereignism has equally gained ground in the Chilean left. The vicissitudes of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP11 or TPP-11, a last generation free trade agreement which would include 11 countries, forming one of the world's largest free trade areas, provides a good example. Chile was one of the originators and promoters of the project, which stemmed from the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4) between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand, and which represented the first free trade agreement linking Asia, the Pacific, and the Americas. Negotiations for a broader and more ambitious agreement were joined by several countries including, especially, the United States. The first version of the TPP was signed in 2016, but never entered into force, as the U.S. withdrew from the agreement soon after the election of President Donald Trump. All other TPP signatories agreed to revive and reshape the agreement, with Japan taking the leading role in place of the U.S. In January 2018, the CPTPP was created as a succeeding agreement, retaining two-thirds of its predecessor's provisions; 22 measures favored by the US, but contested by other signatories, were suspended, while the threshold for enactment was lowered so as not to require U.S. accession. The revised version was signed in Santiago, Chile, under the active leadership of Chile and Japan. However, at the time of writing, the Chilean Parliament has held back the approval of the agreement, fearful of public reaction. Although the agreement is more progressive than most, if not all, of the trade agreements which Chile had negotiated previously, political forces which traditionally supported and promoted free trade are divided on the project, and it has already received its total rejection by the parties of the hard left. The battle against TPP-11 was also part of the social revolt which

shook Chile in October 2019. The campaign against the agreement has been global, but it has been successfully nationalized in the Chilean case. Leaving aside several myths and fake news associated to the treaty, its more serious criticisms point to investor-state dispute settlement provisions, which allow investors to sue host governments using international arbitration panels, and to its supposed limitations to the regulatory powers of the state in some domains. Both criticisms apply to almost all trade and investment treaties approved by Chile since the 90s.

A major wave of civil unrest, the *estallido social*, broke out in Chile in October 2019, leading to mass and sometimes violent protests, which were triggered in mid-October 2019 by a Metro fare increase in Santiago and quickly escalated to encompass widespread social grievances such as inequality and poor basic services, with demonstrators demanding a change to the country's neoliberal economic model and a new Constitution. Although traditionally the establishment political elites had resisted the creation of a Constituent Assembly, most political forces reached in November 2019 an agreement to hold a national referendum that would rewrite the constitution if it were to be approved. In October 2020, after a six-month delay due to the pandemic, nearly 80 percent of Chilean voters expressed their support in a plebiscite for a new constitution, to be drafted by a directly elected constitutional assembly rather than a mix of directly elected representatives and sitting politicians. This was the first time that Chilean citizens were able to vote for the members of the body created to write the Constitution. Although based originally in the system to elect the 155 members of the Chamber of Deputies, the election process established several changes. For the first time, 17 reserved seats were established for the 10 officially recognized indigenous groups. Also, different mechanisms in the inscription of candidates and the election system itself were designed to ensure gender parity in the Convention, being the first assembly of this kind in the world with equal representation of men and women. The constitutional election had surprising results. Unlike in every election since Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship ended in 1990, Chilean political parties suffered a big blow: 40 percent of the votes went to independent candidates, who competed in lists issued by social movements and local activist networks. Traditional center-right and social democratic parties, which have shared power for 30 years, were defeated. The new constitutional assembly is markedly left-wing. The final document of the assembly will also need to be submitted to a national referendum next year.

With the exception of the TPP-11, foreign policy issues were not part of the social revolt nor where they raised in the campaign for the constituents. It is unlikely that the deliberations of the assembly will focus on Chilean international relations. The agenda is already overloaded. There is strong pressure for the recognition of social rights, gender equity, multiculturality and interculturality, recognition of rights for indigenous groups like the Mapuche, pension and education reform, more avenues for civic participation, enhanced environmental protections, and police reform. However, it can be expected that some of the

constitutional reforms may indirectly affect foreign investors' rights guaranteed in trade and investment agreements. Nor can it be excluded that the new text will include provisions limiting the scope of future agreements or providing for the revision of existing ones. Another factor of uncertainty are the presidential elections in November 2021, which could lead to a change in the traditional political elite which has held power since the restoration of democracy.

The new political landscape in Chile could influence foreign policy in two areas. First, it could induce changes in its trade policy, as a consequence of changes in its development strategy. Although trade policy has already been updated and to some extent corrected (Novik and Nazal, 2020; Nazal, 2021), a development strategy embodying a strong industrial policy or favoring national production could lead to a redefinition of Chile's traditional open trade policies. The same can be said in the area of foreign investment in certain strategic sectors. Second, it could lead to more participation and initiatives in areas which are of special interest for sectors of civil society and the emerging political counter elite. Although the massive protests triggered by social unrest over economic, justice and environmental issues forced Chile's government to cancel its hosting of the 2019 UN climate change summit (COP 25), climate change remains an important issue in the country's political discourse. Ocean protection is already a key concern for Chile. Successive governments have created marine protected areas covering almost 1.5 million km², or 40% of Chile's waters, making it one of the few countries to have exceeded the 30% target for ocean protection recommended by scientists as a means to shore up ocean health in the face of multiple threats. Chile is also part of a network to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Gender equality issues are also raising in importance and could lead to more initiatives to address the gender gap at the international level, as well as to more appointments of female ambassadors and high officials at the foreign ministry, which remain low (Erlandsen, Hernández-Garza & Schulz 2021). Chile is also experiencing strong migratory pressures, mostly derived from the Venezuelan exodus. It may be expected that a new progressive government will promote the lifting of some of the barriers that have been introduced to restrain the entry of refugees and will halt the massive expulsions of undocumented migrants. It may also aim at strengthened regional cooperation to address Venezuela's dramatic migration crisis. Finally, in the highly centralized Chilean polity, regions are also claiming more participation in the area of foreign policy, highlighting the need for certain modalities of paradiplomacy or substate diplomacy (Maira, 2010; Astroza, 2021).

Conclusion

Theoretically, foreign policy changes occur within policy windows, which are appropriate periods for new ideas and proposals to emerge in the political agenda (Gustavsson, 1999). These windows can be based on potential events: politi-

cal or economic crises (Hay, 1999), critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007), changes in the base of social support for leaders (Mattes, Leeds and Carroll, 2015), and leader or regime change (Gustavsson, 1999, Alden and Aran 2017). Several of these categories could apply to the Chilean case. The political system is suffering a legitimacy crisis, both the constituent assembly and the coming presidential elections remain subject to considerable uncertainties, and there are clear signs of a change of leadership.

A recent analysis on foreign policy change in Latin America concluded that "presidents virtually define foreign policy change in Latin America", specifically when their succession means ideological or preference shifts (Merke, Reynoso and Schenoni, 2020, 425). Although recent presidential changes in Chile have not implied important modifications in foreign policy, with the exception of the second Piñera administration, the coming change of leadership could have a deeper impact on foreign policy.

Rosati (1994) created a four-degree scale to classify foreign policy change: (1) intensification of external activism; (2) refinement, or small change; (3) reform, a moderate but significant change; and (4) restructuring, the most extreme degree, a complete foreign policy redirecting. The last presidential change in Chile implied a modification in Chile's foreign policy, which manifested itself in some neo-sovereigntist multilateral policies and in its position towards the Venezuelan crisis. In Rosati's scale, the degree of change would be somewhere in between small and significant change. Taking into consideration the present constitutional process as well as the coming presidential elections, one may expect that the next change could be more significant.

The onset of structural change in a country can become an obvious condition for foreign policy change. However, the effect is not automatic and will depend on the intensity of structural change as well as on the resilience of its traditional foreign policy culture. Thus, in the Chilean case, change may be less forthcoming in its relations with its direct neighbors, which tend to be based on almost frozen images, beliefs and perceptions which have nurtured a certain national identity, than in the domains of trade policy or multilateralism. On the other hand, there will remain limits to the extent of foreign policy change. The complex combination of a growing economic dependence on China, and a traditional identification with Western values and orientations, will likely favor moderate and incremental changes.

References

Acharya, A. (2014). *The End of American World Order*. Cambridge: Polity.

Acharya, A. (2018). *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alden C., and Aran. A. (2017). *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. New York: Routledge.

Amorim Neto, O., and Malamud A. (2019). The Policy-Making Capacity of Foreign Ministries in Presidential Regimes: A Study of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2015. *Latin American Research Review*, 54 (4), pp. 812-834.

Amorim Neto, O., and Malamud. A. (2015). What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 57 (4), pp. 1-27.

Asia. Nikkei (2020). Chile picks Japan's trans-Pacific cable route in snub to China. Retrieved from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/Chile-picks-Japan-s-trans-Pacific-cable-route-in-snub-to-China>

Astroza Suárez, P. (2021), "Paradiplomacia y actores subestatales: nuevas estrategias de inserción internacional". In: C. Bywaters C., D. Sepúlveda Soto, and A. Villar Gertner, (eds.). *Nuevas Voces de Política Exterior*. Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 155-165

Brands H. & Edel C. (2018). The Disharmony of the Spheres. *Commentary*, January, pp. 20-27

Bywaters, C. (2014). El NO de Ricardo Lagos a la invasión de Iraq en 2003: el proceso de toma de decisiones de política exterior en Chile, *Estudios Internacionales*, 46(177), pp. 65-88.

Bywaters C., Sepúlveda Soto, D. and Villar Gertner, A. (2021). Reflexión final. Los desafíos del nuevo ciclo de la política exterior chilena. In C. Bywaters C., D. Sepúlveda Soto and A. Villar Gertner (Eds.), *Nuevas voces de política exterior*. Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 367-374.

Capoccia, G. and D. Kelemen. (2007). The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. *World Politics* 59 (3), pp. 341-369.

Contesse, J. (2021). The Rule of Advice in International Human Rights Law. *American Journal of International Law*, 115(3), pp. 367-408.

ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean), (1994). *Open regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: economic integration as a contribution to changing production patterns with social equity*. Santiago: CEPAL.

EL LIBERO (2018). Pacto Migratorio «incentiva la migración irregular y afecta el derecho soberano», los argumentos que Chile dio en la ONU para abstenerse. (21/12/2018). Retrieved: <https://ellibero.cl/actualidad/pacto-migratorio-incentiva-la-migracion-irregular-y-afecta-el-derecho-soberano-los-argumentos-que-chile-dio-en-la-onu-para-abstenerse/>

Erlandsen, M., Hernández-Garza, M., Schulz, C. (2021). Madame President, Madame Ambassador? Women Presidents and Gender Parity in Latin America's Diplomatic Services, *Political Research Quarterly*, Retrieved: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912921997922>

Evans, Gareth. (2011). *Middle power diplomacy*. Santiago de Chile: Inaugural Edgardo Boeninger Memorial Lecture. Retrieved from <http://www.gevans.org/species/speech441.html>

Fernandois, J. (2011). Pragmatism, Ideology, and Tradition in Chilean Foreign Policy. In G. Gardini and P. Lambert (Eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies. Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 35-52.

Flisfisch, A. (2011). La política exterior chilena y América del Sur. *Estudios Internacionales* 168, pp. 115-141

Fortín, C. (1975). Principled pragmatism in the face of external pressure: The foreign policy of the Allende government. In: R. Hellman and H. Rosenbaum (Eds.), *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 216-245.

Fortín, C., Heine, J., Ominami, C. (2020). Latin America Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Second Cold War and the Active Non-Alignment Option. *Global Policy Journal*. Retrieved: <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/Fort%C3%ADn%20Heine%20and%20Ominami%20-%20Latin%20America%20Between%20a%20Rock%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place%2C%20A%20Second%20Cold%20War%20and%20the%20Active%20Non-Alignment%20Option.pdf>

Fuentes V., C. (2021). Categorías zombies en la política exterior chilena de la transición democrática. *Si Somos Americanos Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos*, 21(1), pp. 56-77.

Fuentes-Julio, C. (2020) Norm entrepreneurs in foreign policy: How Chile became an international human rights promoter, *Journal of Human Rights*, 19(2), pp. 256-274

Gardini, G. (2011). Latin American Foreign Policies between Ideology and Pragmatism: A Framework for Analysis. In: G. Gardini and P. Lambert (Eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies. Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13-33.

Gustavsson, J. (1999). How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? *Cooperation and Conflict* 34 (1), pp. 73-95.

Harmer, T. (2011). *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press.

Hay, C. (1999). Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 1 (3), pp. 317-344.

Huneeus, C. (2007). Argentina y Chile: el conflicto del gas, *Estudios Internacionales* 158, pp.179-212.

Jenne, N. (2020). Bridging the Pacific Ocean? Tactical Maneuvering Instead of Grand Strategy in Chile's Foreign Policy toward Southeast Asia, *Asian Politics and Policy*, 12(2), pp. 106-126.

Kaarbo, J. (2015). A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory. *International Studies Review*, 17 (2), pp. 189-216.

Maira, L. (Ed.) (2010). *La Política Internacional Subnacional en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal.

Mattes, M., Leeds, B. and Carroll, R. (2015). "Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2), pp. 280-290.

Mattli, W. (2013). Explaining Regional Integration Outcome. In P. De Lombaerde and F. Söderbaum. *Regionalism. Vol. IV. Comparative Regionalism (2000-2010)*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 1-28.

Merke, F., D. Reynoso, and L. L. Schenoni. (2020). Foreign Policy Change in Latin America: Exploring a Middle-Range Concept. *Latin American Research Review* 55 (3), pp. 413-429.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (2014). Speech of the Foreign Minister of Chile, Heraldo Muñoz. "Diálogo sobre Integración Regional: Alianza del Pacífico y Mercosur," Santiago de Chile, 24 November 2014. Retrieved <http://www.minrel.gob.cl/discurso-del-canciller-munoz-dialogo-sobre-integracion-regional/minrel/2015-03-09/163854.html>.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (2019). Comunicado de Prensa. 23/4/2019. Retrieved: <https://minrel.gob.cl/comunicado-de-prensa-ministerio-de-relaciones-exteriores-ministerio-de/minrel/2019-04-23/105105.html>

Muñoz, H. (1986). *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*. Santiago: Ediciones del Ornitorrinco/Prospel-CERC.

Míguez, M. (2022). The Concept of Autonomy as an Epistemic Foundation? Many Paths, Many Turns. In A. Acharya, M. Deciancio, and D. Tussie (Eds.) *Latin America in Global International Relations*. New York: Routledge, pp. 220-234.

Nazal Aranda, P. (2021). El futuro de la política comercial de Chile y su impacto para un desarrollo inclusivo. In: C. Bywaters C., D. Sepúlveda Soto, D., Villar Gertner, A. (Eds.). *Nuevas Voces de Política Exterior*. Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 251-263.

Nolte, D. (2018). China Is Challenging but (Still) Not Displacing Europe in Latin America. *GIGA Focus Latin America*, 1, February.

Novik A., A., and Nazal, P. (2020). The New Scenario for Chilean Trade Policy. *Latin American Journal of Trade Policy*, 3(6), pp. 88-98.

Ominami, C. (2021). Prosur: ¿integración o revancha ideológica? *Nueva Sociedad*, 291, pp. 157-168.

Oyarzún, Lorena. (2013) When trade policy is not enough: opportunities and challenges for Chile's international insertion, *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research*, 19 (2), pp. 268-285.

Oyarzún, L. (2018). The Pacific in Chile's foreign policy: A tool to reinforce open regionalism, *Latin American Policy*, 9(2), pp. 282-303.

Portales, C. (2014). ¿A dónde va el multilateralismo en las Américas? Proyectos superpuestos en un período de cambios globales. *Pensamiento Propio*, 39, pp. 35-74.

Putman, R. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, *International Organization*, 42(3), pp. 427-460.

Riggiorozzi, P. and Tussie, D. (2012) The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism in Latin America. In P. Riggiorozzi and D. Tussie (Eds.) *The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin America*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1-16.

Rosati, J. (1994). Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy. In: J. Rosati, J. Hagan and M. Sampson (Eds.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 221-261.

Sanahuja, J. (2009) Del 'regionalismo abierto' al 'regionalismo post-liberal'. Crisis y cambio en la integración regional en América Latina. In: L. Martínez Alfonso, L. Peña, and M. Vázquez *Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe 2008-2009*, Buenos Aires: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES), pp. 11-54

Sanahuja, J. (2010). *Post-Liberal Regionalism in South America: The Case of UNASUR*. EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2012/05. Florence: European University Institute.

Schulz, C. & Rojas-De-Galarreta, F. (2020) Chile as a Transpacific Bridge: Brokerage and Social Capital in the Pacific Basin, *Geopolitics*, 24(2), pp. 1-24.

Somavía J. and Oyarce, P. (Eds.), (2018). *Chile actor del sistema multilateral. Una tradición nacional*, Santiago: Academia Diplomática de Chile “Andrés Bello”.

Stallings, B. (2020). *Dependency in the Twenty-First Century? The Political Economy of China–Latin America Relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tulchin, J. (2016). *Latin America in International Politics. Challenging US hegemony*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Van Klaveren, A. (1996). Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies. In: H. Muñoz and J. Tulchin (Eds.) *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd ed., pp. 35-60.

Van Klaveren, A. (2015). La promoción de la democracia como principio de la política exterior de Chile. In M. Artaza R. and C. Ross O. (Eds.) *La política exterior de Chile. 1990-2009. Del aislamiento a la integración global*. Vol. II. Santiago: RIL editores, pp. 115-139.

Van Klaveren, A. (2017). *Regionalism in Latin America. Navigating in the Fog*. SECO Working Paper 25/2017, Bern: World Trade Institute.

Vargas C., E. (2012). La política exterior de Chile en Derechos Humanos. In M. Artaza R. and C. Ross O. (Eds.) *La política exterior de Chile. 1990-2009. Del aislamiento a la integración global*. Vol. I. Santiago: RIL editores, pp. 71-113.

Wehner. L. (2020). Chile's soft misplaced regional identity, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (33)4, pp. 555-571

Wilhelmy, M. (1986). Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile. In H. Muñoz and J. Tulchin (Eds.) *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd ed., pp. 61-80.

CHAPTER 4

The Foreign Policy of Uruguay: Ideas, Principled Beliefs, and Regional Cooperation

Isabel Clemente

Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the foreign policy of Uruguay from the liberal perspective with a view to explain the origins and continuity of the conceptual framework that shaped the institutions and principles in foreign policy design of Uruguay and the country's responses to challenges emerging from changes in the international system. This approach includes actor-specific analysis and the contributions of theories of international relations, particularly the Liberal Theory, Role theory, and the statist approach developed by Stephen Krasner (2009), as well as interesting insights from the Latin American theory of autonomy (Briceño and Simonoff, 2017). This eclectic approach is considered fruitful in a long-term analysis to investigate the variety of dimensions with direct incidence in foreign policy making in Uruguay.

The first section introduces a discussion on the conceptual and theoretical contributions of Role Theory and the Liberal theory in International Relations to research on foreign policy. The following section considers concepts of international insertion and autonomy as the determinants of the Uruguayan foreign policy, pointing at the geopolitical conditions of the country and the influence of ideas in the choice of courses of action. From this frame of reference, the analysis in this chapter explores two main directions in the design of the foreign policy of Uruguay: multilateralism and Regionalism. It argues that changes in the international system have led practitioners and scholars to rethink the basic assumptions that framed foreign policy making, and the ways in which visions of the world and principled beliefs are at the centre in policy debates.

Relevant topics of debate concerning Uruguayan foreign policymaking considered in this chapter are related to multilateralism and its capacities for securing global governance, enforcement of rules on climate change, and preventing the risk of failure in the multilateral process of negotiations at the World

Trade Organization. On the other hand, the rise of Asia as a factor of new international dynamics has introduced new topics in the external agenda of Uruguay. Concerning regionalism, changes of government in major regional partners have brought about a new line of policy towards regional blocs, and a revision in the priority given to regionalism since the 1950's.

The Theoretical perspective

The analysis in this chapter is based upon contributions of the Liberal Theory in International Relations, the Latin American theory of Autonomy, and Role Theory. Liberal Theory in International Relations is a system focused theory whose basic assumption is international relations are naturally cooperative. Based upon contributions of Liberal philosophers and writers as John Locke and Immanuel Kant, Liberal theory argues that cooperation is feasible and necessary: despite human egoism, peace is rationally feasible, and democracy may be a positive factor of institutional development (Keohane, 1993, p. 13-38). According to the analysis of Andrew Movarcsik, the central insight shared by all Liberals is that States are embedded in domestic and international civil society which decisively constrain their actions. Works by Kant, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes are main references of different approaches to cooperation from the Liberal perspective. Liberal Theory is based upon the following assumptions: International relations are basically cooperative. Although cooperation is not relevant in the agenda of the media its relevance derives from the fact that it operates at different levels: bilateral relations, relations among sub-national units, cross-border exchanges, among state-members of regional blocs, and in interregional cooperation. Consequently, international relations are basically cooperative. Even if cooperation is not relevant in the reports by the media, it prevails in daily life.

Theory of Autonomy

A Latin American contribution to the theory of International Relations, the theory of Autonomy introduced an alternative approach to foreign policy analysis. During the 1980's debates on economic development and international insertion of Latin America, the Argentinian Juan Carlos Puig and the Brazilian Helio Jaguaribe elaborated on the argument of autonomy as a line of foreign policy to achieve intentional insertion of Latin American countries (Simonoff, 2015; Moreira Lima, 2015).

Role Theory

Role Theory scholarship in politics and international relations seeks to understand decision-making from the perspective of the decision-maker. Scholarship

from this approach has evolved over time: it has moved from the initial emphasis on the structural and institutional constraints that affect human behaviour to a greater emphasis on the agency of human beings. Breuning (2019) argues that role theory re-emerged as an approach to the study of politics and international relations. The new generation of scholarship focussed on decision-makers (or agents) while they acknowledge that the agents are embedded in institutional structures. As such role theory accepts the foundational characteristics of behavioral International Relations.

Autonomy and International Insertion

The question of international insertion has been understood because of regular interactions of a State at the at the systemic level. It involves a variety exchanges, ways, and conditions by which a state is related to the international system and the role it intends to play at this level. As a foreign policy goal, autonomy may involve several public policies and strategies related with the role. Arie Kacowicz (2008) argues that Latin American alternatives for international insertion are the result of three interrelated processes: globalization, regionalization, and nationalism, and the strategies available are the opening of the economy to the world market (in consistency with globalization), regional integration (following the path of regionalization), and fragmentation, by means of external regionalization and trans-regional relations (Kacowicz 2008, 113). The roles a State assumes may be crucial to improve international insertion. The analysis by Cameron Thies (2017, p. 663) on the repertoire of roles in Latin America include a variety of options: bastion of revolution, liberator, regional leader, regional protector, mediator, integrator, among others. Trascending the personal reference, States can also be identified with a role. In the case of Uruguay, the first mention to the possible international role that Uruguay could play is registered in the instructions of the British Foreign Secretary to Lord Ponsomby, the chief negotiator of the peace agreement that would open the way for the emergence of Uruguay as a new state. The British Foreign Secretary's instructions ordered to create a new country that would fulfill the role of a "cotton ball that would prevent two big crystals to clash and break" (quoted in Herrera, Luis Alberto, 2016), *id est* a buffer (a country between two powerful states that reduces the risk of war between them).

History of Uruguay's foreign policy during the 19th century provides evidence of several instances of resorting to that strategy, alternately, sometimes in a combined form with regular diplomatic practices. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, international insertion was conceived as closely associated with market economy and free trade agreements; from 2005 to 2015, regional integration was presented as the main strategy for international insertion along with two main directions: strengthening Uruguayan participation in regional Latin American blocs (Mercosur, UNASUR, CELAC), and pressing for the inter-regional

relations with the EU, based on the EU-Mercosur agreement of 1995. In 2015 Uruguay led an initiative for expanding relations with other regional blocs within the Latin American context, promoting an agreement between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance. Furthermore, without abandoning the option for regional integration, Uruguay has increasingly explored the bilateral way in negotiations for free trade agreements.

In a paper presented at a Seminar held in 2007, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations argued that international insertion had always been vital for Uruguay since its origins as an independent country, because it was strictly associated with the very viability of Uruguay as a nation-state (Cancela 2007). However, decisions on policies and strategies to increase or improve international insertion depend on the degree of autonomy of the State and the concept of autonomy admits two different meanings:

- a) Considering the State as an actor in international relations, autonomy refers to a specific position of the unit into the system. From a neorealist approach, the security interest is related to two main goals: security (to protect and, if possible, to increase the autonomy and influence of the state).
- b) Focusing on the unit, the concept of autonomy refers to independence of the State with respect to civil society. in two main ways: concerning the balance between state power and the influence of socio-economic interests, research in economic history of Uruguay demonstrates the existence of an important degree of relative autonomy of the State in its relations with private sector actors which resulted from the specific nature of the process of modernization in the late 19th century (Finch 2005, 16-17), even though it does not completely fulfill the conditions defining as "embedded autonomy", in Peter Evans terms (Evans, 1995, 12), according to which the State is based upon a rational bureaucracy immune to pressures from rent-seeking private groups, and the State élite members are enmeshed in social relations that put them in close contact with relevant civil society actors.

Approaches to Autonomy in Foreign Policy of Uruguay

The concept of autonomy has been the core idea in Latin American Foreign policy formulation (Briceño and Simonoff, 2015, p. 9-18). In the case of Uruguay, its geopolitical condition as a small country sided by two powerful nations explains why foreign policy played a decisive role in securing national independence and autonomy. International insertion was from the start a major concern in foreign policy design. Different alternatives were a matter of debate: one line of policy pointed at relations with the Great powers as the means to secure independence: British diplomatic mediation in 1828 set the basis for close economic relations with the British Empire during a long period extending up to the

end of World War II. A second line of policy pointed to a focus on closer relations with Latin American countries in the Southern Cone. Concerning the practice of foreign relations, the so-called "pendulum of diplomacy" (Herrera, 1912), between Brazil and Argentina, was adopted to increase independence during a long period of history characterized by the rivalry between the two big nations of the Southern Cone.

Multilateralism, a long-lasting line of foreign policy in Uruguay

The participation of Uruguay in the second international conference organized at The Hague in 1907 provided the occasion for a Uruguayan initiative for a new line in international politics presented by the then president of Uruguay, José Batlle y Ordóñez. The agenda of the first meeting included topics of relevance for Latin American countries such as the adoption of systems of arbitration to settle international disputes and prevent foreign intervention. The Uruguayan response to this question was a proposal framed into previous Latin American experiences of arbitration, that put forward a system of conflict solution based upon compulsory and unlimited arbitration as the way to settle disputes among states peacefully, it included the creation of an independence arbitration Court to be established at The Hague and a declaration confirming the Latin American principle of nonintervention (Turcatti, 1981, p. 11-26). This was the starting point of a long-lasting domestic consensus on the Uruguayan commitment with peace and multilateralism, first at the League of Nations, and after 1945, at the United Nations, although not without critical views: the most relevant question in debate was the participation of Uruguay in the UN mission for the stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) against which a variety of civil society organizations mobilized in support of self-determination of the Haitian people, the non-intervention principle, and defense of Latin American interests. A debate on this issue in Parliament ended with the resignation of a member of the Chamber.

Regionalism and Foreign Policy

According to a well-established conceptual framework in foreign policy design in Uruguay, concentric circles provide a useful guide to assign priority in external relations following an order from the immediate neighbours (Argentina and Brazil), then the American continent, and finally the World. The influence of the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) introduced a new approach to international insertion focused on economic development and strong relations with Latin American countries among which the neighbors of Uruguay played a leading role. Ideational variables as Latin American identity, perceptions of common interests and shared values and beliefs in the need for the uniting of Latin America as a basis for development, were central ideas in debates on domestic policy-making and foreign policy design as well as in

international organisms like ECLAC and played a relevant part in the decision to join the movement towards regional integration.

Uruguay relations with Latin American countries evolved from bilateralism to regionalism: It became a member of ECLAC from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s: the treaty that organized the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) which was the result of joint efforts of politicians and technocrats identified with the integration process (Nye 1971, p. 62-63), and was signed in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1960. In the 1990s, after the creation of Mercosur, regionalism became the *mot d'ordre* in policies of international insertion. This view was generally shared by most Latin American countries.

The Uruguayan preference for regionalism has also been explained in domestic political debates as a response to external factors: the convergence in foreign trade policies of Argentina and Brazil and the cooperation agreements signed by both countries after 1985, persuaded the Uruguayan government to set in motion a policy of rapprochement to its neighboring countries. The traditional “pendulum of diplomacy” had become obsolete. Furthermore, the dominant perception in governmental circles was that a movement toward regional blocs would shape the world. As a result of negotiations carried out after a first meeting in 1988, Uruguay finally joined the Southern bloc signing up the Treaty of Asunción in March 1991.

Uruguay adopted the model of open regionalism (ECLAC 1994) which framed the external relations of Mercosur countries (Luján 2010: 355) but added a specific emphasis on institutions and norms, particularly on the organization of the *Tribunal Permanente de Revisión*, a court for the settlement of disputes in Mercosur, created in 2004 following the stipulations of the Protocol of Olivos (2002). During its term on the presidency of Mercosur (July-December 2005) Uruguay presented an initiative for a high-level group with the mission of writing a proposal for the institutional reform of Mercosur. Uruguay backed the creation of the Parliament of Mercosur even though this initiative was an object of sharp criticism from the political parties in the opposition. In the following years, the regional parliament proved to be an active forum for coordination among political parties sharing similar ideological orientations (Caetano, Carrau, Bermúdez, 2009). This was particularly the case of progressive parties such as the PT (Brasil), FA (Uruguay) and *Justicialismo* (Argentina).

The foreign policy platform in 2005 emphasized regionalism as the cornerstone of international insertion of Uruguay in the world, defining Mercosur as “our strategic option”. The growth of Uruguayan exports to Mercosur countries and the prospects of inter-regional relations with the EU, following an agreement of cooperation concluded in 1992 confirmed this optimism. Furthermore, Uruguay benefitted from the agreements Mercosur-Chile and Mercosur-Russia which resulted in a substantial increase in Uruguayan exports and several agreements of cooperation between 2006 and 2007.

From a constructivist approach, ideas, perceptions, and beliefs inter-subjectively constructed influence foreign policy design. In the case of Uruguay,

two dynamics have been central in this process: the debate involving political parties and civil society organizations and the influential action of specific epistemic communities. The main contentious issues were the nature of regionalism, the choice between open regionalism and strategic regionalism, and the role of regionalism in economic development. Though it does not completely fulfill the conditions defining “embedded autonomy” in Peter Evans terms (Evans 1995, p. 12), according to which the State is based upon a rationalized bureaucracy immune to pressures from rent-seeking private groups, and the State élites are enmeshed in social relations that put them in close contact with relevant civil society actors.

Determinants of Foreign Policy of Uruguay

British diplomatic mediation in 1828 set the basis for close economic relations with the British Empire during a period extending up to the end of World War II. A second line of thought aimed at strengthening contacts with Latin American countries. In the Southern Cone, the geopolitical condition of Uruguay led the government to play since the early days of its independent history, the “pendulum of diplomacy” between Brazil and Argentina, to preserve autonomy. As to influence, considering the small size of the country, there has been little room except for practices of “soft power”. Ideas, worldviews, and analysis of international politics have been determinant in defining options for the external relations of Uruguay.

Approaches to Foreign Policy of Uruguay

This paper adopts an integrative perspective combining theoretical contributions on foreign policy and international relations. In the case of Uruguay, the utmost importance of international insertion, due to the specific geopolitical conditions of the country, explains why foreign policy has been crucial in preserving independence and autonomy. This fact partly explains why concepts and proposals for the international system became ideational factors in the design of foreign policy.

Uruguayan expectations in international cooperation and preferences for institutions and systems of norms shaping the conduct of international relations reflect the liberal institutionalist assumption that institutions control the effects of power, uphold cooperation, and promote reciprocity (Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 42-46). Commitment to multilateralism was first made public as early as 1907 when, on the International Conference in The Hague, Uruguay presented a proposal for the creation of an international organism and a system of compulsory arbitration to secure world peace. Consistently with this idea, Uruguay signed in the Treaty of Versailles in 1918 and became a founding member of the League of Nations, playing an active role in the organization whose Council presided in 1924 and 1926. In 1945, Uruguay joined the United Nations at the San

Francisco Conference, and in 1998 it became a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This continuance of participation in international institutions is evidence of the Uruguayan preference for multilateralalateralism and confirms that one well-established strategy for international insertion has been to take part in collective action. Defense of this line of foreign policy was a component of the bipartisan consensus in the domestic political debate during the 20th century, except for some sporadic and minor attempts to revert the international position of Uruguay during the inter-war period and during the de facto government in the period 1973-1985.

The Liberal perspective, considering foreign policy as a function of state's preferences (Rittberger 2004; Moravcsik 1997) focusses both on the basic interests of the political leadership and members of the civil service, as well as the shared preferences of private actors. In the case of Uruguay, the latter should be differentiated into two main categories: businessmen organizations, and social actors, the former organized in associations like the *Asociación Rural, Cámara de Industrias, Cámara de Comercio* among other influential interest groups; the latter in a variety of civil society organizations (labor unions, student unions, women associations, and environmental movements). However, their influence on foreign policy design has been restricted to issues directly related with frequently competing specific interest groups. Moreover, inside business associations there have been contradictory interests along the divide between free trade and protectionism.

Political parties are crucial actors in the domestic political process, and in the foreign policy agenda setting, allegedly transcending sector interests (López, 2015). Not only in times of electoral campaign, but in formulation of proposals of foreign policy as a component of the electoral platform, and in parliamentary debates and the media, political parties' influence on policy design and decision-making is a well-established practice (Chasquetti; Buquet, 2004). On the other hand, socialization through exchanges at international institutions and regional organisms as well as in political networks such as the São Paulo Forum and the FES, added to social actors' international participation. The role of bureaucracy and political parties has been central in the analysis of public policies in Uruguay, being the country defined as a "*partidocracia*" (Caetano, Pérez, Rilla, 1987). The interplay between state bureaucrats and party politics is one major field of research in Political Science, and in foreign policy studies this implies focussing on the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the recruitment of diplomats, and their connections with political actors. Party Conventions, and debates over electoral platforms regularly include foreign policy guidelines.

Political parties are crucial actors in the domestic political process, and in the foreign policy agenda setting, allegedly transcending economic sector interests (López, 2015). Not only in times of electoral campaign, but in formulation of proposals of foreign policy as a component of the electoral platform, and in parliamentary debates and the media, political parties' influence on policy design and decision-making is a well-established practice. On the other

hand, socialization through exchanges at international institutions and regional organisms as well as in political networks such as the Sao Paulo Forum set the basis for cross-border political agreements.

The role of bureaucracy and political parties has been central in the analysis of public policies in Uruguay, being the country defined as a "*partidocracia*" (Caetano, Pérez, Rilla, 1987). The interplay between state bureaucrats and party politics is one major field of research in Political Science, and in foreign policy studies this implies focussing on the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the recruitment of diplomats, and their connections with political actors. Party Conventions, and debates over electoral platforms provide the room for dialog UE and collaboration among politicians and bureaucrats.

However, areas of foreign policy involving high level knowledge and expertise, as it is the case of issues dealt with at multilateral organisms, are better understood from the Statist approach (Krasner 2009, 25-35) which highlights the specifics of the decision-making process, expertise, and the intellectual work of analysis, and elaboration of hypotheses and alternative courses of action. Far from the idea of the State as a unified rational actor, Krasner maintains that the State has purposes of its own and that the national interest does have empirical reality if it is defined as a consistent set of objectives sought by central decision makers. The constructivist approach contributes useful insights into the process of formulation of alternatives in foreign policy as a resultant of complex social interactions: according to Rittberger (2004) actors seek to conform to the inter-subjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behavior emanating from the social environment. Research from this perspective will focus on the question of how to identify the standards of behavior that a state recognizes as binding on itself.

The process of socialization is the key factor that explains the actor's choices. Ideational variables such as ideas, beliefs, world views, identity, and culture, shape in different ways values and patterns of international behavior. Particularly social norms, internalized in the process of socialization, are key in shaping standards of behavior. Internalization acts in three main ways for foreign policy actors: as citizens, through their political career, and in legitimating their representation of the State depending on their compliance with norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) differentiate various levels in socialization processes: while at the national societal level, internalized norms shape a State foreign policy and decision-makers behavior, trans-national socialization causes policymakers internalize value-based expectations at the systemic level. Norms adopted by the international society or norms applying to a group of countries (for instance, the members of a regional bloc), and norms originated in the domestic society: a norms-consistent policy would be the essence of constructivist understanding of foreign policy.

Ideational factors influencing Uruguayan foreign policy design are ideas on the value of norms, institutions, international law, and democracy, inter-subjectively constructed in political and societal debate and the academia, are

closely related to the value of peace, as the basis for justice, stability, and prosperity. The belief in multilateralism as a shield for protection of weak nations is firmly rooted in Uruguayan political culture and recurrently present in state documents and writings as well as in declarations of political parties and civil society organizations.

Multilateralism

Commitment to multilateralism and peace has been a long-lasting line of policy starting in 1907 with the proposal presented by President José Batlle y Ordóñez at the International Conference in The Hague (Turcatti, 1981, p. 15-26). In 1952, Uruguay joined the United Nations Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan 6 (UNMOGIP), operating on the border between these countries, in Kashmir and Jammu since January 1949, with the mission to monitor activities in the immediate vicinity of the borderline, and to report to the UN General Secretary on incidents and cases of violation of ceasefire. From then on, Uruguayan participation in UN peacekeeping operations increased (González 2014).

The first time Uruguay joined the Security Council as a non-permanent member (1965-1966) coincided with the Cold War era, at a period marked by conflicts in Cyprus, Kashmir, South Rhodesia, Congo, Syria, and the US intervention in the Dominican Republic. When in August 2008 the first Vázquez administration decided to present Uruguayan aspirations for a new term, this background as a contributor to the UN peacekeeping effort was invoked as the main basis in support of the application. In December 2015, Uruguay started a two-year period as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

Designing the strategy for its role in the organization, the government considered it was crucial to secure the domestic consensus strengthening coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Legislative Power, and other state agencies. The bases for this consensus were defining multilateralism as the best way to face global challenges, increase cooperation among nations, and establish the basis for sustainable development, respect for the law of nations, pacific settlement of conflicts, defense of human rights, democracy, and non-intervention. The final goal should be that the international community would recognize the role of Uruguay as a defender of global public goods such as the maintenance of peace and international security, promotion of disarmament, and involvement with the combat to climate change (Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2015, p. 4).

Besides Uruguay, the non-permanent state members of the Security Council during the first year were: Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, Angola, Egypt, Senegal, Venezuela, and Ukraine. In January 2016, Uruguay was the president of the organism and introduced two problems in general debates: protection of civilians in armed conflicts (January 19th) and the Middle East conflict (January 26th). During most of 2016, the agenda was dominated by conflicts in Africa. This section presents an account of the positions defended by the

representatives of Uruguay. At an open debate held on the 23rd of February, the representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Elbio Roselli, introduced a gender perspective highlighting the positive contributions that could be expected from women participation in peacekeeping operations, along the lines of the UN Resolution 1325 approved in 2000 on women, peace, and security, and pointed to the responsibility of African governments to promote good practices to increase women participation. He recommended the approval of additional funding for programs focused on gender equality and women empowerment (Uruguay Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Misión Permanente de Uruguay ante las Naciones Unidas, 2016).

In the area of the Great Lakes, the main problems were related to post-conflict situations dealt with by peace support operations. At an open debate on this subject, Uruguay defended the role played by the African Union, the positive prospect of elections for human rights, rule of law, and economic development. The negative facts were gender violence, serious restrictions in access to food supply for a large number of people and the growth of displaced populations and increasing numbers of refugees (Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, March 21st, 2016).

The open debate on the 25th of April, over the consolidation of peace in Western Africa, focused on transnational maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea, piracy, and armed robbery: since the 1990s, the region has been facing acts of piracy and attacks to navigation. The Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa have discussed different proposals for a comprehensive and integrated strategy to confront the escalation of conflict in the area. The Uruguayan representative argued that regional coordination should be complemented with global action due to the global nature of piracy and crime.

At the session convened for the approval of the Resolution 2285 (29th April, 2016) on the renewal of mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO in Spanish) until April 30th, 2017, the representative of Uruguay explained that his country agreed with the proposal of renewal but not with several unilateral decisions made by the government of Morocco, nor with the terms of the proposed resolution because of several conceptual imprecisions; he demanded some changes in the text but they were not approved, and consequently, Uruguay voted against it. Uruguay started diplomatic relations with the Arab Saharahui Republic on the 26th of December 2005.

Concurring with Venezuela, the Uruguayan representative said that Morocco's sovereign, but unilateral decision had radically changed MINURSO's operations, and surprisingly the resolution contained no reference to that decision. Among other things, the three-month timeline for the Mission's return to full functionality was a long one to fulfill its mandate, and the resolution did not give the instruments or guarantees it required (Security Council Extend Mandate of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara). At the open debate

on terrorism and international security, held on the 11th of May, the Uruguayan Ambassador stated that terrorism was a global threat and every action against it should be framed into the Charter of the United Nations. He presented a disaggregated analysis on the problem and argued that the solution should be multidimensional and based on international coordination and cooperation to combat illegal financial support to terrorism, and to create a system of norms and good practices (United Nations, Security Council, 11 May 2016, S/PV 7690).

Finally, at the session of May 24th, on African Union Peace and Security Cooperation, Chapter VIII application and the future of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Uruguayan Ambassador addressed the question of the growing number and complexity of conflicts in Africa and reminded that 90% of peace-keeping operations are deployed in Africa and that a number of asymmetrical threats were posed by non-state actors whose relationship with transnational criminal organizations has made it very difficult to isolate and solve problems. From this perspective, he argued that partnership with international actors, regional and sub-regional organizations, becomes most important. New threats to international peace and security and grave humanitarian crises require now more than ever before the development of close regional and global alliances which will make more effective responses possible. This argument concluded that it was necessary to revitalize the provisions of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to guarantee international peace and security more effectively (United Nations, Security Council, 7694th meeting, 9-10).

Ideas and beliefs concerning regionalism potential for international insertion became a matter of controversy for different epistemic communities, along the lines of the disciplines involved: economists gradually became increasingly skeptical about the regional strategy, particularly after the much-desired inter-regional agreement between Mercosur and the EU was several times postponed (Vaillant, 2014). The dichotomy between insertion in the region (MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CELAC) and insertion into “the world” set the terms of the policy choices. The argument for the first option defines belonging to the regional bloc as a necessary move for a small country to succeed in gaining bargaining power and strengthening international insertion. On the other hand, defenders of insertion into the world rely on the capacity of the Nation state to negotiate bilateral agreements with other states to increase the access to markets and cooperation networks. The so-called Chilean model would be the most successful example of this policy option (Albertoni 2011, p. 51-59).

Uruguay considered in 2006 the prospects of revising its strategy of international insertion following the path of Chili, starting with a proposal for introducing flexibility in Uruguayan participation in Mercosur. Nevertheless, this idea, which was supported by some members of the government, encountered strong opposition from members of the Cabinet and Parliament, social organizations, and several business associations Porcecancky 2010, 120-122 and 138-143). In the absence of political consensus, international insertion through regionalism remained as the major direction in Uruguayan foreign policy.

According to Carlos Luján (2010, 360-364) the main questions in debate along the period 2005-2010 were the model of regionalism (open regionalism vs. strategic regionalism), alleged deficits of Mercosur (low degree of internalization of Mercosur norms, Argentinian reluctance to ensure compliance with the decision of the TPR concerning the blockade of routes and bridges over the river Uruguay by local environmentalists, paralysis in negotiations for an inter-regional agreement with the EU), and the priorities in the election of areas for international insertion (the Southern Cone, South America, Latin America, Asia).

During the period 2010-2015, Mercosur was again the subject of political dissent: the positions of Uruguay in favor of the suspension of Paraguay after the impeachment against former President Fernando Lugo, and of the accession of Venezuela (blocked by Paraguay in previous successive summits of Mercosur) were vociferously condemned by leaders of the opposition in Parliament. On the other hand, the decision to join the Pacific Alliance in the capacity of observer was the object of criticism from left-wing members of the governing coalition and civil society organizations, but enthusiastically backed by business associations (Clemente, López, Telias, 2015, p. 11)

Challenges and Responses

Challenges arising from the international system led to new policy elections. Two main changes have had direct impact on the foundations of Uruguayan foreign policy and call into question some of the basic assumptions that have shaped policy design: first, the mega-regional trade agreements and its implications for multilateralism; second, the increasing fragility of regionalism. The new wave of mega-regional agreements confronts the multilateral system of trade with proposals for a new set of rules and disciplines covering a broad range of issues: intellectual property rights, environment, labor, and public health, competing against multilateral norms and standards, and possibly undermining the whole multilateral system. Concerning the national state, the issues at stake have been the object of public policies for social and economic development, so that the projected new regulations over government procurement and state-owned enterprises are perceived as an intrusion into the country's policy space. Besides, the deadlock at the Doha Development Round affected the position Uruguay had backed since 2005 after joining the group headed by India and Brazil at the WTO meeting in Cancun.

The negotiations for Uruguay's accession to the Trade in services agreement (TISA) coincided with the transition to the second Vázquez administration: contacts started in 2012 and on the 4th of February 2015 Uruguay joined the group. But the government inaugurated in March 2015 had no information about this fact: negotiations had been carried out in great secrecy until the details of the agreement became known by the media. The agreement included regulatory disciplines in all services including the financial services and insurance, pres-

cribed national treatment to foreign investors, and explicitly established that the government could not regulate or reject private undertakings, once a sector had been open to private initiative, nor could the State nationalize a sector that had previously been privatized.

The opposition to TISA gained support in labor unions connected with a worker's federation of the Southern Cone, students' associations, and the intellectual community: the areas considered at risk were the telecommunications where the state had made huge investments in infrastructure and innovation, the state-owned enterprises, and the pharmaceutical undertakings. The contention with Philip Morris caused the Uruguayan people to feel ill-disposed toward remote investor-state disputes settlement. The decision made by the President confirmed López's argument: Vázquez declared that he would consult the governing party (Frente Amplio) and would act accordingly. Few days later, Uruguay left TISA (*La Diaria* 2015). Disenchantment, manifest in Brexit, and the paralysis of Mercosur, has led the Uruguayan government to the option of bilateralism.

Argentina (2015) and Brazil (2016) have produced changes in the foreign policy of both countries: as in a return to the origins, the revival of the bilateral alliance which started the process leading to Mercosur, is described by Felix Peña as "the hardcore of the construction of a South American geographic space" (Peña 2015, p. 311). Facing the new scenarios, and without abandoning the regional bloc, Uruguay has undertaken what it called "multiple bilateralism" understood as a series of bilateral agreements for specific purposes. As early as 2009, Uruguay negotiated several agreements with Chile, Vietnam, Cuba, Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, Ecuador, New Zealand, Malaysia, Portugal, and the Council of Cooperation of the Persian Gulf (Presidencia de la República, 2009). The second Vázquez administration gave a new start to bilateralism in order to "be in the world" the first result of which is an agreement with Chile.

Nevertheless, regional integration is still the main alternative in international insertion policy: a document presented by the federation of business associations recommended to negotiate with third parties acting jointly with Mercosur partners, to increase bargaining power and minimize costs, but it also advised to advance in bilateral negotiations which should be seen as complementary (CONFEDERACIÓN DE CÁMARAS EMPRESARIALES 2016).

Concluding remarks

The analysis presented in this chapter highlights the specificities of foreign policy design in a small country as Uruguay and the nature of the elections made in front of external factors affecting the choices previously made between lines of policies and courses of action in consistency with ideas of autonomy and models of international insertion. It assesses the potentialities of integrating theoretical perspectives on foreign policy and international relations to explain the complexities of relations between the unit and the system in times of change.

The explanatory power of theories discussed in this paper differs according to the focus. Liberal institutionalism contributes to comprehension of Uruguayan support for multilateralism, expectations in international cooperation, world peace, and preference for norms and institutions in the conduct of international relations, and the nature and content of domestic political debate on foreign policy. The strength of the Statist approach is manifest in explaining policy design on issues demanding cumulative knowledge, high level expertise and technical planning, as in the case of multilateral diplomacy. Finally, constructivism provides useful insights into processes of socialization, construction of identities, ideas, and values, and emergence and mobilization of social actors.

The analysis of multilateralism and regionalism as the main directions under analysis in this paper reveals differences of purpose and emphasis but also some complementarities as seen in the insistence of Uruguay on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations 13 in cooperation with UN peace-keeping operations. On the other hand, the movement toward bilateral agreements negotiations have not superseded the priority given to the regional bloc as the main basis for international insertion, despite the intensity of debates on the scope, the nature, and the role of regionalism in social and economic development.

References

Albertoni, N. (2011) *Entre el barrio y el mundo. ¿Mercosur o el modelo chileno? Dos alternativas para Uruguay*. Montevideo: Ediciones Santillana.

Almagro, L., Conde, R. and Porto, L. (2014) *200 Resultados de Política Exterior. Balance de Gestión y Principales Metas Cumplidas*. Montevideo: Tradinco.

Almagro, L. (2012) Interview in *El Observador*, February 4.

Bizzozero, I. (2008) *Uruguay en la creación del Mercosur ¿Un cambio en la política exterior?* Montevideo: Universidad de la República-CSIC.

Breuning, M. (2019). "Role Theory in Politics and International Relations." En: *The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral and Political Science*, oxford University Press

Briceño rRuiz, J. and A. Simonoff, Eds. (2015) *Integración y Cooperación Regional en América Latina. Una relectura a partir de la teoría de la autonomía*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.

Caetano, G., Perez R., Rilla, J. (1987) La Partidocracia Uruguaya. Historia y Teoría de la Centralidad de los Partidos Políticos. *Cuadernos del CLAEH*, 12 (44): 37-61.

Caetano, G., Carrau, N. Bermúdez, M. (2009) *Cuestiones de agenda. Bancada progresista en el Parlamento del MERCOSUR: un actor regional*. Montevideo: FESUR.

Cancela, J. L. (2007) El sistema global como marco de inserción de Uruguay: el contexto para la Diplomacia. En

Chasquetti, D., Buquet, D. (2004). Uruguay: una partidocracia de consenso. *Política*, No. 42, pp. 241-247. Santiago de Chile.

Ferro, L. Castro, S., Hernández Nilsson, D.; Soto, A. (Eds.). *Seminario Inserción Internacional del Uruguay*, Montevideo: Universidad de la República and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2007, 9-15.

Clemente, I. (2019). Comercio y proyección externa de Uruguay en la Cuenca del Pacífico. En: Aparicio R., M., Milton M. B., T. (Coords.), *Retos y oportunidades de la Alianza del pacífico en el actual contexto internacional convulso*. México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, pp. 155-171.

Clemente, I.; López Burian, C. Telias, D. (2015). Uruguay y la Alianza del Pacífico: ¿Repensando el modelo de inserción internacional? *Cuadernos sobre Relaciones Internacionales, Regionalismo y Desarrollo*, 10 (19): 23-46.

Clemente I. (2008). Facing the Dilemma: Uruguay in Between Mercosur and the US.

Anderson V. and Friba Christensen, S. (Eds). (2008). *New Latin American Development Strategies in a Changing International Economic and Political Context*. pp. 222-240.

Clemente, I. (2007) Inserción Internacional desde la Región. *Cuadernos del CLAEH*, 94-96: 11-33.

Clemente, I. y Ferro, L. (2004). *El golpe de Estado en Venezuela de abril de 2002 y su proyección internacional*. Montevideo: Edit. UR/FCS/Unidad Multidisciplinaria, Documento de Trabajo No. 63/2004

Confederación de Cámaras Empresariales. (2016) *Desafíos en Materia de Competitividad. Una Mirada desde el Empresariado*.

ECLAC. (1994) *Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic Integration as a Contribution to Changind Production Patterns with Social Equality*.

Evans, P. (1995) *Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Evans, P. (1993) Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflexions and Projections. In *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Evans, P. Jacobson, H. K. D. Putnam, R. D. Berkeley: University of California Press, 397-430.

Fajnzylber, F. (1991) International Insertion and Institutional Renewal. *CEPAL Review* 44: 137-166.

Flinch, H. (2005) *La economía política del Uruguay contemporáneo, 1870-2000*. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental.

Finnemore, M., Sikkink. K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4): 887-917.

González G.uyer, J. (2014) La contribución de Uruguay para operaciones de paz de Naciones Unidas: acerca de las motivaciones y la interpretación de un récord. *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, 24 (1): 41-73.

Hellmann, G., Fahrmeir, A., Vec, Miloš (Eds.), *The Transformation of Foreign Policy. Drawing and Managing Boundaries from Antiquity to the Present*, oxford: Oxford University Press.

Herrera, L. A. de. (1912) *El Uruguay internacional*. Paris: Bernard Grasset Editeur.

Herrera, L. A. de, *La Misión Ponsonby y la Independencia del Uruguay*, Buenos Aires: EUDEBA. Edición digital, 2016.

Hellmann, G., Farmeir, A., and Vec, M. (2016). *The transformation of Foreign Policy. Drawing and Managing Boundaries from Antiquity to the Preent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hill, Ch, (2016). *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Palgrave Mc Millan.

Hudson, V. (2007). The History and Evolution of Foreign Polcy Analysis. Smith, S., Hadfield, A., Dunne, T., (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11-30.

Hudson, V. (2005) Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (1):1-30.

Kacowicz, A. M. (2008) América Latina en el mundo globalizado: globalización, regionalización y fragmentación. *Nueva Sociedad* 214: 112-123.

Keohane, R; Martin, L. (1995) The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security* 20 (1): 39-51.

Keohane, R. (1990) Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research. *International Journal*, XLV: 731-764.

Krasner, S. (2009) *Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations*. London, New York: Routledge.

La Diaria. (2015 September 7) "Qué lástima, pero adiós."

Lopez, C. (2015) *Partidos políticos y política exterior en Uruguay (1985-2015): la importancia de las instituciones, las ideas y los intereses de los actores*. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Universidad de la República de Uruguay, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales.

Mansfield, E., Milner. H. (2012) *Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guimarães, S. P. (2015) A Política externa de Helio Jaguaribe. Moreira Lima, S. E. Ed.) (*Visões da obra de Helio Jaguaribe*, Brasilia: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2015, pp.81-106.

Merke, F. (2007). *Identidad y Política Exterior en la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales*. Buenos Aries: IDisco-Universidad del Salvador.

Mingst, K. A. (1995) Uncovering the Missing Links. Linkage Actors and Their Strategies. *Foreign Policy Analysis. Continuity and Change in Its Second Generatio*. Neack, L., Hey, J.A. K., Haney, P. J. (Eds). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Moravcsik, A. (1997) Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization* 51 (4): 513-553.

NYE, J. (1971) *Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Lanham: University Press of America.

Oddone, G. (2013) *Uruguay en el mundo actual*. Montevideo: Comisión del Bicentenario.

Peña, F. (2015) Future Global and Regional Governance: A View from the Deep South. In: Moreira Lima, S. E. Ed. *Global Governance: Crossed Perceptions*. Brasilia: FUNAG, 293-313

Perez Anton, R. (2005) Rumbos y Avatares de la Política Exterior. Caetano, G. (Ed.) *20 Años de Democracia*, Montevideo: Taurus.

Perez Anton, R. (2004) Un siglo de política exterior. *El Uruguay del siglo XX. La Política*, Nahum, B., Ed. Montevideo: Ediciones Banda Oriental.

Pérez Del Castillo, C..(2014) *Inserción Internacional de Uruguay. Realidades, Desafíos, Estrategias*. Montevideo: Cámara de Comercio.

Porzecanski, R. (2010) *No voy en tren. Uruguay y las perspectivas de un TLC con Estados Unidos (2000-2010)*. Montevideo: Random House-Mondadori.

Republic Of Uruguay. (2015) *Bases para la política exterior del Uruguay*. Mimeo.

República Oriental Del Uruguay. Presidencia De La República. (2009) *Uruguay: Ser en el Mundo*, Montevideo: Secretaría de Comunicación Institucional.

Rittberger, V. (2004) *Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theory*. Working Paper N° 46, Tübingen: Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Center for International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute for Political Science.

Thies, Camearon, (2017). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 13, n° 3, 662-681.

Turcatti, D..(1981). *El equilibrio difícil. La Política internacional del Batllismo*. Montevideo: ARCA.

Uruguay. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2016). Intervención del Embajador Elbio Rosselli. Representante Permanente del Uruguay ante las Naciones Unidas. Available at http://uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/sites/uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/files/discursos/debate_abierto_pba.pdf (date of access: February 15, 2017)

Uruguay. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2016). Intervención del Embajador Elbio Roselli. Consejo de Seguridad. Debate Abierto "Prevención y Resolución de Conflictos en la Región de los Grandes Lagos. Available at: uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/sites/uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/files/discursos/debate_grandes_lagos.pdf (date of access: February 15, 2017).

United Nations Security Council. April. 25th, 2016. Peace in Western Africa. Available in: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf7B65BFCF9B-6B27-4E9C-8CD3-CF64FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7675.pdf (date of access: February 15, 2017).

United Nations. Security Council. April 29th, 2016. Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara. Available In: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12346.doc.htm> (date of access: February 16, 2017).

United nations. Security Council. May 11th, 2016. Disponible en: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B6SBFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/spv_7690.pdf (date of access: February 16, 2017).

United Nations Security Council. 7694th Meeting. May 24th, 2016. Stronger United Nations Partnership with African Union. Available in: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12370.doc.htm> (date of access: February 16, 2017).

Uruguay. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2016). Intervención del Embajador Elbio Roselli. Consejo de Seguridad. Debate Abierto "Prevención y Resolución de Conflictos en la Región de los Grandes Lagos. Available at uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/sites/uruguaycsonu.mrree.gub.uy/files/discursos/debate_grandes_lagos.pdf (date of access: February 15, 2017).

United Nations Security Council. April. 25th, 2016. Peace in Western Africa. Available in: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf7B65BFCF9B-6B27-4E9C-8CD3-CF64FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7675.pdf (date of access: February 15, 2017).

United Nations. Security Council. April 29th, 2016. Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara. Available in: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12346.doc.htm> (date of access: February 16, 2017).

United Nations. Security Council. May 11th, 2016. Available in: www.securitycouncil-report.org/atf/cf/%7B6SBFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SPV_7690.pdf (date of access: February 16, 2017).

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. 7694th Meeting. May 24th, 2016. Stronger United Nations Partnership with African Union. Available in: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12370.doc.htm> (date of access: February 16, 2017).

Vaillant, M., Vaillant, PAB. (2014). European Union-Mercosur Negotiations: A Return to Uncertainties. *Latin American Business Review* 15 (3-4):337-362.

Wendt, A. (1994) Collective Identity Formation and the International State.

CHAPTER 5

The Traditional Principles of Bolivian Foreign Policy (2006 - 2021): Ideologization before Pragmatism

Andrés Guzmán Escobari

Introduction

Throughout history, Bolivian foreign policy has been conducted on certain principles that make up the international doctrine of the former Republic of Bolivia, converted into the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009. In accordance with national interests, the geopolitical conditions, and the specific context in which the country has defined its borders and has tried to recover its access to the sea, lost in a war against Chile, these principles were formulated, adopted, and highly respected by almost all Bolivian governments. However, in the last fifteen years, with the radical change produced by the emergence of Movement to Socialism (known in Spanish as MAS), under the command of Evo Morales, Bolivian foreign policy has also radically changed and some of the traditional principles were partially or totally disrespected. In this regard, it is important to note that all these changes were not always the result of pragmatic decisions in line with Bolivian national interests, as might be believed, but rather the result of the ideologization of the foreign policy.

In fact, since 2006, the Morales government has not only changed internal policies, on economic and social issues, but has also changed Bolivian foreign policy in a way that has replaced the Bolivian doctrine of international affairs with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalistic ideologies, based on the Andean worldview of "living well" and "peoples' diplomacy." This had consequences not only on the image of the country and the effectiveness of its foreign policy, but in some cases, on Bolivia's own national interests, as we will see in the following lines.

Contrary to expectations, the ideologization of Bolivian foreign policy has been maintained over the years to the present, even during the right-wing transitional government of Jeanine Añez, who governed the country after the resignation and departure of President Morales in November 2019 until MAS won

general elections again in October 2020, with the current president Luis Arce. During the transitional government, two types of measures showed that Bolivian foreign policy had shifted to the right without leaving ideologization: 1) in the multilateral sphere, Bolivia's withdrawal from integration processes such as UNASUR and ALBA-TCP and its incorporation into the Lima Group and Prosur; and 2) in the bilateral sphere, the breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela (Maduro) on the one hand and the rapprochement with the United States, Israel and Venezuela (Guaidó) on the other.

Later, when the MAS regained power, how could it be otherwise, the Arce administration reversed almost everything again, re-entering Bolivia into the integration processes and reestablishing diplomatic relations with all the countries that the Áñez government had broken. Including the governments of Mexico and Spain, whose representatives were declared *persona non grata* and expelled from Bolivia by the transitional administration. In this regard, it is important to point out that the analysis of the foreign policy of the last fifteen years, that is, of the Morales, Áñez and Arce governments, is not an examination of results, in terms of achievements and failures, but an examination of how these governments have respected or disrespected the traditional principles of Bolivian international doctrine.

In this sense, this article is divided into six sections: 1) this brief introduction; 2) a review of the traditional principles of Bolivian international doctrine; 3) an analysis of the foreign policy of the government of Evo Morales; 4) another analysis on the external relations of the transitional administration of Jeanine Áñez; 5) the corresponding analysis on the foreign policy of the current government of Luis Arce; and finally 6) the respective conclusions about the continuities and differences found from the perspective of principism/pragmatism.

The traditional principles of Bolivian foreign policy

For almost one hundred years, that is, from the founding of the Republic in 1825 to the 1930s, Bolivian foreign policy was directed mainly at ensuring its territorial status. For this reason, the international doctrine of Bolivia was mainly based on the principle of the *uti possidetis juris* of 1810, which defined the borders of the nations that became independent from Spain, and "the diplomacy of lawyers" (Ostria, 1953: 21), in reference to the ruling elite of the 19th century.¹ After the Chaco War (1932 - 1935) and the signing of the 1938 Treaty with Paraguay, with which Bolivia finished delimiting its borders, a new Bolivian international doctrine emerged, a doctrine based on foreign policy principles that are still in force today. Certainly, under the motto "Bolivia, land of contacts and not antagonisms", coined in 1936 by former Foreign Minister Fernando Guachalla, other

¹The ruling elite was composed of men educated mainly in law, at the San Francisco Xavier University from Chuquisaca, its most illustrious exponents were Casimiro Olañeta, Rafael Bustillo, Tomás Frias, Mariano Baptista and Eliodoro Villazón.

renowned Bolivian diplomats, such as Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, Enrique Finot, David Alvéstegui and Eduardo Diez de Medina, developed an international doctrine over certain objectives and principles that have not been fully met yet (Saavedra, 2002: 1).

The objectives were basically three: 1) break the international isolation of Bolivia by taking advantage of the country's geographic location, embedded in the center of the continent; 2) connect Bolivia with its neighbors by railways and pipelines, in order to work as an articulating axis between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans; and 3) recover at least a port of its own in the Pacific, considering compensations for Chile and eventually Peru (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 2004: 105-275). This third objective arose during the prevalence of "the diplomacy of lawyers", in 1910, with the Sánchez Bustamante Memorandum, but it was maintained and later incorporated into the new Bolivian international doctrine, which is still valid (Mesa, 2018: 173). The principles, on the other hand, can be divided into two groups: the general ones that are shared with other countries and those specific to Bolivia. The general ones are: 1) continue with compliance with Public International Law; 2) resolve conflicts with other states by peaceful means only, giving priority to negotiated settlements; 3) reject any interference in the internal affairs of states; and 4) not to recognize territorial annexations by force (Salazar, 2000: 52-58).

The specific principles are: 1) continue with the "invariable and frank international policy" of Bolivia; 2) assert the Bolivian position, as the only country with a presence in the Pacific, Amazon and El Plata basins; 3) enforce Bolivia's right of free transit over the territory that interferes with its passage to the sea; and 4) not reestablishing diplomatic relations with Chile without lifting or committing to lift the landlocked situation of Bolivia (Diez de Medina, 1923: 1; Ostria, 1953: 21-25; Arze, 1991: 287-290; Escobari, 2000: I 371-373). From all these principles, the not recognizing territorial annexations by force and the enforcement of Bolivia's right of free transit to the sea were questioned, if not totally disrespect, by the MAS governments, as we will see in the next sections. For these reasons, in the next lines a review of these two principles is presented, as a background for the analysis of Bolivian foreign policy in the last fifteen years, which is developed in the following sections.

Non-recognition of territorial annexations by force

In 1932, when the Chaco war was not over yet, nineteen American nations, including the two belligerents, signed a Declaration condemning territorial annexations by force: "The Nations of America also declare –once the document is finished– that they will not recognize any territorial settlement of this controversy that is not obtained by peaceful means, nor the validity of territorial acquisitions that are obtained by occupation or conquest by force of arms" (3/08/1932). Although this Declaration was reluctantly signed by Bolivia because it had been conceived to pressure the Bolivian government to stop taking

Paraguayan positions (forts), its foreign minister, Julio A. Gutiérrez, declared that it “interprets with perfect certainty Bolivian thought that for fifty years it has been protesting against the war of conquest” (Díaz, 1954: 100). Later, as this declaration favored Bolivia in the peace negotiations with Paraguay, Bolivian diplomacy adopted it as part of its international doctrine.

Something similar happened with the Non-Aggression and Anti-War Conciliation Treaty, signed in Rio De Janeiro on October 10, 1933, also known as the Saavedra Lamas Pact. Through it, its subscribers declared that “territorial issues should not be resolved with violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial settlement that is not obtained by peaceful means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories that is achieved by force of arms” (article 2). The Bolivian government did not sign this treaty at first but expressed “—although it had not attended Rio de Janeiro— its total adherence to the anti-war pact signed on that occasion by the signatory governments, in correlation with the pacifist policy that it has always maintained”. (Parrón, 2015) Later, when the situation in the Chaco turned adverse, Bolivia adhered to the Anti-War Pact without any reservation.

The American Declaration of 1932 and the Anti-War Pact of 1933 were later included in the non-aggression bilateral agreements signed with Peru and Chile, in 1936 and 1941 respectively. Both were negotiated by Alberto Ostriá Gutiérrez, as ambassador first and Foreign Minister later, always in line with the principle of not recognizing territorial annexations. In the case of Chile, which is a country that has annexed Bolivian territories, the agreement represented an important advance in bilateral relations, by pointing out that both countries: “reaffirm their complete agreement with the principle of non-recognition of territorial annexations by force, enshrined in the American declaration of August 3, 1932; in the Rio de Janeiro anti-war pact of October 10, 1933, and in Resolution XXVI of the Eighth International American Conference, within the terms in which such agreements were signed” (16/01/1941).

Subsequently, despite the constant changes of government, Bolivia maintained its adherence to the principle of non-recognition of territorial annexations, supporting all international initiatives aimed at its fulfillment. In 1945 and 1948, Bolivia signed the UN and OAS Charters, committing to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. In the same direction, in 1970, it signed the Friendly Relations Resolution of the UN General Assembly, which declared: “the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal”.

Likewise, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bolivia has historically condemned Israel’s expansionist policy on Palestine, expressing its solidarity with those affected by the illegal occupation of their territories. In accordance with its traditional principles, Bolivia has always supported multilateral resolutions which reject Israeli annexations, as Resolution 242 (1967) of the UN Security Council, which emphasizes “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”.

Enforcing Bolivia's right of free transit to and from the sea

The principle of enforcing Bolivia's right of free transit to and from the sea was not adopted along with many other countries, as was the principle of non-recognition of territorial annexations. In fact, this principle was incorporated as a part of the Bolivian foreign policy before the international community paid attention to it, only in the 1950s. By that time, Bolivia had already signed free transit treaties with all its neighbors, defining and enshrining its right of free transit to and from the sea.

With Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia signs the treaties of 1867 and 1868 respectively, by means of which its free fluvial transit to the Atlantic was ensured. Later, as a consequence of the loss of its only sovereign access to the sea in the Pacific war (1879-1884) against Chile, the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires extend this right of free transit to land routes through the treaties of 1910 and 1938 in the first case and of 1937 in the second (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1943: V).

With Paraguay, which is a country that was born without a coastline and the only one that currently shares that condition with Bolivia in the entire American continent, two free river and rail transit agreements were signed: the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Limits (article 7) and the 1939 Protocol on Economic Cooperation and Transit Facilities (article 2). On the other hand, with the Pacific countries, due to the intrinsic problems and the greater land traffic, a large number of agreements were signed that define with enough precision the conditions and characteristics of the right of free transit of Bolivia in the territory and ports of Peru and Chile.

In the case of Peru, which until the Pacific War had the port of Arica that was always "the natural port of Bolivia" due to its proximity and accessibility, the first free transit treaty was signed in 1863. That treaty establishes that Bolivia will continue "the absolute freedom of transit that today enjoys through Arica, for all the products of its soil and industry that it exports abroad, as well as overseas merchandise that enters Bolivia through that way" (article 25). Then, when the domains on the coast changed as a result of the war, both countries subscribe free transit agreements in 1905, 1908, 1917 (two instruments), 1918 and 1948. This last one is the Peru-Bolivian Transit Agreement, by which the parties agreed to "grant each other free transit through their respective territories, unrestrictedly, at all times and circumstances and for all kinds of cargo" (article 1).

Regarding Chile, the free transit regime was agreed for the first time in the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, in which Chile recognizes in favor of Bolivia the broadest and perpetual right of free transit to the sea through its territory and ports, including the Arica - La Paz railway. All this in compensation for the extensive, rich, and unique Bolivian maritime coast (Diez de Medina, 1936: 15-18).

However, the problems began with the implementation of the Treaty as early as 1906 and then continued virtually without interruption to this day. Some of the most important historical milestones are: the Chilean arrests of some

of the arms shipments that Bolivia needed to defend itself in the Chaco War (1932 - 1935) disputed with Paraguay; the lack of respect for the jurisdiction of Bolivian customs over cargo in transit to Bolivia in the 1950s and then again throughout the 21st century; port strikes that interrupt the free transit regime that should be "perpetual"; the absolute paralysis of the Arica-La Paz railway on the Chilean side of the border; and the privatization of ports, with which in practice, the Chilean State has delegated its obligations regarding the free transit of Bolivia to private companies (Agramont *et al*, 2016: 104-108).

Some of these problems led the parties to sign: the 1905 Convention for the Construction of the Arica - La Paz Railway, which establishes the obligation to ensure free traffic of the train in "perpetuity" (article 12); the 1912 Commercial Traffic Convention, which grants free storage to Bolivian imports for up to one year (article 12); the 1937 Transit Convention, which specifies that free transit includes all kinds of cargo (article 1), including weapons, and states that only Bolivian authorities have jurisdiction over the cargo in transit to Bolivia (article 4/d); the 1953 Arica Declaration, which obliges local authorities not to interfere in the process of trespassing the cargo in transit to or from Bolivia (article 1); and the 1996 Viña del Mar Protocol, which grants free storage to Bolivian exports for up to 60 days (article 2).

But while Bolivia's right of free transit was well defined and enshrined in the mid-20th century, the international community had done very little until then to define and codify the right of free transit of the landlocked states (LLS). After lengthy discussions that began in 1921 in Barcelona, the international community agreed to recognize the right of free transit starting in 1965, when the United Nations approved the Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States. On that occasion, the representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay proposed reaffirming the right of all landlocked States (LLS) to free access to the sea and to "unrestricted" transit (Uprey, 2005: 63-70).

Although the part of unrestricted transit was not accepted, at the end the Convention recognized the right of free transit of all LLS and therefore, when signing the document, the Bolivian delegate declared: "that Bolivia is not a landlocked State but a nation which is deprived by temporary circumstances of access to the sea across its own coast and that unrestricted and unconditional freedom of transit must be recognized in international law as an inherent right of enclosed territories and countries for reasons of justice and because of the need to facilitate such transit as a contribution to general progress on a basis of equality" (UN, n/d).

The process to codify the Law of the Sea took several years from the 60s until 1982. At that time, the Bolivian delegates, Walter Guevara (1988: 239) and Felipe Tredinnick (1995: 293), made significant proposals that were taken into account in the final text of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), not only in relation to the right of free transit of the LLS, but also with respect to other related issues, such as the enjoyment of the Common Heritage of Humanity (natural resources of the continental shelf and of the seabed and its subsoil).

Finally, in relation to free transit, the UNCLOS establishes: "Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport" (article 125).

The foreign policy of the long government of Evo Morales

When Evo Morales came to power in 2006, with a devastating and historic electoral victory, many things changed in Bolivia in terms of politics and State's administration: the refounding of the nation with the purpose of changing the relations of the State with the economy and society, but also with the international community (Ceppi, 2014: 126). Along this path, Bolivian foreign policy adopted new principles, which tried to offer an alternative not only for the country's external relations, but even for the international order. Indeed, among these principles conceived under an indigenous worldview, the most important one, known as "living well" (*vivir bien*), was proposed as an alternative to capitalism (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014: 58). This principle of "living well" was formally defined by the Bolivian Foreign Ministry (2014: 58) as "the fundamental principle of Bolivian foreign policy, which in international relations means establishing relations of complementarity, cooperation and solidarity among all States and peoples of the world. Living well is a civilizing project that implies harmony among all forms of life, an alternative project to capitalism as an alienating form of society and nature".

Although this approach is somewhat understandable because it took place in a context of empowerment of the Latin American left, led by Cuba and Venezuela; It also happened in an increasingly capitalist world, in which traditionally communist countries, such as China, Russia or Vietnam, had openly turned towards capitalism (Saavedra, 05/10/2021). In these circumstances, the principle of "living well", as an alternative to capitalism, was not even considered in a world in which international relations are governed by power and interests, and the dominant way of understanding and analyzing the interaction among States and other actors of the international community is still the realistic theory.

Another important pillar of this new approach is the concept of "people's diplomacy", which is instrumental to the principle of "living well" and is defined as "a concept through which the actors of international relations expand". (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014: 111) Its implementation does not deny that the States are the main actors of the international arena, "but it complements and expands them in such a way that the peoples in their broadest sense and the social movements in their most restricted level, are the ones that are also actors of the inter-state relations".

Despite this concept is just another way of defining "para-diplomacy", in accordance to the traditional international relations theory, it has served the MAS

administration as an effective slogan to mark differences with previous governments. This is so, because the prevailing perception is that “public diplomacy” is no longer practiced, but only “people’s diplomacy” that sounds more progressive and inclusive. However, during the Morales government, the participation of peoples or social movements in the decision-making process of foreign policy was marginal, if not totally nil.²

According to the many speeches, signals, and few publications on foreign affairs that the MAS government launched in its nearly 14 years in power,³ Bolivia’s international policy was focused on opposing and denouncing the United States for absolutely everything. The essence of Bolivian foreign policy, much more than the principles, was the anti-imperialist ideology that Evo Morales himself used against the US with zeal and pride. In fact, when he was president, Morales used to say that the entire revolution he led should be anti-imperialist and anti-capitalistic. Once, in time to inaugurate an anti-imperialist school for the Bolivian army, Morales said that he will die anti-imperialist (Sputnik, 05/08/2018).

With this new approach of foreign policy, clearly influenced by the ideology of the ruling party, most of the traditional principles discussed in the previous sections were set aside, and some of them were even disrespected. In the next lines we will revise two cases, in which the Morales government privileged its ideology over the national interest of Bolivia and did not comply with traditional principles of the Bolivian international doctrine.

Loss of the ATPDEA benefits

Bolivia was favored with tariff preferences to access the United States market, through the Andean Trade Preferences Law (ATPA) of 1991. This Law was promulgated by President Bill Clinton to encourage the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) to reduce drug cultivation and trafficking. Later, in 2002, the Law was renamed the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which was in force until December 15, 2008, when President George W. Bush decided to exclude Bolivia from that regulation, claiming non-compliance of the Morales government in the war against drugs.⁴

² The Law 699, of International Relationship of Autonomous Territorial Entities, approved in 2015, forbids local governments to sign agreements with other local governments of countries with which Bolivia does not have diplomatic relations (article 11). In other words, “peoples’ diplomacy” with countries like Israel or Chile is restricted because the city of La Paz cannot sign agreements with Jerusalem or Arica, as an example.

³ The only management documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 13 years and nine months that Morales governed Bolivia, were a working report from 2006 and 2013 intitle “La revolución democrática y cultural, y su política exterior” (2014) and a strategic plan for the period 2013 – 2017, intitle “Plan Estratégico Institucional. Política Exterior Soberana para Vivir Bien” (2012).

⁴The “war against drugs” was firstly declared in 1972 by the US president Richard Nixon and ratified at the beginning of the 1980s by Ronald Reagan (Gamarra, 2021: 1)

Although Bolivia did not take advantage of the Law like the rest of the Andean countries (Duran, 2017: 118), the Bolivian textile sector grew vigorously during those years, with a high potential to become a source of employment for hundreds of thousands of Bolivians. In these circumstances, in which there were around 40,000 people working in the textile sector thanks to the ATPDEA (IBCE, 2009), Evo Morales decided to privilege his anti-imperialist ideology, putting aside the interests of the textile sector, and favoring the interests of the coca-growing sector. Certainly, the decision of confronting the US empire was not only inspired by foreign policy objectives but also by the electoral purposes of Morales, who wanted to satisfy the hundreds of thousands of coca growers who were already supporting him for the 2009 presidential elections.

For these reasons, in 2008, Morales declared the United States Ambassador *persona non grata*, under accusations of conspiracy, and then expelled the Drug Enforcement Agency from Bolivia, with a speech that put dignity and sovereignty before the economic interests of the nation. What marked a clear difference with the previous Bolivian governments, totally aligned with Washington's policies. In this regard, it is important to remember that the administrations of the neoliberal era (1985-2005) and previous ones, were too compliant with the White House, which had a very strong influence on the political decisions of Bolivia and on the appointments that had to be done (Gamarra, 2021: 1). In this sense, the disruptive actions of Morales had a positive impact on his popularity since not only the coca growers saw all this as a dignifying policy, but also many other Bolivians.

Morales knew that his anti-imperialist ideology served as an electoral magnet because that was the key that helped him expand his popularity earlier. In 2002, when he first ran for president without much choice, Manuel Rocha, the US ambassador, pushed his candidacy by threatening to cut US aid to La Paz if Morales were elected (Birns & Sanchez, 2011: 104). The result was impressive, Morales was second in electoral preferences, just two percentage points behind the first, which made him the sure winner of the next elections that, after bloody conflicts and some changes of government, were held in 2005. On that occasion, Morales obtained an unquestionable victory with more than 54% of the votes and started the longest presidency in Bolivian history, almost fourteen years, until November 2019.

The strong demonstrations of the textile workers that occurred after the loss of the ATPDEA were confronted by Morales with a rhetoric that sought to minimize the economic effect and that promised to replace the US market with the Venezuelan and Cuban,⁵ which of course never happened. Cuba did not buy a single shirt and the purchases made by Venezuela in 2010 and 2011 did not cover even half of what was lost. As a result, the textile companies had to lay off many of their workers and reduce the wages of others, but then many of those compa-

⁵ Morales spoke of a not very significant loss of "25 million dollars", stating: "The dignity of Bolivians does not cost 25 million dollars." (BBC: 1/07/2009). However, those 25 million were just the initial loss for the textile Bolivian industry in the first trimester of 2009, when the estimated loss was 200 million (ANF, 11/08/2006).

nies had to close down. As protests increased in La Paz and El Alto in 2012 the government announced the establishment of a state textile company on the ashes of the largest private textile company called Ametex, which was renamed Enatex.⁶ But the market problem continued, and the state administration proved to be inefficient and corrupt once again. Enatex survived only by millionaire state subsidies until 2016,⁷ when the government decided to close it and form Senatex, a national textile service, not a company, which meant the dismissal of the last thousand workers who were still in that business (Página Siete, 23/05/2016).

In other words, due to the anti-imperialist ideology and little interest in combating drug trafficking, the Morales government slowly let the Bolivian textile industry die, first losing the benefits of the ATPDEA and then trying to intervene in the business under the false premise that the problem would be administrative and not the market access. A huge loss not only for the tens of thousands of workers who lost their jobs, but for the socio-economic development of Bolivia, considering the added value generated by textile exports, unlike traditional Bolivian exports of minerals and hydrocarbons, which are basically raw material exports. This is how Bolivia lost the benefits of the ATPDEA, in a decision-making process in which pragmatism should have prevailed to contribute the Bolivian development of value-added industries, such as textiles. But what really prevailed were the principles of the ruling party and its ideology, not only in line with its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist philosophy, but also in line with its electoral purposes.

Recognition of the Russian Annexation of Crimea

In 2014, following the conflicts that toppled the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea that was part of Ukraine held a referendum to rejoin Russia and at the same time the Autonomous City of Sevastopol, also Ukrainian, declared its incorporation in the Russian Federation. The referendum that did not comply with the Ukrainian laws and was not authorized by Kiev, turned out to be in favor of Crimea joining Russia as a federal subject with more than 90% of the votes. In that delicate process, the government of Vladimir Putin sent troops to occupy the Crimean Peninsula in order to guarantee the integrity of the Russian citizens according to the Kremlin (Ingelevič, 2015: 36).

Most countries in the world condemned what was clearly a territorial annexation by force, because although the majority of Crimeans voted to join Russia, the procedures used by local governments and Russian authorities were

⁶ Supreme Decree 1253 of June 11, 2012.

⁷ Since Enatex was created in 2012, the government has allocated three trusts for its operation. In 2012 - regarding its creation - the amount was 53 million bolivianos (about 7 million dollars). A year later, the sum was 104 million bolivianos (about 15 million dollars through Decree 1844) and was aimed at the purchase of Ametex assets. In 2015, the figure rose to 142 million bolivianos (about 20 million dollars, through Decree 2290).

not legal at all (Ingelevič, 2015: 31-34). The Ukrainian government never agreed, neither with the referendum nor with the annexation that was later consolidated in the eyes of Europe and the United States. The map of Europe was undergoing a major change for the first time since 1945 and the UN system could not stop it, among other things, due to Russia's veto power in the Security Council.

Contrary to its traditional principle of non-recognition of territorial annexations by force, Bolivia voted against Resolution 68/262 of the UN General Assembly on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which without mentioning Russia affirmed "its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized border". Of the 169 votes registered, only 11 were against, in addition to Bolivia, Armenia, Belarus, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe voted against.⁸ That vote by the Morales government not only represented a betrayal of one of the most important principles of Bolivian foreign policy, but a contradiction with its own international actions. Indeed, just a year earlier, Bolivia had rejected the result of the referendum held in the Malvinas Islands (Falklands), in which the inhabitants of those islands had decided to continue belonging to the United Kingdom (ANF, 03/07/2013). On that occasion, the votes of the people were not as important for the Bolivian government as they were later, in the case of Crimea.

The representative of the MAS government to the UN, Sacha Llorenti, justified Bolivia's vote by accusing the United States of promoting the overthrow of Yanukovych, as if that overthrow would have given Russia permission to intervene militarily and annex Crimea. "Bolivia cannot remain silent before the interruption of a constitutional process, before the defenestration of a government elected by the votes", said the Bolivian representative, specifying that the vote did not represent "an adhesion or commendation to a particular country" (La Tercera, 27/03/2014).

But the real explanation lies in the "anti-imperialist ideology" of the MAS government, which as was crystal clear in this case, only works against the US empire and not against the Russian or any other empire. In fact, in all the voting processes in the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which Bolivia participated between 2017 and 2018 as a non-permanent member, the same Bolivian representative always voted aligned with Russia and against the United States. One of the most memorable occasions in the Security Council was when Bolivia voted against an investigation to find those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In line with Russian interests, the Bolivian representative defended the Syrian regime and rejected the investigation because it was proposed by the United States.⁹ "It happens that all empires have the illusion that they are morally superior to the rest of us... it happens that all empires

⁸ The UNGA Resolution 68/262 was approved by 100 votes in favor, 11 against and 58 abstentions, while 24 states did not participate in the vote.

⁹ The investigations had to be carried out by the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), of which Bolivia is a member.

believe themselves above the law" criticized the Bolivian representative in the corresponding session of the UN Security Council (BBC, 12/04 / 2018).

The alignment of the MAS government with Russian interests, which has eliminated the independence of Bolivian foreign policy in international forums, also happened in regional forums, where Bolivia aligned itself with the autocracies of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. In some cases, not only against the traditional principles of Bolivian international doctrine, as we have seen in the case of Crimea, but also against the country's own national interests.

The Foreign Policy of the Transitional Government of Jeanine Áñez

At first it was assumed that the government of Jeanine Áñez was not going to last long, since it had only two functions: to pacify the country that was in a turmoil and to call elections in three months. With that in mind, it was not expected to see big changes in general and even less in foreign policy. However, the difficulties in organizing the general elections in such a short time first and the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic later, inevitably prolonged Áñez in power for another nine months, in which foreign policy went through the most extreme changes imaginable.

In her first days in office, the new Foreign Ministry, Karen Longaric, broke relations with Venezuela (Maduro), withdrew Bolivia from the ALBA and UNASUR, and announced the reestablishment of relations at the highest level with the United States (El Deber, 29/12/2019). Although these were transcendental measures, they were necessary since it was not possible to continue to recognize a dictatorship as despicable as the Venezuelan one and it was urgent to improve ties with the United States, considering the commercial and economic interests that exist with that country.

Until that moment, the signals were correct, the bad decisions taken by the previous administration were being rectified in accordance with national interests and the institutionalism of the Foreign Ministry was also recovering. The excesses came later, when the Áñez government, in its intention to "de-ideologize" foreign policy and mark clear differences with the previous administration, continued to take important measures that took foreign policy to the other extreme (Deutsche Welle, 03/01/2020). Bolivia had gone from being ruled by the extreme left to being ruled by the extreme right.

In this process, besides Venezuela (Maduro), Bolivia broke with Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Spain, and Mexico. With Cuba for a tweet of its foreign minister, who called Áñez a "liar", a "coup-plotter" and a "self-proclaimed"; with Nicaragua and Iran due to economic restrictions, Áñez explained that there was nothing against those countries or their noble peoples, but it was necessary to save the money destined for those Embassies; and with Spain and Mexico, due to a confusing incident, in which some hooded Spanish men tried to enter the Mexican Embassy where several former MAS authorities were in asylum (El País, 28/12/2019).

Likewise, relations with Argentina deteriorated to the lowest level in more than 100 years, considering that since 1909, relations had been quite close and fluid. The government of Buenos Aires that initially recognized Áñez as president, later changed its position when Alberto Fernández assumed the presidency. The new administration welcomed Evo Morales as a refugee and allowed him to make political statements from its territory, which had clear destabilizing intentions.¹⁰ A particularly serious event occurred when a senior Argentine government official made a public commitment to Morales to strengthen the participation of Bolivian migrants in Argentina for the general elections, which was considered by the Áñez government as an act of interference in the Bolivian electoral process (Viceministerio de Comunicación, 24/08/2020).

Regarding the Mexican diplomatic asylum that some former MAS authorities requested because they considered themselves politically persecuted, the Áñez government granted safe-conduct for the departure of a few. However, when two of them were about to leave the country, the police arrested them, in another confusing incident that was seen internationally as a violation of Human Rights (La Jornada, 01/02/2020). That incident, together with the suspension of the repatriation of some Bolivians who were in Chile, due to the restrictions of passage that the same government imposed to control the pandemic (Erbol, 30/03/2020), represented two clear violations of international law. These violations also represented the disrespect of another traditional principle of Bolivian international doctrine, the one which establishes that foreign policy must strictly comply with international law.

At the same time, Bolivia recognized Juan Guaidó as acting president of Venezuela; it reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel, which had been broken by Morales; and it joined the Lima Group and Prosur, which is the right-wing version of UNASUR. All these signs, together with Áñez's close relationship with far-right governments such as those led by Bolsonaro in Brazil and Trump in the United States, showed that what supposed to be a "de-ideologization", was in practice was a "re-ideologization".

The Foreign Policy of the Current Government of Luis Arce

After the great changes in foreign policy that occurred during the transitional government, the Arce administration decided to reverse almost all the measures taken then, returning to the ideologization of the extreme left. In that sense, diplomatic relations with Venezuela (Maduro), Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Spain, and Mexico were reestablished, as well as cordiality with Argentina. At the multilateral level, Bolivia returned to ALBA, UNASUR and its full participation in CELAC, which had strongly deteriorated with Áñez. But what has not changed, applying a pragmatic approach that privileges national interests, is the intention

¹⁰ From Argentina, Evo Morales said that if he returned to Bolivia, he would have to "organize armed militias like in Venezuela" (El Clarín, 12/01/2020).

to improve relations with the United States. Indeed, under the new principle of having relations with all the states of the world that respect the sovereignty and self-determination of Bolivia, enunciated by Arce since his election campaign (La Época, 08/04/2021), Bolivia has begun a process of detente with Washington, never seen before in a MAS government.

This is not a minor change, considering that the essence of the foreign policy during Morales's era was precisely the anti-imperialist ideology, understood as a ploy to complain and accuse the United States of absolutely everything. When explaining this decision, the Ministry of Presidency, Marianela Prada, stated: "we are not going to make ideological issues harm the efforts that are for the people". (La Razón, 29/05/2021). This form of government, in which ministers from other areas comment or announce foreign policy measures is not new, during the Morales government it happened all the time, in fact the foreign ministers of that time rarely said anything. The President was the head and main protagonist of foreign policy, some of his ministers, the vice president and certain congressmen were in second place and the foreign ministers in third place. This hierarchy has been modified at present, because now not only the foreign minister appears little, but also the president, and therefore there is no a single and clear protagonist as before.

While Arce started with a pragmatic approach to the United States, the management of the Foreign Ministry started with very bad signs: more than 90% of the officials who worked there in the transitional government, almost a hundred people, were fired between November and December 2020 (ANF, 23/02/2021). The new administration decided not to have career diplomats that the State had trained in the Bolivian Diplomatic Academy, and on the contrary, it replaced them with MAS militants, who have little or no knowledge neither experience on international relations. But the worst signal that the Arce government could have sent to the world was the arrest of former president Jeanine Áñez, who was jailed to this day on charges of sedition and terrorism. The governments of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and the United States expressed their concern over said detention; as well as the European Parliament, the general secretariat of the OAS, the organizations Amnesty International and Humans Rights Watch, and the former presidents of the Democratic Initiative of Spain and the Americas (IDEA). All of them, pointing out that Áñez's arrest is part of a political persecution and the result of the interference of the Executive Power in the Judicial Power (France24, 16/03/2021).

The only country which supported the Arce government was Mexico, whose president urged the OAS to respect the will of the Bolivian people and democracy, and both countries, in a joint Declaration, agreed not to tolerate injections in the internal affairs of the countries (Government of Mexico, 24/03/2021). This last part in clear reference to the pronouncements. Another important difference with the Morales government is the intention to normalize and also improve relations with Chile, in line with the new principle of having relations with all the nations of the world. The problem in this case is that one of

the traditional principles of Bolivian international doctrine states that diplomatic relations with Chile cannot be reestablished without first resolving or committing to resolve the Bolivian maritime problem, which was the main reason for the last rupture of diplomatic relations in 1978.

Moreover, what the ruling party now presents as a great step of understanding with Chile, which effectively allows negotiating other important issues, is actually a great setback on the maritime issue, which is the result of the great failure of the Morales government in this matter. And it is a setback because the dialogue that is being resumed does not include the maritime issue, which is the most important objective of Bolivian foreign policy, and does not include it, according to the Chilean authorities, because it would be a resolved issue by the 1904 Treaty and the 2018 ICJ ruling (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 07/05/2021).

But although the Ambassadors have not been accredited and one cannot speak of a lack of respect for the principle of not reestablishing diplomatic relations with Chile, the authorities of both countries announced a "normalization process", which should logically culminate with the restoration of diplomatic relations.

Preventing the Restoration of the Arica-La Paz Railway

A very controversial issue that arose in the approach to Chile was the decision of the Bolivian authorities to suspend the process of rehabilitation of the Arica-La Paz railway, which is another disrespect for a traditional principle of Bolivian international doctrine: the principle of enforce the right of free transit to and from the sea. In effect, considering that the railway is an integral part of the free transit regime that Chile granted to Bolivia in its territory and ports, the stoppage of its operations prevents Bolivian trade from exercising the right, which, according to the bilateral agreements, it must be granted in perpetuity. But to understand this strange decision, which is like rejecting a benefit that has already been granted by international treaties, it is necessary to go back in time and explain what happened before.

Under the 1904 Treaty and the 1905 Convention, the railway operated with relative regularity from 1928, when Chile handed over the Bolivian side of the track to the La Paz government, until 2001, when a strong storm destroyed a railway bridge on the Chilean side of the border. From that moment on, the private company that administered the railway faced serious economic difficulties that prevented it from functioning normally. In fact, between 2001 and 2005, when the company went bankrupt, the train made very few trips and from then on, it was completely paralyzed on the Chilean side of the border to this day.

Not many years before, in 1996, the paving of the highway that connects La Paz with Arica was finally completed, and trucking, taking advantage of the problems that the railway was going through, quickly became the main means of freight transportation between the port of Arica and Bolivia. In this process,

Bolivian truckers assumed a monopoly not only in relation to the railway but to Chilean truckers, who were prohibited from transporting cargo in transit to Bolivia, under an interpretation of the 1937 Convention, which establishes that the jurisdiction over cargo in transit to Bolivia corresponds exclusively to the Bolivian authorities (Article 4/d).

In such conditions, after 16 years of absolute paralysis, the companies that now operate the railway on both sides of the border, announced the rehabilitation of the train through a technical test that was carried out successfully in early May 2021. However, Bolivian truckers who are organized in several unions close to the government, began to protest with major roadblocks in the whole country. As this situation was affecting the Bolivian economy, the government decided to address the truck drivers' claims and put pressure on the railway company in charge of the Bolivian side of the road, to stop the technical test it was carrying out. Thus, the Minister of Public Works, Edgar Montaño, brokered in a meeting between the railway company and the transport sector, in which it was agreed to suspend the technical test and lift the blockades (El Diario, 05/13/2021). As it is notorious, this agreement not only represents another disrespect for a traditional principle of Bolivian international doctrine, but also prevents Bolivian commerce from accessing a competitive logistical alternative, which was granted to Bolivia in order to alleviate its landlocked situation.

The affected business sectors rejected the suspension of the railway, accusing the government of privileging the interests of one sector over the interests of the entire country, and explained through local media that the train is not a direct competitor of trucks for two basic reasons: 1) the weight that the train can carry exceeds the maximum weight allowed for a truck on the roads; and 2) the time it takes for the train to cover the same route is much longer than the time it takes for a truck. For these reasons and the market studies that were made by the rail company, the railway can only transport the 10% of the cargo that at the present crosses the border (El Deber, 12/05/2021).

But one thing that can change this whole situation is the correct implementation of the 1990 International Land Transport Agreement (known in Spanish as ATIT), which in this case should prevail over the interpretation of the 1937 Convention that supposedly grants monopoly rights to Bolivian truckers. And it should prevail not because it is a multilateral agreement but because it is specific to the question of discussion, that is, in what conditions the transport companies should work between the Chilean ports and Bolivia? In this regard, the ATIT is very clear in establishing that it should be in reciprocity conditions (article 5). Considering this provision, Bolivian truckers protected by the Arce government could lose their monopoly not only in relation to the railway but also in relation to foreign truckers.

Conclusions

As we have seen, in the last fifteen years some of the most important traditional principles of the Bolivian foreign policy were partially or totally disrespected by the governments of the day, who, with the intention of marking differences with their respective predecessors, assumed the most extreme positions imaginable. With this statement, we are not ignoring that all governments have an ideology that defines their political position, but what we are observing is that there was no intention to achieve a balance between that position and the traditional principles of the international doctrine of Bolivia. Everything was always extreme, in a dichotomy of left and right, as if fanaticisms were the best way to conduct foreign policy.

This extremism was evident in multilateral forums, where Bolivian votes were always in favor or against, but almost never in abstention. As if it were mandatory to have definitive positions on each issue. Abstaining is by nature the intermediate option, the best way not to favor either one or the other. Balance and neutrality can also work in many cases, not only to ensure respect for traditional foreign policy principles, but, above all, to safeguard the national interests and even the image of the country. In the case of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if the Bolivian representation did not want to support the investigation proposed by the United States, it was better to abstain but not to vote against, because what is perceived in the end is that Bolivia was trying to cover up those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. The difference in the vote was almost imperceptible, because the United States motion was going to be rejected anyway since Russia also voted against it; but for Bolivia, which has no interest in that conflict, the difference in terms of image and respect for the foreign policy principles, it was enormous.

This extremism has also cost Bolivia its foreign policy independence in the multilateral arena because all votes, declarations, and decisions are in line with the interests of other countries and not necessarily in line with the Bolivian interests, as it should be. In the MAS governments, Bolivia acts openly aligned with Russia in the UN and with the ALBA-TCP alliance in regional forums. In February 2020, in relation to the coup in Myanmar, the Bolivian government expressed its deep concern about the situation of violence "and the illegal detention of political leaders" (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 02/01/2020). But then, when the UN Human Rights Council was about to approve a Resolution that among other things calls "urgently for the immediate and unconditional release of all persons arbitrarily detained"; Bolivia asked to be excluded, as did Russia, China, Venezuela, and the Philippines (Bolivia Verifica, 11/03/2021).

The transitional government of Jeanine Áñez, in its intention to condemn internationally and get as far away as possible from what Morales had done, ended up doing the same as its adversary but on the other side. Indeed, during the Áñez administration Bolivian diplomacy acted under far-right

ideologies and alienated with the United States and Brazil. Although the Foreign Ministry regained its institutional status with the reincorporation of several career diplomats, the foreign policy leadership decided to take extremist measures that, although they were welcomed at the beginning, were also contrary to Bolivian interests. The Human Rights violations mentioned and the loss of Cuban medical assistance in times of crisis of the Bolivian health system were the most visible examples of this reality.

Regarding the future, the Arce government has the possibility, if it decides to act pragmatically, to reestablish trust with the United States and regain at least part of the market lost with the ATPDEA during Morales' administration. The signals given so far to abandon the ineffective anti-imperialist ideologies are encouraging, but from the experience we have with the United States, which has a more predictable foreign policy than the Bolivian one, everything will depend on the commitment that Bolivia can assume with the fight against drug trafficking.

Finally, with respect to Chile, without reestablishing diplomatic relations, the government must try to ensure faithful compliance with all bilateral agreements and in that sense enforce the right of free transit to and from the sea, including the full operation of the Arica - La Paz Railway. In this sense, the government is in time to rectify its decision to suspend the rail rehabilitation works, so as not to leave a disastrous precedent regarding compliance with international agreements.

References

Agramont Lechin, Daniel; Peres-Cajias, José; Flores Orellana, Marwin, Fernández Ortíz, Rodrigo; Guzmán Escobari, Andrés (2016) *Bolivia: un país privado de Litoral. Apuntes para un debate pendiente*. OXFAM y Plural Editores. La Paz-Bolivia.

ANF (07/03/2013) *En La Paz se realizará acto de rechazo al referéndum en las Malvinas*. Agencia de Noticas Fides. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/en-la-paz-se-realizara-acto-de-rechazo-al-referendum-en-las-malvinas--328177-328164>.

ANF (11/08/2006) *Estiman pérdidas de \$us.220 millones y 80 mil empleos sin ATPDEA*. Economía. La Paz - Bolivia. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://www.noticiasfides.com/economia/estiman-perdidas-de-us220-millones-y-80-mil-empleos-sin-atpdea-146143>.

ANF (23/02/2021) *Denuncian masacre blanca en Cancillería, más de 100 diplomáticos de carrera fueron despedidos*. La Paz - Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/denuncian-masacre-blanca-en-cancilleria-mas-de-100-diplomaticos-de-carrera-fueron-despedidos-408282>.

Arze Quiroga, Eduardo (1991) *Las Relaciones Internacionales de Bolivia, 1825 - 1990. Obras Completas*. Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro". La Paz, Cochabamba-Bolivia.

BBC (12/04/2018) *Las razones de Bolivia para ponerse del lado de Rusia en las discusiones sobre Siria del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas*. BBC Mundo. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-43741695>.

Berman, Nathaniel (21/05/2020) *Annexation in the Shadow of the Law–Part I*. Opinio Juris. [online, 20/06/2021] <http://opiniojuris.org/2020/05/21/annexation-in-the-shadow-of-the-law/>.

Birns, Larry; Sanchez, Alex (2011) *From Obscurity to Center Stage: The Architectonics of Bolivia's Foreign Policy*. In *Latin American Foreign Policies. Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Edited by Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert. Palgrave Mcmillan. United Sates. Pp. 103-118. [online, 12/06/2021] <https://epdf.pub/latin-american-foreign-policies-between-ideology-and-pragmatism-1668d439a25e5107c4326d8ac57c731d33793.html>.

Bolivia Verifica (11/03/2021) *Bolivia y su posición sobre Birmania: contradicciones diplomáticas frente al golpe de Estado*. Explicador. Jesús Vargas. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://boliviaverifica.bo/bolivia-y-su-posicion-sobre-birmania-contradicciones-diplomaticas-frente-al-golpe-de-estado/>.

Camacho Omiste, Edgar (1966) *Bolivia: Convenios y Declaraciones Internacionales*. Empresa Editora Novedades. La Paz-Bolivia.

Ceppi, Natalia (2014) *Bolivian foreign policy during Evo Morales Ayma's administration*. Si Somos Americanos. Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos. Volumen XIV / No. 1, January-June 2014 / pp. 125-151. [online, 05/06/2021] <https://www.scielo.cl/pdf/ssa/v14n1/art07.pdf>.

Deutsche Welle (03/01/2020) *Bolivia: ¿Qué busca Jeanine Áñez con su política exterior?* América Latina. Diego Zuñiga. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.dw.com/es/bolivia-qu%C3%A9-a%C3%91-busca-jeanine-%C3%A1ez-con-su-pol%C3%ADtica-exterior/a-51883694>.

Diez de Medina, Eduardo (1923) *La cuestión del Pacífico y la política internacional de Bolivia*. Sin editorial. La Paz-Bolivia.

Diez de Medina, Eduardo (1936) *Problemas internacionales*. Sin editorial. La Paz-Bolivia.

Durán Lima, José E. (2017) *Algunas consideraciones sobre posibles efectos de la no renovación del ATPDEA por parte del Congreso de los Estados Unidos*. Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). Santiago-Chile. [online, 12/06/2021] https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/3568/S2007380_es.pdf.

Ecolex (n/d) *Convention on the High Seas*. [online, 30/05/2021] <https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/convention-on-the-high-seas-tre-000144/>.

El Deber (12/05/2021) *Bloqueos: Ferroviaria Andina dice que no necesita autorización para operar tramo Charaña-Viacha*. Iván Paredes. Santa Cruz-Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] https://eldeber.com.bo/economia/bloqueos-ferroviaria-andina-dice-que-no-necesita-autorizacion-para-operar-tramo-charana-viacha_231565.

El Diario (13/05/2021) *Se suspenden pruebas en vía férrea Arica-Viacha*. La Paz-Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.eldiario.net/portal/2021/05/13/se-suspenden-pruebas-en-via-ferrea-arica-viacha/>.

El País (28/12/2019) *Bolivia carga contra España tras un confuso incidente en la Embajada de México en La Paz*. Bogotá/México/Madrid. [online, 20/06/2021] https://elpais.com/politica/2019/12/27/actualidad/1577487072_206632.html.

Erbol (30/03/2020) *Suspenden repatriación de bolivianos varados en la frontera de Chile*. La Paz-Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://erbol.com.bo/nacional/suspenden-repatriaci%C3%B3n-de-bolivianos-varados-en-la-frontera-de-chile>.

Escobari Cusicanqui, Jorge (2013) *Historia Diplomática de Bolivia*. Plural Editores. La Paz-Bolivia.

France24 (16/03/2021) *OEA critica al sistema judicial de Bolivia y pide la liberación de los políticos detenidos*. Luis Méndez. Con EFE, Reuters, AP y AFP. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20210315-bolivia-a%C3%B3lez-oea-prision-justicia-mas>.

Gamarra, Eduardo (2021) *100 días de Biden. Las relaciones Bolivia-Estados Unidos: ¿Qué se puede esperar de Joe Biden?* FES Briefing. Friederich Ebert Stiftung. [online, 19/06/2021] <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/uruguay/17816.pdf>.

Government of Mexico (24/03/2021) *Declaración conjunta de los presidentes de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia*. Presidencia de la República. Prensa. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/declaracion-conjunta-de-los-presidentes-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos-y-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia>.

Gumucio Granier, Jorge (1997) *Alberto Ostría y el pacto con Perú de 1936*. Revista Agenda Internacional del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Vol. 4 Núm. 9, pp. 97-106. [online, 22/05/2021] <http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/agendainternacional/article/view/7187/7390>.

Guzmán Escobari, Andrés (2015) *Un mar de promesas incumplidas. La historia del problema marítimo boliviano, 1879-2015*. Plural Editores. La Paz-Bolivia.

IBCE (2009) *Bolivia perdió el ATPDEA*. Nota de Prensa E-416. Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior. La Paz-Bolivia [online, 12/06/2021] <https://ibce.org.bo/noticias-detalle.php?idNot=184>.

Ingelevič-Citak, Milena (2015) *Crimean conflict – from the perspectives of Russia, Ukraine, and public international law*. De Gruyter. ICLR, 2015, Vol. 15, No. 2. Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. Pp. 23-45. [online, 19/06/2021] <https://sciendo.com/abstract/journals/iclr/15/2/article-p23.xml>.

La Jornada (01/02/2020) *Detienen en Bolivia a exfuncionarios, pese a tener salvoconducto*. Ana Langner. Ciudad de México. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/politica/2020/02/01/detienen-en-bolivia-a-exministros-de-evo-morales-402.html>.

La Razón (29/05/2021) *Prada: No vamos a hacer que 'temas ideológicos' con EE. UU. perjudiquen la búsqueda de justicia*. Edwin Condori. La Paz-Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://www.la-razon.com/lr-article/prada-no-vamos-a-hacer-que-temas-ideologicos-con-eeuu-perjudiquen-la-busqueda-de-justicia/>.

La Tercera (27/03/2014) *América Latina dividida ante ONU por crisis de Ucrania y anexión rusa de Crimea*. AFP. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://www.latercera.com/noticia/america-latina-dividida-ante-onu-por-crisis-de-ucrania-y-anexion-rusa-de-crimea/>.

Mesa Gisbert, Carlos Diego (2018) *La historia del mar boliviano. El largo camino a casa*. 3ra edición. Editorial Gisbert. La Paz – Bolivia.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (01/02/2020) *Comunicado: Sobre la situación en Myanmar*. [on line, 20/06/2021] <https://cancilleria.gob.bo/webmre/comunicado/4200>.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (1943) *Colección de Tratados Vigentes de la República de Bolivia*. Compilada, revisada y anotada por Luis Iturrealde Chinel. Director del Departamento Político y Diplomático. La Paz-Bolivia.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2012) *Plan Estratégico Institucional, 2013 – 2017. "Política Exterior Soberana para Vivir Bien"*. Dirección General de Planificación. La Paz-Bolivia. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://www.cancilleria.gob.bo/webmre/sites/default/files/files/PLAN%20ESTRATEGICO%20INSTITUCIONAL%20DEL%20MRE%20PEI%202013%20-%202017%20RM%20685.pdf>.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (2014) *La revolución democrática y cultural, y su política exterior. Memoria 2006 – 2013*. Artes Gráficas Sagitario S.R.L. La Paz-Bolivia. [online, 05/06/2021] <https://www.cancilleria.gob.bo/webmre/sites/default/files/Logros/1%20Memoria%20Institucional%202006-2013%20%281%29.pdf>.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (07/05/2021) *Cancillería informa sobre la normalización de las relaciones bilaterales entre Chile y Bolivia*. Santiago – Chile. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://minrel.gob.cl/noticias-anteriores/cancilleria-informa-sobre-la-normalizacion-de-las-relaciones-bilaterales>.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (2004) *Raíces de la Doctrina Internacional de Bolivia*. Academia Diplomática Boliviana “Rafael Bustillo”. La Paz-Bolivia.

Ostria Gutiérrez, Alberto (1953) *Una obra y un destino. La política internacional de Bolivia después de la guerra del Chaco*. Imprenta López. Buenos Aires Argentina.

Página Siete (26/05/2016) *De Ametex a Enatex: del orgullo textilero a un cierre conflictivo*. Gabriel Diez Lacunza. La Paz-Bolivia [online, 12/06/2021] <https://www.paginasiete.bo/gente/2016/5/23/ametex-enatex-orgullo-textilero-cierre-conflictivo-97347.html>.

Parrón, Mario Gustavo (2015) *La diplomacia argentina en el conflicto bélico del Chaco Boreal según la intransigente y nueva época*. Mundos Nuevos, Open Edition Journal. [online, 26/05/2021] <https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/67686>.

Saavedra Weisse, Agustín (10/05/2021) *Equilibrios y rivalidades en un mundo 100% capitalista*. Los Tiempos, Opinión. Cochabamba-Bolivia. [online, 05/06/2021] <https://www.lostiemplos.com/actualidad/opinion/20210510/columna/equilibrios-rivalidades-mundo-100-capitalista>.

Saavedra Weisse, Agustín (2002) *Seamos ¡de una vez! tierra de contactos*. Santa Cruz Bolivia. [online, 20/06/2021] <http://agustinsaavedraweise.com/sitio/documentacion/articulos/articulos2002/SEAMOS%20DE%20UNA%20VEZ%20TIERRA%20DE%20CONTACTOS.pdf>.

Salazar Paredes, Fernando (2000) *Hacia una nueva política exterior boliviana*. CERiD y Plural Editores. La Paz Bolivia.

Sputnik Mundo (05/08/2018) *Evo Morales: “Voy a morir anti-imperialista”*. [online, 05/06/2021] <https://mundo.sputniknews.com/20180508/soberania-defensa-bolivia-1078484894.html>.

United Nations (n/d) *Chapter X. International Trade and Development. 3. Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States* New York, 8 July 1965. UN Treaty Collection. [online, 16/06/2021] <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X-3.en.pdf>.

Uprety, Kishor (2005) *The transit regime for landlocked states. International Law and Development Perspectives*. Law, Justice, and development series. The World Bank. Washington D.C.

Viceministerio de Comunicación (24/08/2020) *Cancillería rechaza publicación de subsecretario de Obras Públicas argentino sobre elecciones en Bolivia*. [online, 20/06/2021] <https://comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20200824/30436>.

CHAPTER 6

Colombian Foreign Policy: Dependence, Pragmatism, and Ideologization (2010-2022)

Martha Ardila

Introduction

Colombia is a secondary power that seeks to exercise regional leadership. This intention has been present in the foreign policy of Iván Duque (2018-2022) and in that of his predecessor Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018). Two characteristics stand out in Duque's international insertion: the first is linked to the incidence of internal factors, particularly of the political and economic elites, and the second, the management of a rhetoric in international forums that, at times, has little to do with reality. This chapter therefore seeks to examine the internal, external, and personal factors that influence Colombian foreign policy. With the presence of COVID-19, the situation has become more complicated for all countries and in the Colombian case, it has increased in the midst of an inter-party struggle between different, predominantly political elites. It increased with the deepening of a crisis that resulted in demonstrations with displays of social protests for labor, pension, fiscal, educational and health reforms.

Iván Duque was elected in 2018 as the candidate of the Democratic Centrist Party which has the former president, Alvaro Uribe, as its leader. He represents a traditional caudillo (strongman) leader who uses an aggressive, confrontational, and often religious language, and who rewards loyalty as well as friendship: he who is not my friend is my enemy. His ideologization is present in internal and external affairs and he aims to show how he is different from his predecessor. In this context, the chapter seeks to answer questions related to the principles and characteristics of foreign policy, and to the predominance of pragmatism and/or ideologization. Consensus on international insertion requires inter-party agreements that are reflected in the guidelines and practice of foreign policy, which in the Colombian case has been made difficult by the country's polarization.

The present chapter will be divided into 4 parts. The first part examines a series of concepts related to the factors that influence the design of a country's foreign policy, the interaction between internal and external elements, and the dialogue between pragmatism and ideologization. Personality characteristics and the role of the decision-maker in terms of his or her ideas, values, beliefs, and personal history influence his or her domestic and international preferences and actions. In the second part, a review of the geographic and thematic priorities of the government of Iván Duque (2018-2022) is carried out, showing similarities and differences, changes, and continuities with respect to Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018). Emphasis will be placed on diversification or alignment with the United States, the relationship with Venezuela, particularly at the border, and the presence of immigrants from that country. Even though the Colombian Constitution of 1991 points out the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, the country has prioritized an alliance with the northern power that has sometimes generated distrust for international insertion. Subsequently, the third part of this chapter refers to integration, emphasizing the crisis of multilateralism and the ideology with which integration groups are formed, something which hinders their durability. New integration modalities are proposed, such as Paradiplomacy, which has shown its virtues in MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, and Colombia's three pro tempore presidencies are examined: the Andean Community, the Pacific Alliance and PROSUR. Finally, the fourth part contains conclusions and a series of challenges for Colombian foreign policy.

Colombia: Between the Internal and the External, the Structural and the Conjunctural

An examination of Colombian foreign policy reveals a series of both structural and conjunctural characteristics with a marked emphasis on the domestic situation, which is linked to its international actions. The special relationship with the United States, the narrowness of the political regime and presidential diplomacy have been structural characteristics with nuances depending on the ideas, preferences, and incidence of the political and governmental elites, and of course, of the head of state.

It is in these that we find the pragmatism, principles and ideologization of a country's foreign policy. Although it is difficult to define what is meant by pragmatism from the theoretical point of view of international relations, a pragmatist theory of IR could be inspired by the works of John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as Menand (1997) points out. Or in the analyses of Gardini and Lambert. The truth of the matter is that pragmatism privileges results following the objectives and means at its disposal. Ideology is perceived as the desirable and pragmatism as the attainable, observing both a tension and complementarity between the two. Ideology and pragmatism are an integral part of all political

activity and, therefore, of foreign policy. For this reason, any foreign policy should contain elements of both, since "they are complementary, rather than opposed or irreconcilable terms. Although there is certainly a tension between ideology and pragmatism, they are interrelated and compatible, not mutually exclusive" (Gardini, 2011, p. 13). In other words, a foreign policy where only ideas prevail, ends up being a utopia; while one dominated by pragmatism would fall into opportunism and more seriously into the lack of direction.

Complementing the above, Antoni Kapcia (2011) suggests that ideology in foreign policy is exclusive to the strongest developed countries, while pragmatism would be the best asset for small developing countries. Something similar could be said of the Argentine, Carlos Escudé with his contributions on Peripheral Realism and the need to build alliances with dominant countries. In this direction, a pragmatic foreign policy is based on the usefulness and practicality of ideas, policies, and proposals (Gardini & Lambert, 2011). It is compatible between established principles and a leader's personalized vision of international relations. Ideology, on the other hand, is the lens through which principles and values are viewed beyond practical and historical circumstances. Large countries with more resources could exercise more pragmatic policies, while small countries would use ideology as a resource to increase their international visibility. In the Colombian case, there would be a combination of the ideological and the pragmatic.

Colombian foreign policy formulation has been subject to these tensions between pragmatism and ideology. Its foreign policy, "has tended to be dominated by a small foreign policy elite, in which the president without exception has been the most important player" (Randall, 2011, p. 140), to the point that many of the presidents set the agenda leaving little influence to congress and even less to public opinion. Undoubtedly, it is a foreign policy without consensus that shows divergences of the traditional political elites with the incumbent rulers, as could be observed with the Plebiscite for Peace during the Santos administration and/or during the administration of Ivan Duque who represents the Democratic Centrist Party.

Taking the above considerations into account, indicators such as presidential discourse, the profile of foreign policy elites, and the mechanisms of international insertion, shed light on the analysis. For many years, Latin American countries examined their foreign policy separately from their domestic policy, ignoring their interaction and the extension of the internal to the external. Long argues that this ignorance was influenced by the lack of coordination between different actors and decision-makers (Long, 2017), since Latin American political processes have become more complex due to the participation of the executive, the legislature, civil society, and subnational governments. Actors who prefer to conciliate manage to build more alliances and cooperative actions.

The treatment of foreign policy issues varies according to context and situation. Not all domestic factors and actors have the same relevance but will vary according to national interest and the interests of different sectors of so-

ciety. Economic elites tend to be the most active, but in general it will depend on the capacity for leadership, coordination, and association. Here, consensus becomes very important. In consensus, the capacity for leadership and conviction has a bearing on the construction of authority and national identity. Leadership, rationality, and persuasion are fundamental. There is a lot of "tug-of-war". But not only that, but coordination also favors follow-up and implementation. However, there are many difficulties around coordination due to the lack of leadership, a comprehensive vision and institutional jealousy.

The so-called "sensitivity" of leaders is linked to the degree of cognitive and emotional openness to ideas that are contrary or different from their own or their political leanings. A leader with low sensitivity will prefer to rely on his personal beliefs -including ideological ones- to adopt courses of action and one-man management. To the contrary, highly sensitive leaders identify political situations and signs of favorability or antagonism before adopting a definitive decision, seeking the greatest possible consensus. There are leaders who know that many conflicts can only be partially resolved, with the conviction that many of their decisions should include various preferences, but recognizing that full consensus cannot always be reached, so they opt to seek the lowest possible consensus, accepting that there will never be a preference or alternative satisfactory to all (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 153-156).

In turn, the link between the internal and the external, as Putman argues, is an entangled "game" and requires concertation. Often this concertation must be pragmatic. One interacts "with actors who have the power to ratify or reject a final agreement", which must be acceptable to the internal and the external (Putman, 1988). There are some actors who have more power than others, which are generally the executive, the legislature and some interest groups in society depending on the issue to be addressed, but in general the economic and political elites, as well as the political party to which the president belongs hold this power. They are actors with veto power, which is also held by the president and the foreign minister of the day. International negotiators move on parallel negotiation boards and are influenced by great state and social powers. In this sense, the interaction between internal and external for diplomacy is also related to two aspects: bilateral and multilateral. It crosses state, regional, and local levels, and alludes to issues such as cooperation, security, environment, culture, and education.

James Rossenau refers to the way in which the international system is shaped and the countries that exert the greatest influence. For Latin America, the United States is its main political and economic reference. Rossenau analyzes systemic, governmental, non-governmental and idiosyncratic factors (Rossenau, 1996). The former refers to the situation and trends in the international system and their impact on a country's foreign policy decision-making. In this sense, the position of the United States and its weakening, and the rise of powers such as China, India and Russia have an impact on foreign affairs. And even more so for a country like Colombia, for which the United States is its main

foreign policy reference. At the same time, idiosyncratic factors are important to understand the leadership and the capacity to convince and dissuade the head of state.

The Russell and Tokatlian (2013) models involve a set of permanent, durable, and contingent factors. The permanent or structural factors are the size of the country and its geographical location. Durable factors are power, natural resources, identity, and the degree of diversification of foreign relations. And the contingent ones point to the political orientation and the importance that the country has for the United States (Russell and Tokatlian, 2013, p 213). Santos' pragmatic style influenced Colombia's external insertion during his 8 years in office. Ties were strengthened with Latin American regional powers, such as the member countries of the Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico) and with Brazil, and a series of actions were promoted towards Asia, mainly in the areas of cooperation and trade. Its relationship with the United States was pragmatic and diversified. Its participation in multilateral organizations also showed its capacity to build consensus on issues such as diplomacy for peace in the UN, the OAS and UNASUR.

Returning to the systemic factors identified, the United States occupies an important place. Trump mentioned the recovery of the United States as "America first" in order to show a different foreign policy. It was not an alternative vision of the international order, nor a new doctrine, nor a consistent foreign policy guide. But it did have an impact at the international level, and its withdrawal from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the climate agreement, UNESCO and the global pact on migration and asylum, affected the region and in particular Colombia, mainly on issues such as migration, security (and with that, drugs), environment and trade. And even more so, with the growing trade tension between China and the United States that alters the Latin American economy. With Joe Biden, the situation is different. He is a supporter of multilateralism and relations based on cooperation. Towards Colombia, he particularly supports actions aimed at fostering a lasting and sustainable peace, as well as prevention as a means of combating the use of illicit drugs.

In recent years, Latin American leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Luis Ignacio Lulla Da Silva in Brazil have been identified, but they have lost influence and it has been replaced by other "sectoral" leaderships. Today, there is a lack of general leadership in Latin America and there are thematic, sectoral, and non-state actor leaderships. Colombia tried to exercise sectoral leadership around drugs during the Santos administration and Iván Duque sought to do about Venezuela and migration. Within these factors, ideas, traditions, identity, and language, among others, play an important role and are often linked either to ideology or to the pragmatism that characterizes their leaders. Thus, for example, in Colombia during the government of Álvaro Uribe, there was talk of a "Microphone Diplomacy" exercised by various actors involved directly or indirectly in decision-making, in which presidential diplomacy was very clear and derived from the authoritarianism exercised in the

domestic sphere. Not only because of this, but also the need to legitimize and obtain economic and military resources for the Democratic Security Project, Colombia was seen as a problem country that exported insecurity to neighbouring countries. With Santos, the language was conciliatory and changed the country's image, and with Duque, it returned to aggressive, provocative and ideologizing expressions.

Changes and Continuities: Principles, Ideologization and/or Pragmatism?

Latin American countries and Colombia in particular respond differently to systemic and individual factors. The variable change of government and Presidential Diplomacy indicate either a pragmatic or ideological style, permeating language and alliances. This is influenced by culture, values, traditions, and identity, as well as perceptions and imaginaries. The administration of Juan Manuel Santos showed a series of changes, and that of Iván Duque is described as a setback linked to ideologization (Buelvas EP *et al*, 2021). Nevertheless, Colombian foreign policy, with a markedly juridic character, has a series of guidelines such as sovereignty, political independence, non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international law, promotion of human rights and self-determination of peoples. These guidelines are in accordance with the objectives formulated by a given administration. However, in the Duque administration there is a marked rhetoric and little applicability of the statements it raises at the international level.

At the beginning of 2018, the government proposed three main cornerstones of foreign policy: migration, borders, and sovereignty (Departamento Nacional de Planeación "National Planning Department", 2019). It outlines the policy (2018-2022) that is called responsible, innovative, and constructive. It proposes a series of initiatives to promote a multilateral policy, mainly in scenarios such as the OAS and on issues such as the environment. At the same time, it points out the importance of a new comprehensive migration policy that considers the new migratory dynamics that Colombia faces as a country that sends, receives, and transits migrants. It proposes seeking a new border policy that promotes the comprehensive and differentiated development of Colombian border regions, departments and municipalities, promoting from the state, in coordination with the governments of these territorial entities, both the use of their endogenous potential and the strengthening of their public, private and community organizations and institutions, as well as integration with neighbouring countries (<https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/principios-y-lineamientos-la-politica-exterior-colombiana>). It also intended to lead a national strategy that would allow the consolidation of supply and demand for international cooperation based on foreign policy objectives and the pillars of the National Development Plan: Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity, seeking to consolidate Colombia as a strategic provider of South-South cooperation. However, many of

these formulations were rhetorical and did not coincide with international practice and actions.

When analyzing Colombia's external insertion, we find a series of elements that influence its direction. North American, European, and Latin American scholars have sought explanations regarding the elements that influence the geographic and thematic priorities and the actors involved in this process. The recent history of Colombian foreign policy shows a relationship between ideologization and pragmatism. The government of Álvaro Uribe was ideological and favored bilateral relations, while that of Juan Manuel Santos was pragmatic, conciliatory and sought to consolidate its position in multilateral organizations such as the Pacific Alliance, UNASUR and the UN, with the aim of approaching Latin American countries that were a priority to national interests. The policies of both are framed within the ideological accommodation in the former and pragmatic in the latter.

Colombia presents an ideal geopolitical situation as it is located in the northern part of South America and has a presence in the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Amazon. It has been seen as an attractive country for foreign investment. Under Santos, membership in the CIVETS countries paid dividends, an acronym that was unveiled at the beginning of his administration and which, in addition to Colombia, is made up of Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa. Juan Manuel Santos sought diversification by looking towards Asia and strengthening relations with Latin America. Expanding its external ties, he sought support for the peace process by internationalizing the negotiations with the FARC in Havana, which enjoyed broad support from the international community (Rojas, 2019). Not only that, but it also joined NATO and the OECD.

In general, Santos promoted a diplomacy in permanent interaction with his domestic policy with a clear indication of what he intended but with political and economic elites fragmented against his predominantly political project. In this situation, consensus is difficult to reach. Its international insertion was motivated by showing a new image of the country, promoting economic diplomacy by attracting foreign investment, increasing its presence in the world and carrying out a peace process with the support of the international community. To this end, it diversified its international relations, internationalized peace, returned to multilateralism and promoted South-South cooperation in security matters. This diplomacy was carried out in a changing international world, in the face of an asymmetric Latin America, with diverse political and economic projects. And, above all, in a polarized country with fragmented political parties and elites.

With Iván Duque, there is a tendency towards an "ideological" and, to a lesser extent, pragmatic accommodation towards the United States. He supported Trump's reelection and the election of Mauricio Claver-Carone to the IDB presidency. He put forward guidelines that showed differences with his predecessor through provocative language, returned to the narcotization of relations with the United States, and perceived Venezuela as a threat to his own security.

To this end, he had the support of the Lima Group and the OAS. The government of Iván Duque was characterized by “venezualization” and a close relationship with the United States. The discourse towards the neighboring country derives from the deep polarization of the country and is very close to the Venezuelan opposition and the United States. Undoubtedly, Colombia abandoned prudence towards the neighbor with which we share 2,219 kilometers, with which we have an unresolved dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela or Coquivacoa, and with which we are also united by economic and social interests. Venezuela has been the main and almost the only country to which Colombia has exported value-added products.

The situation with Venezuela is seen as a security problem and in the relationship with the United States, the drug issue has returned to the agenda between the two countries. Former President Donald Trump stated that “Colombia has done nothing” (El Tiempo, March 29, 2019). He pressured Colombia, stating: “Well, you’re going to have to spray. If you don’t do spraying, you’re not going to be able to get rid of them. So, you must do spraying in relation to drugs in Colombia” (El Espectador, March 6, 2020). Colombia unquestioningly adopted the U.S. approach to illicit crops, glyphosate spraying, prohibitionism, militarization and criminalization. Colombian foreign policy returned to its traditional reactive diplomacy and to an ideologization and securitization with its main actors, reducing the thematic agenda, which Santos had diversified.

The geographical priorities of Iván Duque’s administration have focused on the United States and Venezuela. However, former Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Claudia Blum and Martha Lucia Ramírez made trips to China, Russia, European countries such as Belgium and Finland, and several Latin American countries. For example, during their trip to China at the end of July 2019, agreements were signed to promote trade and Colombian exports of Haas avocado, bananas, flowers, coffee, and meat, and to inaugurate an air route between Beijing and Bogota. With the coronavirus pandemic, this air route was postponed. The alliance with the United States dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. Some scholars call it *Respice Pollum* (Borda, 2019; Tickner, 2007; Randall, 2017), others active subordination, and more recently, pragmatic, and ideological accommodation (Ardila and Clemente, 2019). Alfonso López Michelsen, Belisario Betancur and Juan Manuel Santos made efforts to diversify.

With Biden, a pragmatic accommodation is observed. A return to bipartisan consensus due to the role he played as a senator in supporting Plan Colombia. He continues to be a strategic ally of the U.S. from a national security perspective and a “cornerstone” of its vision for Latin America. Now, Human Rights and post-conflict have greater importance and deep reforms are demanded to bring the country in line with international standards. Several U.S. congressmen, especially Democrats, reiterate their support for the post-conflict and insist on not abandoning the implementation of peace. They show concern for the increase in crimes against social leaders and human rights defenders. There is a shift from a unidirectional tone to one in which the search for consensus as a

tool to transform the substance of a more multilateral relationship takes precedence. In this sense, Biden's personality, more empathetic and attached to the traditional ways of using diplomacy to solve problems and crises, has an impact on the bilateral relationship.

Trade and migration are also high on the agenda. Almost 30% of Colombian exports go to this country and the United States is the leading investor. There are tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum exports, which Colombia has requested a reduction. In turn, more than 2.5 million Colombians born in Colombia and/or children or grandchildren of Colombians live in that country, which corresponds to approximately 50% of Colombian emigrants.

And the transition in Venezuela is an issue of interest to both countries. The diplomatic siege sponsored by the Lima Group was carried out with the collaboration of the Trump administration accompanied by economic and political sanctions. With the arrival of Biden to the White House, a new approach and spaces for dialogue with Caracas are opened and Venezuelan immigrants are granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS). It is not a 180-degree turn, nor will he recognize Maduro's legitimacy or lift the sanctions, but he has stopped launching threats of military intervention from the White House and the Office of the Secretary of State, to explore other alternatives oriented towards dialogue.

Of Colombia's 6,342 kilometers of land border, the Venezuelan frontier is the most extensive with 2,219 kilometers, the most active and the most interdependent.¹ However, and even though the 1991 Constitution indicates that Colombia should privilege integration with Latin America and the Caribbean, international policy is derived from the relationship with the United States, with the vast majority of cases involving reactive and only few proactive actions. And the language of the current Duque administration is aggressive and confrontational. The Colombian-Venezuelan relationship resembles a pendulum that swings between long periods of confrontation and short moments of cooperation. With the Bolivarian Revolution this tendency was accentuated. And Colombia should be careful in its bilateral, regional, and international management to avoid further instrumentalization of the relationship. Institutional ties have been interrupted, Colombia has had no Ambassador in Venezuela since January 2018, and then, in February 2019, Nicolás Maduro broke diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, the support that the neighboring country provided to the peace negotiations with the FARC must be acknowledged.

Before Chávez, Venezuela based its economy on oil and developed an oil diplomacy. At the time and due to high oil prices, it promoted and led initiatives such as ALBA, CELAC, Petrocaribe, Bank of the South and UNASUR, and modernized its military equipment (Battaglino, 2008). Although its leadership has diminished, Venezuela continues to have followers such as Nicaragua, Bolivia,

¹ Venezuela: 2.219 km

Brazil: 1.645 km

Peru: 1.626 km

Ecuador: 586 km

Panama: 266 km

and Cuba. In the UN Security Council, it has Russia and China as allies. In this context, mistrust continues to prevail with Venezuela and President Maduro permanently makes statements that instrumentalize the bilateral position. He accuses Colombia of being an accomplice in the attacks against his country and that his neighbor allied with the United States to invade Venezuela. Maduro has made many accusations against Colombia. He is currently calling Iván Duque a "racist and xenophobe" for denying vaccinations against the coronavirus to Venezuelans living in that country who have not yet legalized their documentation. The closures and incidents at the Táchira-Norte de Santander border were permanent, to the point of closing the border for more than a year since August 2015, causing inflation and shortages of products. The fact is that the Colombian-Venezuelan relations move between mistrust and temporary cooperation. In 2021, the border remains closed and clashes between illegal actors, the ELN and some FARC dissidents are increasing, especially in the Arauca-Apure area.

For many experts, the Venezuelan crisis is not only a product of Nicolás Maduro's mismanagement of the economy, which has been going on since before Hugo Chávez came to power. However, the situation has deepened since 2015, in the middle of Maduro's first presidential term, where the annual inflation rate surpassed the thousand percent barrier with a very rapid increase in price levels. This situation was qualified as "the worst economic crisis for a country without war" (New York Times, May 17, 2019) due to corruption, mismanagement of the economy and an overconfidence in the price of oil, the foreign currency deficit was generated and the fall of imports thusly increasing the prices of scarce goods. It is worth noting that the government took even more harmful measures such as printing extra money, increasing salaries and non-payment of government bonds, causing more inflation and further devaluation of the Bolívar (BBC, January 10, 2019; El Tiempo March 2021). In January 2019, he was sworn in as president and in the same month opposition leader Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself interim president of Venezuela (El País, January 23, 2019). However, his popularity fell as well as the support of the international community in the face of a divided opposition that Guaidó failed to unite.

Furthermore, continuing with neighboring countries, there was also a securitization of the relationship with Ecuador. There was talk of an asymmetry between the two countries, and in an ongoing manner the southern neighbor points out that it had no reason to assume the costs of displacement and fumigation that has affected the health of its border population. It complained about the lack of State presence and the prejudices of "Plan Colombia" and "Plan Patriota", also presenting an instrumentalization in the relationship. In turn, cases of corruption in the Ecuadorian army contributed to the lack of bilateral trust.

Since the end of the 20th century, the FARC had been located on this border in order to control coca transport routes, on the one hand, and to acquire illegal weapons more easily, on the other. At the same time, the guerrillas were crossing borders and looking for safe areas of settlement, as demonstrated by Operation

Fénix when the Colombian army destroyed the FARC camp where Raúl Reyes was located. This violation of sovereignty led to the breakdown of relations between the two countries in April 2008, also affecting the relationship with Venezuela and leading to a triangulation of Colombia's relations with Ecuador and Venezuela. What happened with one country also affected the bilateral relationship with the other (Ardila and Amado, 2009).

With both Ecuador and Venezuela, Colombia had a favorable trade balance for Colombia and exported value-added products. In addition, investments of Pintuco, Cordials, Alpina, Tecno químicas, the Dann Carlton hotel chain, Servientrega, Familia or Leonisa, Crepes & waffles, Exito stores, among others, had an important place in Ecuador since they had already withdrawn from Venezuela. There is independence between the economic and political spheres and the latter did not affect the economic sphere. Today, the political sphere affects the economic level, although the Neighborhood Commission and the Defense Ministers are gaining strength.

On the other hand, Brazil and Colombia have been distant neighbors despite sharing a border of 1645 kilometers and an Amazon with great natural resources. Throughout recent history, ignorance, distance, and disinterest had prevailed. But ties deepened as of 2010. Since then, the relationship has been mainly economic, and investment related. Bilateral trade increased fourfold and Brazilian investments –in transportation, construction, infrastructure, mining, energy, science, and technology– increased significantly. Finally, in addition to the drug issue with the United States, the ups and downs with Ecuador, the rapprochement with Brazil and the distancing with Venezuela, the arrival of Venezuelans to Colombian territory has increased day by day, in the midst of a regional loneliness, due to the fact that countries such as Ecuador, Peru and Chile, place restrictions on receiving them.

Venezuelan immigrants

The most notorious aspect of the Venezuelan crisis is represented in the migratory situation that is spread throughout the countries of the region. According to UNHCR, the country hosting the most Venezuelans is Colombia with 1.5 million, followed by Peru with 768,000 and Chile with 288,000, which are considered alarming figures that reflect the need to support the receiving communities, establishing that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean cannot continue to respond to migrants without international assistance (UNHCR, 2019). By 2021 this figure is close to 2 million.

The economic and political-institutional crisis in Venezuela provoked massive migration of its citizens throughout the region. In Colombia particularly, the government of Iván Duque, with its Minister of Foreign Affairs first, Carlos Holmes Trujillo and then, Cláudia Blum, and Martha Lucía Ramírez have led a transition project for Venezuela, reflected in the recognition of Juan Guaidó, as

well as in its participation in the Lima Group to denounce Nicolás Maduro. However, the Venezuelan president is entrenched in power and a forced exit is distant; rather, dialogue is the most viable alternative aimed at a peaceful transition in the neighboring country.

The Colombian-Venezuelan border has different characteristics depending on the area and territorial scope, although there are cross-cutting issues related to security. Although it is closed, it has more than 150 illegal crossings (Carvajal 2020) through which people and goods pass, and migrants arrive in Colombia or other countries such as Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. The “trocha” as it is commonly called, controls illegal groups, and many of the migrants’ only option for survival is to join criminal activities. This has led to an increase in xenophobia, especially in border areas and particularly in the city of Cúcuta (El Derecho a No Obedecer *et al.* 2020).

The arrival of COVID-19 increased vulnerability and uncertainty. Neither international cooperation nor governmental actions such as the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants (Migración Colombia 2021), have led to a positive, durable, and legal insertion in the labor market. While developing this process of Maduro’s departure, the Duque government manages another agenda for migrants, an example of which is the nationalization of Venezuelan children born in Colombian territory, as well as health assistance in border municipalities in order to provide welfare to this population.

Now, to be able to understand the dynamics of the current migration crisis, it is crucial to recognize the South American border agenda, which is characterized by conflicts over the boundary line and the territorial sovereignty of the States (García, 2016). However, countries over the years have established center-periphery policies with respect to their borders which has left these areas in the background generating an imbalance between population, territory, development and institutionalism (García, 2016) for such reason in this region we speak of a “double border”: internal borders, where the state is characterized by having no presence and are territories that have not been successfully integrated into Nation State projects, and international borders that imply that these borders are assumed as limits of sovereignties and competing powers with a predominantly military vision, which gets in the way and closes the possibilities of establishing ties (Ramírez and Cepik, 2004, p. 450).

This is how the two types of borders, internal and international, locate the border that Colombia and Venezuela have, but where the characteristics of the internal border come to the fore, due to the abandonment by both States, which leads to these areas being exploited by transnational criminal groups that coexist with state actors but whose presence is ambiguous (García, 2016). On the other hand, this border is characterized as a “scenario of cultural exchange and historical migration” that cannot be conceived as a single border but as a region comprising 6 departments - La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Vichada, Guainía - and four Venezuelan States - Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Amazonas- (Sánchez, 2015) which means that greater state action is needed that does not

materialize in a militarized international border strategy, but rather understanding the needs of the communities residing there as well as that of migrants seeking new opportunities.

Towards a Fragmented and Pragmatic Multilateralism?

Since the 21st century, Latin American multilateralism has linked the economic with the political and continues with an ideologizing character that has gained strength with the rise of the new Latin American Left. At present, there is a trend towards a Latin American Left with new actors among which the media will influence the construction of identities and dominant roles (Cannon and Rangel, 2020). In the face of this, concepts such as power and region are changing. In the former, hard capabilities continue to dominate and are intertwined with soft power with different actors leading to a socially, economically, and politically constructed region (or several). The old multilateralism continues at a cross-roads of tensions linked to the crisis of the State, the emergence and strengthening of new actors with international projection, new threats, and the absence of leadership, which led to "mini-lateralisms". It is a "light regionalism" that requires debate and discussion on the tensions between the principles of non-intervention and the defense of sovereignty, as well as between the need for consensus on basic rules among a community of states (Notle, 2019). Disenchantment with integration is present due to the current uncertainty.

COVID-19 deepened the crisis of Latin American regionalism. Dependence on raw materials has a negative impact on intra-regional trade, which dropped to 9% in MERCOSUR, 7.3% in CAN, and 2.7% in the Pacific Alliance (Notle, 2019). There is no leadership, confidence or representativeness of either Mexico or Brazil. There is no Paymaster (Morales, 2020). And it is difficult for Colombia to assume this role. Colombia has developed border cooperation actions with CAN members such as Ecuador and Peru, and also with Brazil. On the contrary, the absence of institutionalism with Venezuela hinders a joint treatment of the effects of criminality and COVID-19 in this border of 2,219 kilometers. Colombia and Venezuela have lacked diplomatic and consular relations since 2019.

However, Colombia did not take advantage of its pro-tempore presidency of the CAN to propose and lead a series of triangular and South-South cooperation initiatives in the Andean and Latin American region. Its emphasis was on economic issues, expanding trade, harmonizing public policies and joint projects that contribute to boosting regional competitiveness and improving people's quality of life. After the United States, China and the European Union, the Andean Community is the fourth destination for Colombian exports: "In 2019 Colombia exported 3.235 billion dollars to CAN countries with agricultural, manufacturing and service products" (CAN, 2020). Recently, it has been oriented towards migratory and environmental standardization by promoting the Andean Environmental Charter, which will finally be signed at the end of 2020.

For one year, Colombia received the pro tempore Secretariat of the Pacific Alliance in December 2020. It has encountered a multilateral organization weakened by COVID and social protests in member countries. It proposed to continue with the proposals formulated and initiated by Chile. This group is more about cooperation than integration and promotes a neoliberal model of open regionalism, with diverse geopolitical and geo-economic interests and a marked hyper-presidentialism. Although its initial integration included Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, its networks have been extended to associate members, observers, and economic and social actors such as the business, parliamentary, tourism and academic sectors, among others. Since January 2022, Singapore is an associate member. And the Pacific Alliance also seeks to integrate Ecuador. All these increase activities with associates and observers from different geographic regions and promote multilateral cooperation with APEC and ASEAN. Its roadmap for 2021 included limiting the use of plastic, promoting the digital market as a means of strengthening intra-regional exchange and interdependence; aligning PA objectives with those of the SDGs, deepening the gender agenda with the reduction of the wage differential; coordinating with Mercosur to generate more trade in the region; and creating a working group on Science, Technology, and Innovation. Thus, it was a great opportunity for Colombia to promote these initiatives aimed at a Scientific, Digital and Feminist Diplomacy, in a year in which the Pacific Alliance turns 10 years old and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs turns 200.

PROSUR is an attempt to institutionalize the Lima Group in order to isolate Venezuela from the regional scenario. It is a weak and unconcreted regional project, since it is a simple forum for presidential deliberation, without bodies, mandate, and attributions. In its different meetings it has focused on looking for ways to combat the pandemic and obtain vaccines for the member countries. In general, Duque used other bodies, such as the UN General Assembly to deploy his speech against Maduro before a wider audience and accuse him of helping FARC dissidents. In this way, he based his accusation on the communist ideological affinity that exists between the insurgencies and the Venezuelan government. Many manifestations point to the crisis of multilateralism and the lack of institutionalization and confidence in integration and joint solutions. The absence of State policies and their ideologization makes it difficult to rebuild a structural multilateralism that can overcome the marked hyper-presidentialism.

Conclusion: Challenges for Colombian Foreign Policy

Colombia is a secondary regional power that seeks leadership and international insertion in accordance with its capabilities, which have been affected by COVID-19. Its foreign policy moves between pragmatism and ideologization and presents a legalistic and juridic character attached to international law. The United States is the main referent, and the security issue is its priority- A multidimen-

sional security that includes the individual, ranging from drugs to migration, including peace and crime. This asymmetric relationship also has U.S. interests focused on economic-commercial-financial issues, and Colombian interests focused on the viability of an internal agenda promoted by political and, to a lesser extent, economic elites. Over the years, Colombia was integrated into the major international circuits always hand in hand with the United States, but at the same time, new non-governmental actors were emerging who were interested in being heard and inserting themselves internationally. Thus, business-people, non-governmental organizations, cities, and regions began to outline their own foreign policy, independent of the State.

The United States will continue to be relevant for Colombia's international insertion. However, its economic weakening will bring Latin America closer to the Great Dragon and the Asia-Pacific region, deepening ties not only in trade but also in investment, tourism, culture, and education. A triangulation also of United States-China-Colombia tends to be present and to be linked to that other United States-Colombia-Venezuela relationship, within an ideological and pragmatic accommodation, which indicates a formulation of policies more of government than of State, in which personal interests prevail over national ones.

Regarding immigration, Colombia should seek economic support from the private sector and from Venezuelans who arrived at the beginning of this century. It also urges the support of mainly South American countries, multilateral organizations, and the international community in general. The great challenge is to make the most of the immigrants arriving in the country. This requires international, regional, and local multilevel governance, and policies aimed at the development and positive labor insertion of migrants. An intelligent migratory policy is needed and the reconstruction of institutional channels in their relationship. The Temporary Migratory Statute is a good start. Colombia's *pro tempore* secretariats were of little use for exercising pragmatic and innovative leadership to reestablish trust and real cooperation between countries and Latin American regional organizations on issues such as migration, health, and security. Pragmatic and institutional strategies aimed at diversifying Colombia's international relations are urgently needed.

References

Ardila, M. & Clemente Batalla, I. (2019). "Santos: Una diplomacia tradicional con cambios". *OASIS* 29, pp. 7-27.

Ardila, M. y Amado JA (2009). "Continuidades y cambios en las relaciones de Colombia con sus vecinos. 2008-2009 año crítico con Ecuador y Venezuela". *OASIS* 14, pp. 55-70.

Arroyabe, M. (2012). "Colombia en el ámbito multilateral: su papel actual en las organizaciones internacionales y frente al derecho internacional". Stefan Jost, Editor, *Colombia: ¿Una potencia en desarrollo?*, KAS.

Battaglino, JM (2008). "Palabras mortales; ¿Rearme y carrera armamentista en América del Sur?". *Revista Nueva Sociedad*, 15.

Bernal-Meza, R. (2016). "Contemporary Latin American thinking on International Relations: theoretical, conceptual and methodological contributions". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 59(1), 1-32.

Borda, Sandra (2019). *¿Por qué somos tan parroquiales?* Editorial Crítica.

Buelvas, E. P., Hernández, A. M. V., Giraldo, M. Á. B (2021). *El discurso y la acción exterior del gobierno de Iván Duque: ¿la ideologización de la política exterior colombiana?* Fundación KAS-ESAP.

Briceño, J. y A. Simonoff (2015). Integración y cooperación regional en América Latina: Una relectura a partir de la teoría de la autonomía. In *Integración y cooperación regional en América Latina: Una relectura a partir de la teoría de la autonomía*, Editorial Biblos.

Cannon, B y P Rangel (2020). "Introducción: resurgimiento de la derecha en América Latina". *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* 126, p. 7-15

Dallanegra Pedraza, Luis. (2012). "Claves de la política exterior de Colombia". *Latinoamérica. Revista de estudios Latinoamericanos*, (54), 37-73. Accessed on 28 February 2020, http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-85742012000100003&lng=es&tlang=es.

El Derecho a No Obedecer, Universidad Externado de Colombia, FESCOL, Save the Children. Barómetro de Xenofobia. 2020. "Informe julio 2020". Accessed on 22 February 2021. https://issuu.com/elderechoanobedecer/docs/informe_de_julio_-bx_pagenumber.

Flemes, Daniel y Thorsten Wojczewski (2011). Contested Leadership in Comparative Perspective: Power Strategies in South Asia and South America. *Asian Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 24 No. 1: 1-27.

García, V. (2016). "Seguridad, amenazas irregulares y frontera en Chile": el plan frontera norte". *Fronteras, fuentes de conflictos y cooperación*. Universidad del Norte. pp. 111-141.

Gamez, A. (2005). "Fuentes de cambio en política exterior: una revisión de los modelos de política exterior para los países en desarrollo". *CIDOB d'Afers Internationals*, No 69, May, pp 127-151.

Gardini, G. (2011). Latin American Foreign Policies Between Ideology and Pragmatism: A Framework for Analysis. In G. L. Gardini & P. Lambert (Eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (pp. 13-33). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230118270_2.

Gardini, G., & Lambert, P. (Eds.). (2011). *Latin American foreign policies between ideology and pragmatism*. New York, Estados Unidos: Palgrave MacMillan. Accessed on <http://resolver.shef.ac.uk/?https://www.dawsonera.com/guard/protecte d/dawson.jsp?name=https://idp.shef.ac.uk/shibboleth&%5Cndest=ht tp://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractVie w/S9780230118270>

Hermann, M. et al. (2001). "Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions". *International Studies Review*, 3(2), 133-168.

Hermann, M. (2001). "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework". *International Studies Review*, 3(2), 47-81.

Hermann, C., Kegley and Rosenau, J. (Eds.) (1978). *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen and Unwin. pp. 339-365.

Holsti, K. J. (1991). Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory. In: Holsti, K. J. (ed.), *Change in the international system. Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 83-110.

Kapcia, A. (2011). Defying Expectations: The External Profile and Activism of the Cuban Revolution. In G. L. Gardini & P. Lambert (Eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (pp. 179-195). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230118270_11

Long, T. (2017). "Coloso fragmentado: la agenda "interméstica" y la política exterior latinoamericana". *Foro internacional*, 57(1), 5-54.

Long, T, Sebastian Bitar y Gabriel Jiménez-Peña (2019). Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*.

Menand, L. (1997). Pragmatism: A reader.

Migración Colombia. 2021. "ABC Estatuto Temporal de Protección - Migrantes Venezolanos". Acceso el 16 febrero de 2021. <https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/abc-estatuto-temporal-de-proteccion-migrantes-venezolanos>.

Morales, D. (2020). "Jerarquía de poder en la comunidad andina: un proyecto de integración carente de paymaster". *Tla-Melaau. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, (48).

Nolte, D. (2019). "Lo bueno, lo malo, lo feo y lo necesario: pasado, presente y futuro del regionalismo latinoamericano". *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, 28(1), 131-156.

Pastrana, E. y Hobert Gehring (2016). *Política exterior colombiana. Escenarios y desafíos en el posconflicto*, Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Putnam, Robert D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of two-level games". *International Organization*, Vol 42, No 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460.

Ramírez, S. y Cepik, M. (2004). *Agenda de Seguridad Andino Brasileña: primeras aproximaciones*. Universidade Federal Rio Grande do Sul.

Randall, S. (2011). The Continuing Pull of the Polar Star: Colombian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. In G. L. Gardini & P. Lambert (Eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (pp. 139-157). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Randall, S. J. (2017). *Frente a la estrella polar: Colombia y Estados Unidos desde 1974*. Taurus.

Rojas, D. M. (2019). La política internacional de la administración Santos: entre los imperativos y las aspiraciones. *OASIS*, (29), 7-27. <https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n29.02>

Rosenau, James, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" (1996). In John A. Vásquez, Editor, *Classics of International Relations*, UpperSaddle, (NJ), Prentice Hall.

Russell, R., & Tokatlian, J. G. (2013). "América Latina y su gran estrategia: entre la aquiescencia y la autonomía/Latin America and its grand strategy: between acquiescence and autonomy". *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals*, 157-180.

Russell, R., & Tokatlian, J. G. (2009). "Modelos de política exterior y opciones estratégicas: El caso de América Latina frente a Estados Unidos". *Revista CIDOB d'Afers internacionals*, pp. 211-249.

Sánchez, G. (2015). Éxodo en la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela, cruzando la frontera: memoria del éxodo hacia Venezuela, el caso del río Arauca. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica.

Silva Pedroso, Carolina y Joao Carlos Jarochinski Silva (2019). "Los impactos de la crisis venezolana en las relaciones con Brasil: diagnóstico y perspectivas en un contexto en cambio". In *La crisis venezolana: Impactos de desafíos*, Bogotá Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Tickner, Arlene (2007). "Intervención por invitación. Claves de la política exterior colombiana y de sus debilidades principales". *Colombia Internacional*, 65, pp. 90-111.

Velázquez Flores, R. (2015). "Pragmatismo principista: la política exterior de México". *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de la UNAM*, (120/121).

Websites:

ACNUR. (2019) Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela superan los cuatro millones: ACNUR y OIM. Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados. 2019. Accessed on <https://www.acnur.org/noticias/press/2019/6/5cfa5eb64/refugiados-y-migrantes-de-venezuela-superan-los-cuatro-millones-acnur-y.html>.

BBC Mundo. (10 de enero de 2019) Crisis en Venezuela: 5 claves que explican que explican cómo se ha desarrollado hasta ahora. BBC Mundo. 2019. Accessed on <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46821723>.

El País. (23 de enero de 2019) Cuatro años de inestabilidad. El País. 2019. Accessed on <https://elpais.com/especiales/2019/crisis-politica-en-venezuela/>.

The New York Times. (17 de mayo de 2019) Venezuela vive la peor crisis económica para un país sin guerra, según los expertos. The New York Times. 2019. Accessed on <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/05/17/venezuela-crisis-economia/>.

www.cancilleria.gov.co
www.elespectador.com
www.eltiempo.com
www.semana.com
www.dnp.gov.co

CHAPTER 7

Neoliberalism in Peruvian Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatism and Dogmatism*

Oscar Vidarte Arévalo

Introduction

In the foreign policy field, there are many studies that undertake states behavior at an international level, emphasizing concepts such as pragmatism, ideology, and dogmatism. Unfortunately, in Latin America these are rather scarce, and in the case of Peru, even more so. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this approach is not of relevance for the Latin-American foreign policy analysis. According to Gardini and Lambert, “since 2000, there appears to be a parallel rise of pragmatism and of ideological discourse [in Latin America], both employed to foster the national interest in a rapidly changing context” (Gardini & Lambert, 2011, p. 4). In a regional context of great political and ideological transformations, such as the ones that took place in the early 21st century, the interest to understand the role of our countries, whether in pragmatic terms or not, was of great importance.

This last decade, something quite similar has been happening: the left debacle in the region, which seemed to represent the return of conservative governments and then the progressist resurgence, presents us an unclear and changing regional political context. This added to a severe economic and social crisis with a major impact due to the COVID-19 pandemic, let us comprehend the current instability in Latin America and, therefore, the need to continue analyzing our foreign policies from a perspective that highlights the importance of thinking ourselves in pragmatic, ideological or dogmatic terms. Is the international behavior of Latin American States a result of decisions that are understood according to the existing circumstances, or the result of pre-established doctrinal frameworks?

In the case of Peru, its foreign policy has faced a regional and global context that is deeply influenced by the Neoliberalism guidelines. Even though, to a greater or lesser extent since the 1990s, governments that seemed to reach for

*This paper counted on the collaboration of Mayte Díaz Quichua, a student of the Political Science and Government Program at PUCP.

power with a critical discourse against Neoliberalism were elected, these ended up aligning with it. In its beginnings, generated stability lets us refer to a mainly pragmatic foreign policy. Nonetheless, in the 21st century, Peruvian external behavior has become much more complex, in such a way that the maintenance of this economic model in our international relations has combined quotas of pragmatism and dogmatism. Precisely, Neoliberalism –of great importance to understand the Peruvian foreign policy of these times– will be analyzed with the objective to demonstrate that, in the Peruvian case, even when it is associated to pragmatism, it will also allow us to comprehend the inherent dogmatism to its foreign policy, demonstrating the synergy that exists between pragmatism and dogmatism in international matters.

Between Pragmatism, Ideology and Dogmatism: A Difficult Theoretical Debate

What do we mean when we refer to pragmatic foreign policy? Dominguez understands it as a state policy that clearly identifies its objectives and the instruments to achieve them, “with the awareness that achievable benefits are pursued starting from reasonable costs” (Domínguez, 2008, pp. 180-181). Similarly, by pragmatic behavior Leone refers to actions that lead to concrete goals, that report the greatest number of benefits and can be achievable with the means available (Leone, 2013, p. 258). According to the *Diccionario de la Lengua Española*, the word pragmatic is defined as “inclined to pragmatism”, whilst pragmatism refers to the “preference for what is practical or useful”. That explains why Gardini conceives that a pragmatic foreign policy is the one based on criteria such as usefulness, workability, and practicality, emphasizing the priority of action over doctrine and the experience over principles (Gardini, 2011, p. 17). Nevertheless, despite the apparent consensus regarding what is understood as a pragmatic foreign policy, in fact it is a widely discussed concept since there is a “extensive disagreement among scholars, and especially between philosophers, over how to define the term's meaning” of pragmatism (Ralston, 2011, p. 74).

There are those who question pragmatism as an opportunistic behavior or an ad hoc reaction, but in fact, a pragmatic attitude would respond to “a policy, thought and based –up to a certain point– on an integrating doctrine” that provides certain degree of foresight and coherence (Fernandois, 1985, p. 177). In other words, a pragmatic foreign policy not only should be explained in utilitarian terms or based on a rational decision that seeks for the best choice (meaning that which maximizes benefits and reduces costs, as developed by Realism, one of the main theories of International Relations in the 20th Century), but also from the existence of a doctrinal component, not to call it ideological.

Raymond Aron pointed out that authentic Realism forces us to understand states' foreign policy not only regarding the pursuit of power, but also from ideological frameworks that influence that behavior. It's in that sense that

Dominguez claims that ideology is a form of cataloging and valuing the information being gathered, "Ideology thus understood constitutes a useful instrument, not confronted with pragmatism, to comprehend the world in which we live, the importance of the past and its legacy to the present, as well as the values that matter to individuals" (Domínguez, 2008, p. 187). Similarly, Zízék proposes that ideology is "the framework of sense that organizes our opinions and attitudes regarding what we assume, as well as what we consider correct or incorrect". It is, therefore, "the filter of our perception of reality and of our morality" (as quoted by Ilizalde, 2020, p. 130). In this way, proposing a difference between a pragmatic foreign policy and an ideological one would constitute an error. Ideology, thus, cannot be marginalized from political analysis because it is supposedly value biased, nor can values fail to be considered for the comprehension of a state behavior in the international arena (Gardini, 2011, p. 15). A doctrinal framework could be both a heterodox approach and a liberal or conservative proposal, and it is often present in any type of behavior.

Despite the aforementioned, the dichotomy between pragmatism and ideology, or experience and principles, is still used to comprehend foreign policy. However, it seems to be evident that, at this point, there are no pure governments in ideological or pragmatic terms (Merke & Reynoso, 2016, p. 110). Highly pragmatic governments show doctrinal bases that serve them as guidelines, and very ideologized ones behave, most of the time, demonstrating a high dose of pragmatism. Even, as Ralston mentions, a pragmatic behavior in the International Relations ambit requires different techniques, approaches, and ideas, which force diplomats to count on tools coming from different theoretical frameworks, all of them fundamental for the defense of their country's interest (Ralston, 2011, p. 82-83). What could seem contradictory turns into a perfect complement. In any case, "the ideology-pragmatism continuum shows that an action, occasionally, can respond to both elements (...), without a clear answer" (Leone, 2013, p. 258).

It is in this point that the concept of dogmatism emerges into the debate. According to Domínguez, "dogmatism refers to an idea, and a mindset developed in the past, that could result appropriate then, but differs from present reality, prevents new ideas from being learned, new information from being gathered and official policies from being changed or modified" (Domínguez, 2008, p. 184). And even when ideological behavior is not necessarily the same as dogmatic behavior (as mentioned before, a pragmatic policy could have an ideological component), it is undeniable that dogmatism has, itself, a high ideological content.

Hence, it is quite easy to associate an ideological foreign policy with positions defined in the past, out of context, without considering its viability and real utility; as well as with a "personalized" a vision of "international relations related to a specific leader or administration rather than to a consistent national interest" (Gardini, 2011, p. 17). We will call this a dogmatic foreign policy. For the purposes of this paper, we will take the dichotomy that the debate on prag-

matism and dogmatism proposes to foreign policy, whilst the ideological component will be always present, as it determines the states' international behavior.

Neoliberalism in the 1990 Decade as an Expression of a Pragmatic Foreign Policy

Neoliberalism is an ideological framework that is used by different governments not only as an economic model for a country's development, but also as a tool of great importance for its international relations. It had its highlight during the 1980s decade under the impulse of two leaders of great influence at a global scale: Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. It is in this context in which Latin American countries understood the importance of not only deregulating its economies and opening their markets, but also of promoting commercial trades, going from political integration to economic integration and understanding the international as a source of commerce and investments.

To Latin America, the "lost decade" urgently called for a different economic proposal, after the developmentalism attrition. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War, as well as the United States and capitalism triumph (that evolves with the Washington Consensus to a more radical version), made Neoliberalism more than an option to the countries in the region, almost an obligation. "Thus [...], both in the Southern Cone and in the Andean region of South America, neoliberal policies became hegemonic, being able to achieve the consensus of various fractions of different social classes and began to be applied throughout democratic governments with a greater emphasis than what dictatorial governments had been able to implement" (Kan, 2018, p. 17).

In the case of Peru, the terrible macroeconomic situation inherited from the Alan García administration (1985-1990) and the country's distancing from the international financial system (highly necessary to have access to credits), forced Peru to get closer to the United States and implement the neoliberal economic model. Therefore, it is no coincidence that as soon as Alberto Fujimori won the Presidency in 1990, he became distant from his criticism to neoliberal reforms (which were an important part of his main political rival, Mario Vargas Llosa) and assumed this ideological framework as the path to take. Ever since, "the State priority has been economic growth based on deregulation and production liberalization, the privatization of public companies, private investment and, especially, international capitals promotion (Ilizalde, 2020, p. 141). As it can be seen, the international component of this proposal is evident.

It is worth noting that Fujimori was "a practically unknown candidate [...] with an eclectic discourse in ideological terms, but [...] popular, oriented to tackle economic crisis and terrorism (Urra, 2011, p. 150). Initially, he approached politicians from different political orientations. Furthermore, as he appointed well-known left-wing leaders to cabinet charges and other top-level positions, he also

assigned a Prime Minister to the liking of businessmen and started applying drastic fiscal policy shocks and opening negotiations with international creditors. "In doing so, he kept many guessing about his real intentions. But when it became clear that major policy decisions were being made by Fujimori's closed circle of economic and military technocrats, with little outside influence, these appointees resigned" (Mauceri, 1995, p. 22). In this context, without alternatives to capitalism and having communism failed globally (and all its derivatives), the neoliberal ideological impulse did not find any opposition.

In this difficult context to Peru, one of the priorities of Peruvian foreign policy (if not the most important) was to reincorporate Peru to the international financial system, although this required restoring the country's international position. To do so, the support of the American government was of great importance. Hence, besides implementing neoliberal economic reforms required by this great power (with an emphasis on market and privatizations), another ambition that was of great interest to the United States in its relationship with Peru was the fight against drug production and trafficking.

In the early 1990s, fight against drugs was of great importance to American foreign policies, and Peru, as one of the biggest cocaine producers in the world, with vast areas of coca leaf cultivation, was a key actor". As a result of it, initial negotiations between both states focused on drug production and trafficking, a policy of great interest to George Bush administration. This approach demonstrated the initial pragmatism in Fujimori administration, for Peruvians in and outside the government had been more involved in the fight against terrorist movements –especially the Shining Path– than what they were during the war against drugs" (St. John, 1999, p. 213). But this did not mean a submission to United States interests. On the contrary, not only did the Peruvian government take advantage of the importance that the problem against drugs for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush had acquired based on the country's interest, but also proposed a different approach to the military (of great American influence): one of an integral nature, finally successful (Ramacciotti & Mendez, 2012, pp. 112-113).

On the other hand, this reintegration to the global finances' world, highly necessary to Peru, also implied making an agreement with its main creditors. To do so, Peru needed to provide stability in order to stimulate investment and activities from the private sector, besides eliminating the terrorist threat and facing social demands. Fujimori's response was to emphasize public order. To Mauceri, "enhanced state power domestically" had been one of the "keys to the overall success of the Fujimori neoliberal reform program" (Mauceri, 1995, p. 23). As a result, Fujimori administration did restructure the debt in favorable conditions and reestablished Peru's position in the international financial community. This allowed him to extend the diplomatic and economic linkages between Peru and important countries from the Asian-Pacific region, as well as consolidate bilateral relations with the United States, making it an important partner to Peru (St. John, 2017, p. 73-74).

Evidently, at this juncture, the neoliberal model implementation could have a positive impact on the country. An eminently pragmatic analysis may have led Alberto Fujimori to move off from what he stated during the electoral campaign and build a neoliberal order that, for many, "providing a quick, effective and resolute solution to the economic crisis and the internal war" (Felices, 2017, p. 166). In the same respect, St. John claims that Fujimori's source of success was based on having demonstrated "both pragmatism and perseverance in the tracing of a series of political initiatives, daring and innovative" (St. John, 1999, p. 227).

Actually, as a result of the self-coup carried out by Fujimori in 1992 and his first authoritarian attempt, Peru was close to lose, in an instant, everything gained in the matter of the country's reintegration to the international financial system. The possibility that countries such as the United States and the OAS impose sanctions against Peru, led Fujimori administration to propose a Democratic Constituent Congress as a way out to save this situation (Vidarte & Quispe, 2018, p. 62-63). Therefore, besides the fact that the emergency and national reconstruction government that emerged after the self-coup had to submit itself, perhaps reluctantly, to the pressure and demands of the international environment (Bákula, 2001, p. 1514), it is also likely that there has been a quota of pragmatism, which rapidly made the Fujimori administration realize that the authoritarian path was not a good option and that it was better to adopt measures that could lead Peru into a democratic transition. Despite the aforementioned, there is no doubt that the country's image was going to be severely affected.

At this point, it can be said that the Fujimori administration actions were perfectly framed in a pragmatic behavior. The neoliberal economic reforms adopted seem to be the expression of a government that, at a certain moment, decided what the most convenient option for the country was. In that sense, the study that Merke and Reynoso carried out on the political orientations of Latin American countries between the years 1980 and 2014 confirms it by recognizing the Fujimori administration as a mainly pragmatic one in its different moments. Without constituting a "hard pragmatism", it is clearly present (Merke & Reynoso, 2016, p. 118). Furthermore, it points out that governments that propose a larger economic openness and an alignment to the United States policies (such as Fujimori's) usually have a more pragmatic style in terms of foreign policy (Merke & Reynoso, 2016, p. 125). It turns evident that "there is a relationship stated between the presidents' ideological positions [...] and their orientation to present foreign policy styles that are more ideological for leftists and more pragmatic for right-wingers. Nevertheless, [...] this relationship is far from linear and excluding, there are cases of left-wing presidents that present pragmatic attitudes and right-wing presidents with ideological ones" (Merke & Reynoso, 2016, p. 128).

The latter is of great importance, since it is a tendency in Latin America to always consider governments politically aligned to neoliberalism as governments that are actually expressions of a pragmatic foreign policy, and critical governments as ideologized or dogmatic *per se*, but as Merke and Reynoso claim,

this does not always occur this way. In the Peruvian case, a great deal of the literature identifies that governments that were developed in the 21st century as pragmatic, since they continued policies that were being developed in the foreign policy ambit in previous years (especially the ones that in the international context prioritized economic openness and free trade agreements). For instance, since administrations such as Alan García's (2006-2011) and Ollanta Humala's (2011-2016) rapidly moved away from the criticism they made to the predominant discourse (that during the first decade of the present century had a great reception in different countries of the region), they can be considered pragmatic. And that is precisely what is going to be questioned next.

Is the 20th-Century Neoliberalism an Expression of a Pragmatic Foreign Policy?

At this point, it is evident that Alberto Fujimori's administration developed a neoliberal proposal based on the market, whose impact, by reestablishing economic stability and the popular support that came with it, allowed him to keep going with ambitious market reforms (Weyland, 2003, p. 1107) that were expressed in different ambits, including foreign policy. Precisely, considering the achievements of the model implemented by the Fujimori administration in the 1990s, and the fact that the Peruvian foreign policy had followed these economic ideas, is that we could refer to a pragmatic foreign policy (Guerra-Barón, 2019, p. 48-49). Additionally, since the market defeated important ideological rivals, is that, ironically, neoliberal populists (such as Fujimori) reinforced the idea of "the end of ideology" by developing a discourse that emphasized the importance of political pragmatism (Weyland, 2003, p. 1107). But what has happened in the 21st Century? Firstly, the tendency on comprehending Peruvian foreign policy as a mainly pragmatic one continues.

According to Guerra Barón "all presidents in the 21st Century have led their actions based on Fujimori's economic ideas, with which not only pragmatism can be noted, but also the consistency of strategies and formulas used to insert the country internationally" (Guerra-Barón, 2019, p. 48-49). For his part, St. John, when analyzing the Peruvian foreign policy during Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan García and Ollanta Humala's administration, claims that, in the same way, pragmatism has tended to prevail over ideology, and that the latter rarely ended up overshadowing pragmatism (St. John, 2011, p. 133-134). From his perspective, the continuity of Peruvian foreign policy after the year 2000, following the bases introduced by Alberto Fujimori, and the coherence and rationality of the initiatives in the international ambit by the Peruvian diplomacy, made evident a high degree of pragmatism (St. John, 2017, p. 66; 108).

In the study Marke and Reynoso carried out, the Alejandro Toledo administration and the second term of Alan García were characterized by a pragmatic leadership style (ranked 5 out of 7). In the case of Humala, even when his

administration shows less signs of pragmatism, it could be considered that way (4.6 points out of 7), although it seems ironic that he shares perspective with Fujimori's second term (1995-2000), since, according to both authors, this is the most pragmatic term of his entire stay in power (Merke & Reynoso, 2016, p. 118). In the same line, to St. John, the Toledo administration "largely continued the pragmatism-over-ideology model employed by President Fujimori" (St. John, 2011, p. 124-125). His orientation for neoliberalism as economic model, its openness and economic integration to the world, and the design of an institutional architecture responsible for international economic negotiations, could have been signals of this attempt to instrumentalize foreign policy in terms of the country's interests (Guerra-Barón, 2019, p. 50). Pragmatism is shown at its finest.

For his part, Alan García's second term in office might have moved away completely from the economic heterodoxy of his first administration in the 1980s in order to embrace a neoliberal agenda. Commerce and investments promotion, as well as free trade agreements, meant the continuation of what was built in the previous administration. From a pragmatic perspective, García would have decided to "opt for Peru's integration to a globalized world, taking advantage of the enormous possibilities that [were presented] to a developing country" (Arias, 2006, p. 19). The international context, mainly positive back then especially to Latin America, seemed to want to be taken advantage of by García, even when this implied distancing from the old *aprista* tradition, by not questioning and using the neoliberal ideology bases (and even against of what García himself promoted as president in the 1980s).

In the second decade of the 21st century, Ollanta Humala and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2016-2018) won the Presidency, but it did not change the course already taken. Foreign policy during the nationalist administration "did not pay attention to what was proposed in its party platform, but continued the great guidelines established already. (...) continued with a basically "economicist" foreign policy, without great political goals nor leaderships, both at a regional and a global level" (Vidarte, 2016, p. 82). Whilst Kuczynski represented from the beginning a liberal government close to the great capital, no one actually was surprised when he continued with the neoliberal foundations to foreign policy. Integration and global economic openness were expressed through the continuation of "bilateral contacts started in the Humala administration with secondary markets to our products, but (...) highly important for their size" (Vidarte, 2018, p. 117).

At this point, Peruvian foreign policy could be considered as one of pragmatic character, but being neoliberalism an expression of an ideological framework, we would actually be facing a pragmatic foreign policy guided by a neoliberal ideology. The first thing that is obvious is that the Peruvian case lets us overcome the pragmatism-ideology dichotomy in terms of foreign policy. It is, in fact, much more precise to utilize the pragmatism-dogmatism dichotomy. Bákula himself pointed out that, even in the eighties, the economic crisis experienced in the region and the attitude of the international financial centers

“contributed to the problem's ideologization” (Bákula, 2001, p. 1511; 1513). De-ideologize Peru and other Latin American country's response to get out of this situation is a mistake, but this does not mean that there was no pragmatic-nature answer to face the crisis.

Hence, it is important to finish not only with the idea that invites us to believe that ideology does not exist or, even worse, does not matter, which was indeed popular during the Cold War and was carried out by authors like Francis Fukuyama; but also, in the same line, to consider liberal democracy “as a historically superior and insuperable form of development” (Ilizarbe, 2020, p. 129). There comes a point in which the academy must assume a revolutionary choice, and as Robert Cox would say, it should be all about transiting from a conservative analysis that seeks to solve problems and that conceives itself as value-free, but in fact “it is full of values since it accepts implicitly the dominant order as its own frame”, to one that questions the institutional and discursive bases of the existing order, and helps in the construction of an alternative one (Cox, 2014, p. 133-135). Therefore, it is fundamental to introduce ideology to the debate and understand neoliberalism as an ideological framework that has had, and still has, a fundamental role to comprehend Peruvian foreign policy, both from a pragmatic and dogmatic perspective.

On the other hand, even when Neoliberalism offered a project that allowed to end hyperinflation, its insistence on continued budget austerity, and its warnings against economic overheating, blocked any decided effort to promote growing and create employment rapidly (Weyland, 2003, p. 1107-1108). So, once the 1990s decade has passed, is it possible to keep considering neoliberalism as an expression of a pragmatic policy when it seems to present limitations to achieve the expectations that its implementation in the region generated? Not by chance did certain political parties and movements critical to the current order began to gain power in Latin America, which were actually developed on the Neoliberalism broken promises. In foreign policy, this change of political course in the region is also going to have direct consequences over the countries' economic and commercial priorities, more critically on the role of the United States and a different idea on the future of regional integration and the relevance of our participation in the emergent world.

It is not strange that for some academics Neoliberalism in fact ended up turning into a lifestyle, generating social conditions to its reproduction among society. On the pretext of liberty, “it was generating a quota of consensus in favor of a social order that actually ends up accepting as such”. “It is not unreasonable to suppose that the greater strategic triumph of neoliberalism was to have promoted social awareness” (Salinas, 2018, p. 8-9). Hence, the bases of the neoliberal model, in certain Latin American countries including Peru, were practically intact, holding on to the dogmatic idea that the “State must only have the market work in an appropriate manner in order to avoid restrictions and impediments to free and full competition” (Salinas, 2018, p. 9). This unique way of thinking, which dominates much of politics, academy, the media, and society in general,

and that is developed under the main international organizations, was imposed as “the only and more convenient course that should be followed in all countries and under all circumstances” (Tello & Ibarra, 2012).

Therefore, Peruvian society, especially those urban sectors more favored by these policies, has a quite positive perception on the current economic model. In a poll carried out a few years ago, it was demonstrated how important it was to Peruvian population that Peru increase its commerce in other countries, as well as the benefits generated by foreign investment. These results remain, and even in some cases improved, *vis-à-vis* previous polls (Vidarte, 2016, p. 84-85; 87-89). From the elites to much of the population, there is a clearly established idea on the validity of the neoliberal agenda.

In that sense, is anyone surprised by the fact that Alan García, running for President in 2006, had promised to revise the Free Trade Agreement that his predecessor had signed and that sought to be approved by the Congress, but then, once in office, became an active promoter of such agreement? It could be said that pragmatism prevailed, but it is evident that he lied during his campaign (in order to confront Ollanta Humala’s proposal, who did not seem to have any intentions of subscribing such agreement), and that he was convinced that a model that is built to an international level through those types of trade agreements was fundamental. Moreover, he claimed, once in the presidency, that “for Peru not to sign the FTA with the United States, *tendrían que caer piedras hacia arriba*”¹ (Andina, 2006). Furthermore, his willingness to articulate the commercial integration between Pacific riparian countries, which later on would be the bases of the Pacific Alliance, shows his adhesion to the principles under which the Washington Consensus emerged (Toche, 2011, p. 92). However, at a moment in which a great part of Latin America urgently called for a change, different Peruvian governments that reached power in those years did not want to assume that challenge and based on the results of the last presidential elections (2021), it may not have been the best choice.

Among all of them, the case of Ollanta Humala was the most evident. With the Nationalism winning the elections, many changes regarding Peru’s position in the international system were expected, but these did not occur. In terms of foreign policy, his political platform known as “La Gran Transformación”² had a distinct progressivism, similar to what had been going on in other countries of the region. Nevertheless, these five years meant a high level of continuity, in which an “economicist” foreign policy developed during the previous years prevailed. This deceit has been studied not necessarily as a pragmatic behavior, but in terms of “capture”: a government that is captured by an important sector of great economic powers (Durand, 2016). Going from a reactionary discourse to an absolutely opposite one, does not imply a pragmatic decision on

¹ The expression *tendrían que caer piedras hacia arriba* has its equivalent in *when pigs fly*, whose definition, according to the Collins Dictionary, is “If you say ‘when pigs fly’ after someone has said that something might happen, you are emphasizing that you think it is very unlikely”.

² “The Great Tranformation”.

what is best for the country, but does involve a pact that allows the existing order to survive. This pact can also be understood as an expression of an institutional macro arrangement of neoliberal core that emerged in the nineties and remained unaltered in its main guidelines until late in the 21st century (Vergara, 2012). It has little or no pragmatism at all.

It is important to remember that not only the world, but the region have changed considerably in the last three decades. Currently, we are immersed in a highly questioned context regarding economic globalization that started in 2008 (the major crisis to capitalism since the Wall Street Crash of 1929), and that has been strengthen due to the COVID-19 pandemic (to such an extent that in Latin America there is a discussion on a new "lost decade"); furthermore, the world seems to get fractured with respect to the two great powers' (the United States and China) interests, societies call for stronger states that could face situations such as health crisis and transnational threats, as well as the fact that the world requires a greater political cooperation to solve the global problems that afflict us. In this context, can our foreign policy keep prioritizing market openness, trade agreements and economic liberalization? Considering the risks, opportunities and threats that are presented in this highly complex world, wouldn't following this path rather be an expression of a behavior that is a little pragmatic, not to say dogmatic?

It is worth mentioning that in Chile something similar occurs. In the last decades it has been common to identify the continuity of its foreign policy, meaning Chile's integration to the post-dictatorship world, as a mainly pragmatic one. Nevertheless, this discourse does not seem to resist any longer: the neoliberal project and all what it implies is in crisis (Robledo, 2020, p. 3). This has been manifested through social strikes, which although they had been happening some time ago, they got worse in 2019, making the Chilean government accept the possibility of a constitutional change as a way out of the crisis. This outbreak has caused a structural crisis due to a public demand for a change of the model in different levels, including international economic policy, the same that is closely related to the so-long existing model (Güell, in Robledo, 2020, p. 26). Thus, in this context, maintaining the model and all what it implies in terms of foreign policy, as a sector of the Chilean elite pretends, is an expression of pragmatism or dogmatism? It seems to be the latter.

Since the limitations that the neoliberal model presents and the increasing social awareness on the need for a change do not matter, continuing with the neoliberal ideology is not that pragmatic. The well-known Peruvian economist Bruno Seminario has recently claimed that the economic model cannot be maintained in Peru, since it has already collapsed (Seminario, 2021); in other words, if criticisms already existed in the early 21st century, currently they should be worse.

Besides, being its origin the result of not a rational choice about what is best for the country (but of an imposition or an arrangement to maintain an order that is mainly convenient to a minority, and that in terms of foreign policy it seems to be unaware of the transformations that are happening), the existence

of a dogmatic component in the Peruvian foreign policy that allows us to understand the country integration in a world mainly in neoliberal terms, not knowing other approaches that could be essential to foreign policy and, as a consequence, to Peru's interests in the international ambit is evident.

Pragmatism in Peruvian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Although neoliberalism is shown as an ideological framework that seems to be an expression of a dogmatic behavior rather than a pragmatic one, both in Peru, as well as in other countries in the region, this does discard the idea that in Peruvian foreign policy there have been moments of pragmatism that clearly aimed at the proper functioning of the economic model. Two recent examples from the 21st century, that help understand what was mentioned, will be presented in the following paragraphs. A first example was experienced during the García and Humala administrations. Considering the García's heterodox and confrontational past against the international financial system, and the Humala's nationalist and critical discourse against the international order, it was expected that, in both cases, the relationship with the United States could be affected. Unlike the instability in the United States-Peruvian relationship during the Cold War, since the beginning of the Fujimori administration, Peru had consolidated itself as a partner of the world power in the continent, so a change in the linkage was feared. Economic reforms that led to the implementation of neoliberalism were since the beginning linked to a relationship with the United States.

In the case of García's second administration, the opposite occurred. After the setback suffered in the relationship between Peru and the United States at the end of the Fujimori administration, the García's second term was, continuously with that of Toledo, fundamental to rebuilding the bilateral dynamics, despite the distrust that was generated at that moment (Vidarte, 2016, p. 75). García knew how to maintain a good relationship both with President George W. Bush and later on with Barack Obama.

In Humala's case, his victory in the 2011 elections does not "seem to have been very encouraging for the United States due to the closeness that existed with that group of countries led by Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. But, except for his presence at the funeral of the former Venezuelan leader, Humala had no major contact with the Bolivarian axis. From the beginning he showed interest in continuing to be an ally of the United States in this part of the continent. At least in the two main axes of the relationship, the economic and security ones, there were clear coincidences, either through the Peruvian government's support for the TPP, an instrument that among other things reflects the geopolitical interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, or through the alignment of the government -except for a short period at the beginning of it- to the anti-drug policy promoted by the great power" (Vidarte, 2016, p. 75-76). Thus, while he sought to consolidate Peru as a good ally of the United States, at the same time,

his foreign policy was pragmatic enough to keep its distance, without breaking its linkage with the axis led by Venezuela. It is no coincidence that, in spaces such as the OAS, during Humala's five-year term, Peru has shown great independence to vote against motions of interest of the Caribbean country (Dextre, 2019, p. 25), without this having implied difficulties in the Peruvian foreign policy at the regional level.

A second example is the interest shown at the beginning of the Pedro Pablo Kuczynski administration to get closer to China. It is a fact that for a few years now, the Chinese market has established itself as the main destination for our exports, while the Chinese investments, mainly in the mining sector, are shown to be the most important ones. Being both the promotion of free trades and investment pillars of the neoliberal model, the new ruler demonstrated the relevance that China had for Peruvian foreign policy, choosing this country as the destination for his first state visit, a few weeks after taking office as president of the Republic (Novak & Namihas, 2017, p. 123).

And what is pragmatic about this? Although a visit by a Peruvian president seems logical and necessary –considering the economic importance of China for Peruvian interests–, this decision reflected a more complex political calculation. “Kuczynski was someone very identified with the United States. He developed a large part of his professional career in that country, and he also happened to have American nationality, a subject that at the time was part of a big debate”. Hence, visiting the Asian giant meant “recognizing the significance of the Asian country for Peru and ending any negative speculation that may be generated with Kuczynski winning the Presidency to power, or on the Chinese influence in the region, an aspect that is of great concern for the United States government” (Vidarte, 2018, p. 114). The trip included meetings at both government and business levels, and although it did not have great economic achievements, it did have political value. The official visit of President Xi Jinping at the end of 2016 proves this. Any fear about the future of the relationship between Peru and China disappeared. China continued to be an important partner to Peru.

Conclusion

It has been evidenced in the Peruvian case that, as it happens at a theoretical level, ideological frameworks can be part of a pragmatic and dogmatic behavior in the international sphere. In Peru, neoliberalism, an ideological framework of great relevance in recent decades, was not only the expression of a pragmatic foreign policy in the early 1990s, but also, in the 21st century, it proved to be part of a dogmatic foreign policy. At one point, it was considered the best choice to get out of the economic crisis of the 1980s, with great impact internally and externally. But two decades later, as happened in other Latin American countries, Peru began to show the need for changes in the face of a neoliberal model that

seemed to be running out. Despite this, and the criticism that began to grow in the population, the same model continued to be maintained. In these circumstances, neoliberalism is presented as a dogmatic proposal, since Peruvian political and economic elites understood it as part of a model that had to be defended at all costs.

Governments that many expected to be reformist, to a greater or lesser extent, were not, and for different reasons they maintained the discourse. However, in this context, Peruvian foreign policy, in order to sustain the economic reforms initiated in the 1990s, also showed signals of pragmatism. Ironically, Peru's relationship at an international level, especially our relationship with the main great powers, of major importance for the purposes of the economic model, showed a high level of pragmatism. In this way, Peru has managed, on the one hand, to consolidate a solid relationship with the United States for almost three decades and, on the other hand, to develop a fruitful rapprochement with China in recent times, based on its consolidation as a world power.

References

Andina. (28 December 2006). Alan García: "Para que el Perú no firme TLC con EEUU tendrían que caer piedras hacia arriba". <https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-alan-garcia-para-que-peru-no-firme-tlc-eeuu-tendrian-caer-piedras-hacia-arriba-110013.aspx>

Arias, C. (2006). El retorno de Alan García. *Nueva Sociedad*, (205), 15-22.

Bákula, J. M. (2001). *Perú: entre la realidad y la utopía. 180 años de política exterior*. Lima: FCE.

Cox, R. (2014). Fuerzas sociales, estados y órdenes mundiales: mas allá de la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales. *Relaciones Internacionales*, (24), 129-162.

Dextre, A. (2019). "Donde manda capitán" Perú y Venezuela en la OEA, 2011 - 2016. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Domínguez, J. I. (2008). Las relaciones contemporáneas Estados Unidos-América Latina. En R. Lagos, *América Latina: ¿integración o fragmentación?* (págs. 179-207). Buenos Aires: Edhusa.

Durand, F. (28 June 2016). "Cuando el poder extractivo captura el Estado: lobbies, puertas giratorias y paquetazo ambiental en Perú". (A. Ñiquen, Interviewer). <https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2016/06/28/cuando-el-poder-extractivo-captura-el-estado-lobbies-puertas-giratorias-y-paquetazo-ambiental-en-peru/albertoniquen/>

Felices, M. (2017). The Pacification of Peru and the Production of a Neoliberal Populist Order. *State Crime Journal*, 6(1), 156-174.

Fernandois, J. (November 1985). Ideología y pragmatismo en la política exterior chilena durante la crisis del sistema político 1970-1975. Las Tendencias de la Política Exterior de Chile entre 1970 y 1984. Santiago de Chile: *Revista de Ciencia Política*.

Gardini, G. L. (2011). Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism: A Framework for Analysis. En G. L. Gardini, & P. Lambert, *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gardini, G. L., & Lambert, P. (2011). *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Guerra-Barón, A. (2019). Consistencia, pragmatismo y resiliencia de la política exterior peruana en una crisis política estructural. *OASIS- Observatorio de Análisis de los Sistemas Internacionales*, (30), 27-54.

Ilizarbe, C. (2020). El sustrato ideológico del neoliberalismo en el Perú. En G. Canepa, & L. Lamas, *Épicas del Neoliberalismo. Subjetividades emprendedoras y ciudadanías precarias en el Perú* (pp. 129-156). Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Kan, J. (2018). El Modelo de Integración Regional Asociado a Las Reformas Neoliberales. Un Análisis de las Iniciativas Regionales de los Años Noventa y de la Coyuntura Actual. En F. Barbosa, R. Bertoni, S. Carpenter, M. Duarte, C. Flores, J. Kan, J. Stronzake, *América Latina: Una integración regional fragmentada y sin rumbo* (pp. 14-42). Argentina: CLACSO.

Leone, M. (2013). Reseña de: Gardini, Gian Luca & Lambert, Peter, (eds.). *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism. Relaciones Internacionales*, (22), 257-260.

Mauceri, P. (1995). State Reform, Coalitions, and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru. *Latin American Research Review*, 30(1), 7-37.

Merke, F., & Reynoso, D. (2016). Dimensiones de política exterior en América Latina según juicio de expertos - Latin America. *Estudios Internacionales*, 48(185), 107-130.

Novak, F., & Namihas, S. (2017). *La inserción de China en ALC y el Perú. Su impacto en la relación con la UE*. Lima: IDEI - PUCP.

Ralston, S. J. (2011). Pragmatism in International Relations: Theory and Research. *Eidos*, (14), 72-15.

Ramacciotti, B., & Mendez, M. (2012). Las relaciones entre Perú y Estados Unidos: dos décadas de asociación convergente. En IDEI, *Veinte años de política exterior peruana (1991-2011)*. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Robledo, M. (2020). *La crisis del largo ciclo neoliberal y de la política exterior chilena*. Madrid: Fundación Carolina.

Salinas, D. (2018). Cambios políticos en América Latina: la problemática dinámica de los avances. *Espacio Abierto*, 27(1), 5-21.

Seminario, B. (2 May 2021). "El problema del Perú, ahora, independiente del modelo, es vencer la pandemia". (R. Cevallos, Interviewer). <https://larepublica.pe/economia/2021/05/02/bruno-seminario-el-problema-del-peru-ahora-independiente-del-modelo-es-vencer-la-pandemia/>.

St. John, R. B. (1999). *La política exterior del Perú*. Lima: Asociación de Funcionarios del Servicio Diplomático del Perú.

St. John, R. B. (2011). Ideology and Pragmatism in The Foreign Policy of Peru. En G. L. Gardini, & P. Lambert, *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (pp. 119-137). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

St. John, R. B. (2017). Peruvian foreign policy in the new millennium: Continuity and change. *Revista del Instituto Riva-Agüero*, 2(2), 65-119.

Tello, C., & Ibarra, J. (2012). *La revolución de los ricos*. Ciudad de México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Toche, E. (2011). Política exterior y seguridad: los giros, las dudas y los fracasos. En *Perú Hoy, el quinquenio perdido. Crecimiento con exclusión* (págs. 83-100). Lima: Desco.

Urra, F. (2011). Perú, el desafío del optimismo. *Política Exterior*, 25(140), 148-158.

Velázquez, R. (2015). "Pragmatismo principista": la política exterior de México. *Relaciones Internacionales*, (120-121), 151-164.

Vergara, A. (2012). Alternancia sin alternativa. ¿Un año de Humala o veinte años de un sistema? *Revista Argumentos*, 6(3). https://argumentos-historico.ipe.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/vergara_julio2012.pdf

Vidarte, O. (2016). *El Perú, las Américas y el Mundo 2014-2015. Siete años de Opinión Pública y Política Exterior*. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Vidarte, O. (2016). La política exterior conservadora y economicista de Humala. En *Perú Hoy. Ni Gran Trasnformación ni Hoja de Ruta*. (pp. 71-83). Lima: DESCO.

Vidarte, O. (2018). La política exterior en tiempos de Kuczynski. En *Perú Hoy, Sin paradero final* (pp. 109-124). Lima: DESCO.

Vidarte, O., & Quispe, L. (2018). *Cambios en el régimen político y su impacto sobre la política exterior peruana*. Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Weyland, K. (2003). Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much Affinity? *Third World Quarterly*, 24(6), 1095-1115.

CHAPTER 8

Venezuela's Foreign Policy in the Era of "Chavism" (1999-2021)

José Briceño-Ruiz

Introduction

Venezuela's foreign policy has experienced substantial transformations after the arrival in power of Hugo Chávez in 1999. The country was traditionally a close US ally in the Western Hemisphere. Especially after 1958, Venezuela promoted a foreign policy based on the defense of democracy, the fight against communism, the protection of human rights and the promotion of a new international economic order, but without abandoning a Western and capitalist identity. The arrival of Chávez in power was accompanied by a reconfiguration of this strategy. The Chavist administrations have fostered a new approach in which the promotion of a new multipolar world, the reactivation of the idea of a Bolivarian integration, the fight against neo-liberalism and south-south cooperation have been central.

Similarly, in the Chavist era, Venezuela developed an oil-diplomacy as a mechanism to balance the US through a "social diplomacy strategy" in the Latin America and the Caribbean, and even beyond. Venezuela increased its presence in Africa and the Middle East and established close links with Eurasian countries. Oil diplomacy has been the mechanism to show the Venezuelan revolution as a kind of symbol of solidarity and cooperation among developing countries.

After the death of Chávez, such a foreign policy has been continued during the Nicolas Maduro administrations. However, the political and economic context has been substantially modified. On the one hand, Venezuela has undergone a deep economic crisis since 2013, which has limited the ability of the Maduro's administration to continue an "oil diplomacy". On the other hand, the regional and global context has also changed. The cycle of "left wing" governments in Latin America has been surpassed by a more diverse region in terms of the ideological composition of their governments. Additionally, the increasing geopolitical and economic competition between the US, China and Russia has impacted on the Venezuelan foreign policy strategy.

What are the reasons that explain this transformation of the Venezuelan foreign policy in two decades of Chavism? Has the new policy been just a consequence of the overwhelming role of Hugo Chávez and his egocentric pretension of global leadership, to the point that has endured his death? Or is the new policy part of a strategy to challenge the international liberal order established after the II World War under the US leadership? Does this policy coincide with revisionist powers' (China and Russia) pretensions to build of a new global order?

The hypothesis presented in this chapter is that the changes in the Venezuela foreign policy in the era of Chavism is a consequence the revolutionary nature of the political regime. Although, it is recognized that the figure of Hugo Chávez has played a critical role in the promotion of the foreign policy, this latter could be more properly understood by considering the literature about revolutionary states. As it is explained further in this chapter, the revolutionary regimes tend to replicate at international level the political and economic transformations that are fostering at domestic level. This was clearly the case of the strategy promoted by Chávez that could be described as a "revolutionary foreign policy".

This revolutionary policy implied a clear confrontation with the leaders of the status quo: the US. Venezuela clearly has not the economic and political capabilities to confront the US and its allies. That was clearly understood by Chávez and later Maduro. Thus, in the Chavist era, Caracas adopted a soft balancing strategy based on a social diplomacy to balance the US, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, Venezuela became a close ally of other revolutionary states such as Cuba, Libya, and Iran, but also with revisionist powers in the contestation of the global order. China and Russia, the two revisionists power are not revolutionary states, but they promote a transformation of the international order and Venezuela has become an ally in those demands.

This chapter analyses the development of this period of the Venezuelan foreign policy. The goal is to determine the links between changes in the Venezuelan the political system since 1999 and the "revolutionary" foreign policy followed by Chávez and Maduro. To explain that problematic, a qualitative methodology is used in the chapter. The main technique used is text analysis. The chapter is divided in five sections. In the first one, the theoretical framework is presented. In the second section, the explanatory framework is given. In the third section, the Venezuelan policy in the era of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro is accounted for. The fifth section is devoted to explaining the reasons of the revolutionary foreign policy. The chapter ends with some conclusions.

The Theoretical Framework: A "Revolutionary Foreign Policy"

We argue in this chapter that Venezuela is a revolutionary state. As Paul Rich has properly pointed out "the study of revolutions has been rather a neglected terrain by scholars of international relations. The conservative state-centric paradigm that has dominated the subject since Second World War has tended to

inhibit enquiry into the global implications of revolutionary changes within nation states" (Rich, 1995: 18). This is also valid when referring to foreign policy analysis (FPA) that has normally discarded "revolution" as a variable to be considered. FPA has mainly concentrated in Western states and, in consequence, has assumed certain practices as normal behavior, such the "Allison centric" premise of a complex decision-making process (Williams and Chan, 1995: 5). Even if those traditional tools could remain valid, the fact is that the logic of the revolutionary states can alter its use. For example, revolutions are associated to "strong men" or "revolutionary leaders" like Vladimir Lenin, Fidel Castro, Ayatollah Khomeini, or Hugo Chávez. Their role could be overwhelming in the development of a revolution and could be crucial in their state's international behavior. In those cases, the importance of bureaucratic policy could be at least undermined. Secondly, revolutions strongly believe in the illegitimacy of the international order. In Armstrong's words: "Revolutionaries, (...) if they have a conception of international society, see it as an oppressive, unequal, and immoral structure of power" (Armstrong, 1999: 44). Another feature of revolutions is that they do not conceive the world in terms of inter-states relations but in classes or peoples.

The concept of revolutionary states was initially developed by Henry Kissinger (1957) and Raymond Aron (1962), and they referred to states the values of which are potentially subversive for the international system (Schmitt, 2019: 37). Further research about revolutionary states was advanced by experts like David Armstrong, who describes a revolutionary state as "one whose relations with other states are revolutionary because it stands, in some sense, for fundamental changes in the principles on the basis of which states conduct their relations with each other" (Armstrong, 1993: 3). Rucker also developed the idea of revolutionary states. According to him, this latter is one that seeks not only "to improve its relative position in the configuration of the balance of power," but also to export the principles of the revolution and, "therefore, to contest the norms, values, relations between actors on the international scene" (Rucker, 2004: 110).

For Armstrong, revolutionary states could develop diverse strategies: the promotion of a world revolution, international reform, or isolation (Armstrong, 1993: 1). By contrast, Fred Halliday has argued that revolutionary states aim at exporting the political and economic changes that they have promoted at a domestic level: "[R]evolutions have aspired to the internal transformations of societies, but equally they have sought to alter relations between states and nations. ... [I]n ideological and programmatic terms, a revolution aims to transform a society within: it has equally to be international, or it is nothing" (Halliday, 1999: 2). For Halliday, revolutionary states consider the internationalization of their struggle as part of the domestic consolidation of their revolutions. In the military dimension, it entrains the gaining of like-minded allies. From an economic point of view, internationalization supposes the winning of collaborative relationships with new allies. And from an ideological perspective, the promo-

tion of a revolution also needs to further at the international level similar ideals to those which legitimate their own internal regime (Halliday, 1994: 90).

It is valid to argue that Venezuela has become a revolutionary state in the era of Chavism and that fact has influenced its foreign policy. Before 1999, Venezuelan foreign policy was largely delimited by the condition of a Western, democratic and oil producer country. These factors determined the geographic priorities of its foreign policy, in which the US was a partner in the defense of democracy and with which Venezuela shared a common strategy to combat communism (Josko de Guerón, 1984). It is also legitimate to assert that Venezuela has become a revolutionary state during the government of Hugo Chávez. However, ideological motivations to promote the transformation of the international system have been complemented by realpolitik even in the Chávez era, expressed for example in the economic relations with the US, the principal Venezuelan oil buyer or the political rapprochement with China and Russia. Maduro deepened this dimension after 2013. Venezuela needed allies to balance the US threats but also partners that could provide economic assistance in a moment of deep recession and crisis. Both aspects are crucial to understand the reasons why countries such as Iran are still important for the current Venezuelan administration.

Soft balancing was an element of the early Chavist foreign policy. According to Corrales, "soft balancing is a relatively new concept in international relations, referring to efforts by nations, short of military action, to frustrate the foreign policy objective of other presumably more powerful nations. It is a variation of traditional balancing behavior: whereas hard balancing involves efforts to reconfigure the international system (e.g., ending the predominance of a great power), soft balancing seeks less ambitious goals centered mostly on raising the costs of action for the more powerful state" (Corrales, 2009: 98). Corrales argues that Chávez administration was a "clear practitioner of "soft balancing" against the United States" (Corrales, 2009: 98). Williams also thinks that "Venezuela's foreign policy exhibits the hallmarks of what international relations theorist term "soft balancing", "a strain of balance of power politics whereby weaker states employ non-military tools to protect their interests, and to delay, frustrate, and undermine a hegemonic state's capacity to impose its preferences" (Williams, 2011:261).

Chávez clearly implemented a soft balancing strategy that included a social diplomacy, as the internationalization of the Venezuelan social programs, called Misiones, or initiatives such as "Sponsor a school in Africa". Chávez also developed an oil-diplomacy as Petrocaribe or the signing of agreement with countries like Syria to exchange oil for olives, for example. However, balancing the US was not a goal itself, it was part a policy to increase its influence in Latin America and its presence in Africa and the Middle East as part of a strategy to confront the US and the post-world global order.

The Explanatory Framework of the Venezuelan Revolutionary Policy

At least three clusters of approaches have been presented to explain policy making in developing countries. *The first one* focuses on the extent to which policies from one place and time are exported to other time and places. This has led to a literature on policy transfer, policy convergence, policy diffusion, lesson drawing, bandwagoning, etc. *A second cluster* of approaches explain policy making based on society-centered models, according to which policies result from the interaction of social groups with state decision makers. Marxist approaches highlight the role of social classes. Liberal pluralist approaches are centered on the idea that bargaining and coalitions in a democratic system are critical in policy formation. Public policy approaches stress that powerful and often narrow interests in society can penetrate the state and influence on government officials to make certain policies. All these explanations consider society as the independent variable to account for policy making. *A final cluster* are state centered in the sense that considers that state leaders and bureaucracy are critical actors. Diverse models have been developed to explain the behavior of state actors in foreign policy making decision process. Allison in his classic "The Essence of Decision" presented three models of state actor behavior: rational, bureaucratic, and organizational. The role of the leader is not that critical in this explanatory framework. "The decisions taken by the leaders of the state are seen as the decisions of the state. This conflation of leader and state is possible because of the key assumption that all leaders will act in ways consistent with the long-term, persistent national interests of the country. Since the national interests do not change, changes in leadership are inconsequential" (Neack, 2014: 17).

In our explanatory framework, state units have also been crucial in foreign policy making in the Chavist era. We agree with McCarthy-Jones and Turner that, despite Chávez's close relations with Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution, his political project was, at least in its early years, more a mixture of Bolivarianism and nationalism than an expression of Marxism. Thus, the suggestion of a simple importation of the Cuban model is at least controversial. Societal models are also hard to apply to the Venezuelan case because working class or economic elites, highlighted by Marxist and pluralist approaches, were not determinant. It could be argued that certain actors that profited from a new political opportunity structure, for example the Arab community, mostly Syrian and Lebanese, could penetrate the Chavist political spheres and influenced on the new foreign policy towards the Middle East, in line with the arguments of the public choice approach. However, in our view it is not quite clear the real incidence of the Arab community in the design of the new Venezuelan foreign policy.

The State-centered approach is critical for understanding the new foreign policy. The nature of the Chavist regime "enabled its officials to determine foreign policy priorities independent of societal interests" (McCarthy-Jones and Turner, 2011: 557). Political leaders are important in this approach. "Leaders

seem to be motivated by their own well-being and not by the welfare of the state. The state's immortality beyond their own time is secondary to the quest of leaders for personal political survival" (Bueno de Mesquita, 2002: 4). Recent approaches highlight the subjective understanding of leaders (Kaarbo, 2015). However, the role of the President has been essential in this process.

A monopolization of foreign policy in the hands of Chávez took place. Therefore, he intended promoting at international level the "revolutionary" changes he was furthering at domestic level. His ideas and belief, his military formation and cultural background shape his approach to foreign policy and his views on how the global politics works. Ideas as the promotion of a multipolar world or his particular understanding of Simón Bolívar's ideas were crucial in the determination of the new Venezuelan foreign policy.

As McCarthy-Jones and Turner (2011: 558) have asserted, the complex state-centered foreign policy process "is largely determined by decisions made according to the attitudes and reactions of President Chávez". The military formation of Chávez was associated to views of geopolitical confrontation that influenced on his ideas about the international system (Serbin, 2008: 142-143). Similarly, the Venezuelan president had a sort of messianic belief according to which his country, under his leadership, should become an important actor in confronting the injustice of the international order promoted by the "US empire". Experts asserts that Chávez enacted the role of "the saviour and liberator of South America from the cultural, political and economic predominance of the United States" (Wehner an Thies, 2021: 330).

McCarthy-Jones and Turner affirm (2011: 558) that "Venezuelan foreign policy during this period increasingly moved towards a model of policy-making that was largely state-centered and formulated directly and in most cases solely by President Chávez". Javier Corrales (2011) argues that the President had a total control in the implementation of his own preferences in foreign policy. This gave Chávez a wide degree of discretionarily in deciding the orientation of the foreign policy. According to the same author: "With no veto groups, strong pressure groups, and deep-pocketed, Hugo Chávez ended up with an unusual ability to alter Venezuela's foreign policy, practically at will" (Corrales, 2012: 469).

The consolidation of the Venezuelan revolutionary policy was possible due to the political changes and the radicalization of the Venezuelan regime that took place after 2004. In a democratic and pluralistic society, many states and non-states actors participate in the foreign policy decision making process; some of them could even be "veto players", that could determine a particular policy. However, the role of Chávez was overwhelming in Venezuela. Certainly, factors such as the negative of the Venezuelan opposition to participate in the legislative elections held in 2006, gave to the Chavism an absolute majority in the National Assembly and made easier for Chavez monopolize foreign policy. The legislative role of control of certain aspects of the foreign policy disappeared due to the allegiance of most of his members to Chávez. The National Assembly also

promoted a reform of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to appoint justices with affinity to the Chavist movement. Thus, the Court potential power to control the constitutionality of certain international agreements subscribed by Chávez vanished.

Chávez was able to eliminate any bureaucratic resistance to the new policy. He furthered a progressive dismantling of the professional agencies involved in foreign affairs, which implied a de-professionalization of the foreign service and the restructuring of the Ministry of External Relations (Serbin and Serbin Pont, 2017: 240). Illera Correal has pointed out that the Venezuela Foreign Service was restructured between 2000 and 2005. The Pedro Gual diplomatic academy was transformed and the candidates to enter the diplomatic service had to do a social service in the so called "*misiones*", the social programs implemented by the Venezuelan government (Illera Correal, 2010. 297). Others actors such as political parties, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) leaders, and diplomats lost relevance in the foreign policy process.

The Chavist Foreign Policy in Action

One initial goal strongly highlighted by Chávez was the need of a multipolar world, what meant the rejection of the post-Cold War global order based on the US hegemony. Chávez asserted in 2001: "We must fight against a unipolar world and in favor of a new international order (...) we must contribute to the creation of this multipolar world. This is an essential strategic objective" (Chávez, 2011: WP). The promotion of a multipolar world led Chávez to foster "an independent foreign policy". This latter implied the promotion of closer relations with countries such as Cuba, China, Brazil, and Russia, in the perspective of contributing to the construction of alternative poles to unipolarism. Chávez made campaign to promote a multipolar world personally in his diverse international tours, which included visits to traditional enemies of Washington such as Muamar Gadhafi or Saddam Hussein in 2000. Similarly, the Venezuelan government established a very strong alliance with Cuba, the only communist country in the Western Hemisphere and traditional US enemy in the region. Later, Chávez fostered the relation with Iran and his President Mahmood Ahmadinejad. The Venezuelan leader visited in many opportunities Ahmadinejad and he gave his support to Iran's plan to develop nuclear energy. Similarly, Chávez furthered relations with Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, or Alexandre Lukashenko, President of Byelorussia, leaders who had have complex relations with the US.

Closely related to the fight against unipolarism, the second objective of Chávez government foreign policy was the south-south cooperation. The Venezuelan diplomacy intended reactivating mechanisms of cooperation among developing nations, such as the Group of Fifteen, the Group of Sixty-Seven, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of Rio, among others. Venezuela also

participated in the creation of G-20, a group of underdevelopment countries created at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun, Mexico, in November 2003. This group aimed at influencing on the Doha Round that was being developed in the framework of the WTO.

A key element of this strategy is the “oil diplomacy”. We can argue that “oil diplomacy” was the mechanism to implement soft balancing. This strategy had twofold dimension. The first one was global, the aim of which was to restore the influence of the Organization of Exporting Petroleum Countries (OPEC) in the determination of the prices of this product. Thus, Chávez developed a personal diplomacy that included visits to the OPEC country members and the invitation to an OPEC Summit of Heads of State, held in Caracas in 2000. Afterwards, Chávez proposed to the OPEC countries the substitution of the dollar by the Euro as the currency unit used to determine the oil prices. Only Iran gave support to that proposal. The second dimension of the “oil diplomacy” was the promotion of south-south cooperation by using oil as the main mechanism. Thus, Venezuela sent oil to be paid later in special conditions to the Central American and Caribbean countries, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. Similarly, Venezuela promoted join ventures with countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, or Cuba, where some refineries were planned to be built. Moreover, Chávez promoted the creation of a South American pipeline to send gas from Venezuela to Argentina. All these initiatives were part of more global proposals such as Petrocaribe or Petroamérica, but they concrete advances were differentiated, relative success in the case of Petrocaribe, mostly rhetoric in the case of Petroamérica.

Another crucial variable to understand the Venezuelan strategy is the fight against the “wild neo-liberalism”, as Chávez used to say. Chávez rejected the adoption of neoliberal policies and in diverse national and international forums highlighted the need to overcome them. During his first visit to China in 1999, for example, he pointed out that neo-liberalism had been a disaster in the Third World and had tried to impose economic models from the center of world power in the West: “it had resulted in millions of people leading lives of poverty, and had led to unemployment, misery, and death” (Chávez, quoted in Gott, 2005: 243). He additionally asserted: “The Soviet power has collapsed, but that does not mean that neo-liberal capitalism has to be the model followed by the peoples of the West. If only for that reason, we invite China to keep its flag flying, because this world cannot be run by a universal police force that seeks to control everything” (Chávez, quoted in Gott, 2005: 243).

Another pillar of Chávez foreign policy was *the promotion of Latin American integration*. As a result, Chávez developed his own interpretation of the Simon Bolívar’ plans to create a Latin American community of nations, which would have to become a pole of power in the world. This objective was part of the Chávez program of government (2000-2006), in which is asserted, “the Bolivarian dream to constitute a great Confederation of racially mixed Nations of the continent is still valid. This is not a utopia. Rather, it is crucial to strengthen and to give consistency to all and each of the nations of our political, cultural,

and geographic space" (Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2005). In this strategy, the United States was excluded, which explains the radical opposition of Chávez to the proposal of establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Between 1999 and 2001, the cornerstone of Chávez's regional integration proposal was the creation of a Latin American Confederation. The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) was announced in December 2001 in the context of the III Summit of States of the Association of Caribbean States, held at Margarita Island, Venezuela. At the beginnings, ALBA was presented just as an alternative to the US-led FTAA proposal.

Chávez had already criticized the FTAA in the Third Summit of the Americas, held at Quebec, Canada, in April 2001. This notwithstanding, the Venezuelan government did not totally reject the US proposal, as the Chávez's speech in Quebec demonstrates, but he asked for a win-win agreement based on fair trade and not limited to a trade agenda. Nevertheless, the radicalization of the political conflict in Venezuela from 2001 onwards, the brief coup d'état of the 12 April 2002, the general strike of December 2002 - January 2003 and the increasing number of declarations of important US government speakers describing Venezuelan as a destabilizing factor of the region, all these factors led to a deterioration of the relation with Washington. The coup d'état of April 2002 and the general strike convinced Chavez that the instigator of the conspiracy against his government was the George W. Bush administration. Since then, Caracas became a severe critic of the FTAA model and ALBA became the mechanism to promote and "alternative" integration. Certainly, it is valid to argue that the 2002- 2003 events were determining factors in the design of the anti-FTAA and ALBA strategies. Chávez asserted in 2005 that "the FTAA is an abuse of sovereignty, it is a colonial, imperialist plan" (Chávez, quoted in Guevara, 2005: 101).

Venezuela has also furthered the South American regional integration. The Colombia's and Peru's decision to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States produced a change of strategy by Venezuela. This decision led Caracas to give priority to Mercosur and after having been accepted as full member of this bloc, Chávez announced the Venezuela's withdrawal from the Andean Community and the Group of the Three (G-3). This interest in Mercosur should be also understood in the framework of the country's foreign policy objectives. One of the pillars in the Chávez strategy was the establishment of an alliance with Mercosur in the fight against the FTAA. In his strategy, Mercosur was a component in the promotion of a "multipolar" international order, by opposition to the "unipolar" order that Chávez contested (Briceño-Ruiz, 2005). Chávez perceived Mercosur as an allied in the fight against neo-liberalism and the FTAA. This perception was strengthened since 2003 when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Néstor Kirchner in Argentina took power. The Venezuelan president believed that the critical discourse towards neo-liberalism and globalization promoted by these two presidents was enough reason to establish an alliance with them. The cornerstone of such an alliance would the widening of Mercosur, with the objective of weakening the FTAA and diminishing the risk

of a greater US hegemony. As a result, Chávez furthered an active foreign policy with the aim to become Venezuela a full member of Mercosur. Diverse meetings with Lula and Kirchner took place and Business Rounds of the private sector of both countries were organized. Chávez established a close personal relation with Kirchner and participated in Summits of Heads of State of Mercosur, in which he insisted on his demand of full membership for Venezuela. This objective was partially achieved in 2004, when in the Summit held at Foz de Iguazu, Venezuela was accepted as associated member of Mercosur. Nevertheless, the strategy of Chávez could not conclude with the mere association to this group. Several times the Venezuelan government expressed its interest in becoming a full member of Mercosur, an objective achieved in December of 2005.

The Venezuelan foreign policy radicalized after 2004. In the wake of the victory in the recall referendum in August 2004, a “new strategic map” was designed in November. This was a roadmap for the new period of the “Bolivarian” revolution. In terms of foreign policy, this led to complement the criticism of unipolarism with an anti-imperialist narrative. After 2004, but markedly after 2006, the Venezuela government started to describe the US as an ‘empire’. This ‘anti-US’ and ‘anti-imperialist’ rhetoric became a crucial element in the Chávez government’s international strategy. Similarly, with the adoption of the 21st Century Socialism, the anti-capitalist discourse complemented the criticism to neoliberalism. At that moment, the problem for Chávez was not a particular way to understand capitalism, namely neoliberalism, but the capitalist system itself.

Maduro has continued Chávez’s strategy. Thus, the anti-US, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist narrative has remained a component of Venezuela’s foreign policy. Notwithstanding those efforts of continuity, the situation is quite different. Firstly, Maduro has not the charisma that his antecessor had. Secondly, the fall of oil prices in 2013 has limited the possibilities of using South-South Cooperation and oil diplomacy as mechanisms to promote foreign policy goals (Briceño-Ruiz, 2017). Finally, after the evidence of violations of human rights and the weakening of the democratic institutions, the so-called “Bolivarian revolution” has lost its charm in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the rest of the Global South. As Serbin and Serbin Pont have pointed out “with the presidency of Maduro, the foreign policy of Venezuela, beyond the rhetoric, entered into an increasingly regressive phase, on the defensive *vis-à-vis* regional and international events, in spite of maintaining much of the support and international alliances formed earlier” (Serbin and Serbin Pont, 2016: 281).

This situation worsened after 2015, when the cycle of left-wing governments ended in Latin America, and Venezuela became increasingly isolated in the region. The more aggressive strategy towards Venezuela promoted by the Donald Trump administration, in particular the threat of a military intervention, the recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim President in January 2019 and the economic sanctions implemented in 2017 and 2019, have also contributed to the weakening of the Venezuelan presence in global affairs. Regional isolation

and the conflict with the Trump administration have led the Venezuelan government to promote a strategy of "besieged fortress" (Rozental and Jeifets, 2018: 61) and, in that context, extra-regional alliances built by Chávez became crucial. Víctor Mijares has asked if a Maduro Doctrine exists. If yes, this would imply "a change from proactively seeking international influence, to a policy of reacting to international conditions" (Mijares, 2015: 79). Thus, the strategy of "an aggressive process of revolutionary internationalization has been replaced by a less flashy model of entrenchment" (Mijares, 2015: 79).

In this context the ideological motivations to promote the transformation of the international systems have been complemented by realpolitik. Venezuela needs allies to balance the US threats but also partners that could provide economic assistance in a moment of deep recession and crisis. Both aspects are crucial to understand the reasons why countries such as Russia or Iran are still important for the Venezuelan current administration. However, it does not mean that Maduro has given up to the revolutionary goals of the foreign policy. The political, economic, and social crisis, deepened during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the uncharismatic personally of Maduro, have impeded the development of a "Chávez style" foreign policy. Those factors notwithstanding, Maduro is the heir of Chávez and has maintained the foreign policy premises established by him: multipolarism, anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism and south-south cooperation, even if reduced due to the economic constraints. Similarly, the narrative of a "Bolivarian" and "alternative" regional integration and cooperation remains, even if the country has experienced severe setbacks like its suspension from Mercosur or the replacement of UNASUR by PROSUR (The South American Forum for Progress and Development), created in 2018 and of which Venezuela is excluded.

By the same token, the confrontation with the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have remained. By imitating the Cuban political narrative, Maduro argues that current Venezuelan crisis is the result of the economic sanctions, also described as "de facto embargo", imposed by the Trump administration since 2017. The US is also described as an "empire", following the narrative initiated by Chávez. Even if China has reduced its investment and credits to the Venezuelan government, the Maduro administration considers Beijing a critical ally. In fact, Chinese donations of medical equipment and vaccines has allowed the government to some extent to deal with the pandemic. Russia, Iran and even Turkey has become allies that have helped to Caracas to avoid the impact of the US economic sanctions. In short, Maduro has continued the revolutionary foreign policy strategy initiated by Hugo Chávez.

Explaining the Foreign Policy in the Chavist Era

Let us be clear even at the risk of being too simplistic: Venezuela has not the political, economic, or military capabilities to transform the international sys-

tem. Chávez and even Maduro have understood the limits and constraints of Venezuela as a potential revolutionary state and that was the reason why they deployed a strategy to create alliances with like-minded states. Cuba became a closer ally in the American continent, Libya in Africa, Iran in the Middle East, China in Asia, Russia, and Belarus in Eurasia. It as a global strategy that began in the American continent, with the criticism to the FTAA and the creation of ALBA as alternative regional bloc. In Africa, the Chavist government fostered diverse South-South Cooperation initiatives. The rapprochement with Russia and China was also part of the plan.

The rationalist approach seems limited to explain the Chavist foreign policy because it is difficult to define this latter as the result of an analysis in which decision makers, considering a diversity of options, choose the best one that led to a maximization of profits. In the rationalist approach this logic of action would aim at fostering national interest. If the objective of foreign policy is to maximize national interest, it does not have much sense the Venezuelan strategy of confrontation with the United States, a world superpower, the main commercial partner, and main source of investments, even in most of the Chavist era.

This incoherence could be explained by using the Weberian distinction of ethics of responsibility and ethics of conviction. For the realists, the ethics of conviction does not work in the international relations. States aim at defending the national interest and, in consequence, it is necessary to eliminate any normative bias in its international behavior. It is valid to argue that the Chavist governments foreign policy has been based upon an ethics of conviction that would be linked the logic of a revolutionary state. Since 1999 Venezuelan governments has a sort of conviction of being paladins in the fight against the “neoliberal globalization”, the US imperialism, the rescue of the “Bolivarian” integration and the rapprochement to the forces that according to the Venezuelan leaders are fighting to build a new global order (China, Russia, Iran, for example).

It is valid to argue that the new elements of the Venezuela foreign policy from 1999 onwards were based on Chávez beliefs and world view and his successor Maduro has unconditionally subscribed to those ideas. Both considered themselves as “revolutionary leaders” of a revolutionary state. They wanted the transformation of the world. Thus, the proposal of a multipolar world reflected a Chávez interpretation of the Bolivarian view of the international. Before 2004, this “Bolivarian” view was not linked to an anti-imperialist narrative. Bolívar was not neither socialist nor anti-imperialist. In fact, he considered that the United Kingdom, the global power in the early 1800s, could be a potential ally for the new Hispanic American nations. However, Chávez (and Maduro) have forgotten those facts and present Bolívar as an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist leader. Accordingly, it is valid to argue that the Bolivarian idea of an “equilibrium for the Universe” was reinterpreted by Chávez and became an inspiration for his visions of a multipolar world.

After the failed coup d'état of 2002 and the victory in recall referendum in 2004, Chávez was convinced that the US was the enemy and Cuba, and Fidel

Castro became the most important ideological ally. The increasingly close relation with Castro led Chávez to adopt an anti-imperialist discourse after 2004 and even to declare himself as a Marxist in 2010. Chávez deepened at that moment his revolutionary policy that challenged not just the allegedly unipolar world led by the US but that consider this country as an empire to a large extent responsible for the problems and inequalities of the planet. Libya in the Gadhafi era and Iran (two revolutionary states) became also partners of Caracas. China and Russia, two revisionist powers have been considered by Chávez and Maduro two critical allies of the so called "Bolivarian revolution". In other words, Venezuela joined the group of revolutionaries/ revisionist states that challenge the US hegemony and the liberal international order established after the II World War.

In our explanatory framework, ideas, world views and principled beliefs of the Venezuelan Presidents in the Chavist era have to large extent determine the country revolutionary foreign policy. As leaders of a revolutionary state, Chávez and Maduro's ideas about anti-imperialism or anti-colonialism, their "Bolivarian" view of Latin América, became an essential component of the Venezuelan foreign policy. Certainly, the revolutionary narrative of a new world order based on multipolarism or the ideal of South-South cooperation as a new modality of solidarity among developing countries, was accompanied for mechanisms to balance the US threats against the so-called "Bolivarian revolution", for example the strengthening of new strategic alliances with Russia or China.

These ideas influenced on the strategy towards Latin America or even the Middle East. In the case of Iran, the initial goal was to balance Saudi Arabia in OPEC and defend high oil prices, but afterwards Ahmadinejad became a close ally of Caracas. In 2007, when Iran experienced gasoline shortages, Caracas sent tankers to Teheran. In the case of Syria, the 2010 agreement of exchange of oil for olives was crucial for Bachar Al-Assad regime, in a moment of shortage and international blockade. Palestine also received oil in special conditions. Venezuela implemented a social diplomacy as the Yasser Arafat Scholarships or the reception of Palestinian refugees in Venezuelan territory (See Briceño-Ruiz, 2022). In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Petrocaribe is a clear manifestation of soft balancing to US. The English-speaking Caribbean countries have the main beneficiaries of the Petrocaribe special conditions. Most of these countries later voted against the approval of political sanctions or the implementation of the Interamerican Democratic Charter to Venezuela in the Organization of American States (OAS) (see Márquez Restrepo, 2018). Nevertheless, interests and realpolitik were also a determining factor in some aspects of the Venezuelan foreign policy. This was evident in the Maduro era when Iran and Russia became crucial allies in the survival of the Chavist regime. It may be an irony, but it was Iran who went to the rescue of the Venezuelan revolution in 2020, when it helped Maduro to overcome the gasoline shortage, openly challenging the US sanctions.

Conclusions

Venezuela's foreign policy underwent a radical transformation that reflected the domestic political changes implemented by the "Bolivarian revolution". From being a country that vindicated its Western status and capitalism, it became a revolutionary state that contests the existing international order, confronts the United States, establishes alliances with the enemies of this latter country and becomes an ally of revisionist powers such as China and Russia. The condition of a revolutionary state has been demonstrated by a foreign policy that promotes objectives such as the construction of a multipolar world, the struggle against imperialism and the criticism to capitalism, goals established in the Chávez governments and that have been followed by Maduro. Additionally, in the Chávez era, Venezuela promoted south-south cooperation that aimed the projection of the "Bolivarian" revolution in Latin America and the Global South, and at the same time, it was promoted a soft balancing *vis-à-vis* the United States. In this sense, the Venezuelan government sought to build alliances to confront an eventual aggression by Washington. Similarly, the Caracas aimed to reduce U.S. influence by rejecting its FTAA project and, instead, promoting Latin American regional initiatives such as ALBA, supporting projects such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) or UNASUR.

External constraints and internal factors explain the turn of Venezuela's foreign policy. An external condition has undoubtedly been the confrontation against the United States since at least 2001, when the Chavist government began accusing the Bush administration of financing the opposition and promoting a regime change in Venezuela. Also, Chavist governments have understood that the rise of China and the return of Russia gave them a possibility to balance the US by establishing alliances with these two revisionist powers. Domestic factors have also been crucial. The absolute control of the Venezuelan political system by the Chavism, especially since 2006 was a critical question. Chavism's total majority in the Congress and the appointment of new members of the Supreme Court of Justice, all related to Chávez's political project, eliminated the possible instances of political control over the decisions that the executive approved in foreign policy issues. It must be added that the social actors were not consulted either. This is especially true in the case of the private sector, which, for example, was not consulted either when Venezuela withdrew from CAN, nor when the government decided to join Mercosur. The de-professionalization of the foreign service and the restructuring of the Ministry of External Relations eliminated bureaucratic resistance to the new policy.

In this context, Hugo Chávez became the great foreign policy maker. His visions of the world, his military formation, his understanding of Bolívar's ideas, the influence that Fidel Castro could have exerted on him were decisive in the design Venezuelan revolutionary foreign policy since 1999. These ideas have not been replaced during the years of Maduro's rule; on the contrary, they are vindicated whenever possible. And behind these ideas is the project of giving an

international dimension to the “Bolivarian revolution”, of internationalizing the revolution, a typical behavior of a revolutionary state.

References

Armstrong, D. (1993). *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1999), “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States”, in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (pp. 43-59). Hounds mills: Palgrave.

Aron, R. (1962). *Paix et guerre entre les nations*. Paris: Calmann-Levy.

Briceno-Ruiz, J. (2022). “Venezuela and the Middle East: “Revolutionary” Foreign Policy, Soft Balancing, and Survival Strategy”, in Tawil, M. and Brun, E. (eds.). *Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: Latin America's Relations with the Middle East*. London: Routledge (in press).

Briceño-Ruiz, J. (2017), “Venezuela and South-South Cooperation: Solidarity or Realpolitik?”, in Isaline Bergamaschi, Phoebe Moore, and Arlene B. Tickner (eds.), *South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths: Rising Donors, New Aid Practices?* (pp. 173-195). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Briceño-Ruiz, J. (2018). South—South Cooperation in the Chávez Era in Venezuela, *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 18(3), 2018, 479-496.

Briceño-Ruiz, J. (2006). The Free Trade Area of the Americas in the Foreign Policy of Hugo Chávez, *Unisa Latin American Report* 22 (1), 31-46.

Chávez, H. (2001). Globalización: la enfermedad del nuevo milenio (entrevista). *Foreign Affairs*, 1(3), <https://revistafal.com/numeros-anteriores/fal-01-3/>

Corrales, J. (2009). Using social power to balance soft power: Venezuela's Foreign Policy. *The Washington Quarterly*, 32(4), 97-114.

Corrales, J. (2011), “Cambios en el tipo de régimen y la nueva política exterior de Venezuela”, in Ramos Pismataro, F., Romero. C. A and Ramírez Arcos, H. E (eds.), *Hugo Chávez: una década en el poder* (pp. 467-484). Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.

De Mesquita, B. B. (2002). Domestic politics and international relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(1), 1-9.

Gott, R. (2005). *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. London: Verso.

Guevara, A. (2005). *Chávez: Venezuela and the new Latin America*. Melbourne- New York: Ocean Press.

Halliday, F. (1994). *Rethinking International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Halliday, F. (1999). *Revolutions and the World Politics. The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Powers*. Hounds mills and London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Illera Correal, O. L. 2010. “La proyección internacional de la Revolución Bolivariana: la política exterior de Venezuela (2004-2010)”. *Revista Análisis Internacional* 2: 283-301.

Josko de Guerón, E. (1984). “La política exterior: continuidad y cambió, contradicción e incoherencia”, in: Naím, M. and Piñango, R. (eds.). *El caso Venezuela: una ilusión de armonía* (pp. 350-375). Caracas: Ediciones IESA

Kaarbo, J. (2015). A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turns in IR Theory. *International Studies Review* 17(2), 189-216.

Kissinger, H. (1957). *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Márquez Restrepo, M. L. (2018). "Oil as a Strategic Means in Venezuela's Foreign Policy. The Cases of ALBA and Petrocaribe, 1998-2013", in Wigell, M., Scholvin, S. and Aaltola, M. (eds.), *Geo-Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century. The Revival of Economic Statecraft* (pp. 182-191). Abingdon: Routledge.

McCarthy-Jones, A., & Turner, M. (2011). Explaining radical policy change: the case of Venezuelan Foreign Policy. *Policy Studies* 32(5), 549-567.

Mijares, V. M (2015). Venezuela's Foreign Policy Chávez Foreign Policy. Is There a Maduro's Doctrine? *Americas Quarterly*, winter, 2015, 74-81

Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo (2005). *Programa de Gobierno de Hugo Chávez, Equilibrio Internacional*, en línea: <http://www.mpd.gov.ve/prog-gob/prog-gob2/e?internacionak.htm> (consulta: 17 May 2005).

Neack, L. (2014). *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rich, P. (1995). "Theories of Revolution in International Relations", in Williams, Andrew and Chan, Stephen (eds.), *Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy* (pp. 18-35). Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Rozental, D. M., & Jeifets, V. L. (2018). Política exterior de Venezuela en el ambiente de inestabilidad. *Iberoamérica* (4), 53-76.

Rucker, L. (2004). "A contestation de l'ordre international : les États révolutionnaires, *Revue internationale et stratégique* 54, 109-118.

Schmitt, O. (2019). Raymond Aron : Le réalisme des normes libérales, *Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales* 20, 25-42.

Serbin, A and Serbin Pont, A. (2016). "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: The Limits of Ideological Diplomacy and Regional Leadership", in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (ed.). *Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South. The Search for Leadership* (pp. 263-290). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Serbin, A. (2008). Desenredando la madeja: visiones, concepciones y acciones de la política exterior de Hugo Chávez, *Perspectivas São Paulo* 33, 142-143.

Wehner, L. E., & Thies, C. G. (2021). The nexus of populism and foreign policy: The case of Latin America. *International Relations* 35(2), 320-340.

Williams, A. and Chan, S. (1995), "Introduction", in Williams, Andrew and Chan, Stephen (eds.), *Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy* (pp. 3-18). Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Williams, M. E. (2011). "The New Balancing Act: International Relations Theory and Venezuela's Foreign Policy", in Ponniahand, T. and Eastwood, J. (eds), *The Revolution in Venezuela, Social and Political Change under Chávez* (pp. 259-280). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 9

Principled Pragmatism in Mexico's Foreign Policy Under a Leftist Administration 2018-2021

Rafael Velázquez Flores
Alejandro Monjaraz Sandoval

Introduction

The arrival of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) to the presidency in 2018 represented a significant change in the Mexican political system. His victory meant, for the first time, that a leftist-wing political party came to power. Furthermore, the electoral outcome was overwhelming since the candidate won by a wide margin. In recent history, no president had a similar result achieved. Thus, AMLO enjoyed a significant democratic legitimacy once he took office. In this context, the beginning of a leftist administration generated great expectations about the possibilities of change and continuity in foreign policy. During his campaign, external links were not a central issue and, frequently, the candidate showed little interest in the nation's foreign affairs.

Within this framework, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze AMLO's foreign policy in his first three years under the principled-pragmatist idea. The chapter is divided into parts. The first one describes the domestic, external, and individual variables that could impact in this activity. This part includes a brief description of AMLO's foreign policy plan for the *sexenio*. The second part describes and explains main Mexico's foreign actions towards Latina America. The emphasis to the region was the use of normative principles. Next part examines Mexico's relationship towards Europe and Asia, which are strategic regions for economic diversification. The fourth section explores humanitarian diplomacy and Mexico's multilateral policy. The last part analyzes the US-Mexican relationships under the principled-pragmatism notion, using the key themes in the bilateral agenda: trade, migration, and security.

The Domestic and External Situation

In 2018, AMLO won the presidency under a political party that he had created just a few years ago: MORENA. The fact was significant for two reasons. In first place,

it was the first time in Mexico's history that a candidate from a leftist political party won the presidential election. Secondly, AMLO had a high number of votes; thus, he enjoyed broad democratic legitimacy at the beginning of his term. He won the election with 53.1% of the votes, which had been the highest in the century. PAN only achieved 22.2 % and PRI 16.4 %. The unquestioned victory granted AMLO a democratic "bonus" that could be used as soft power to increase Mexico's international bargaining power.

When AMLO took office, Mexican economy was stable. In 2018, GDP grew 2.1 %. Inflation and unemployment were under control. Exports grew from 450,713 US billion dollars in 2018 to 460,703 in 2019. Even the GDP percentage of debt diminished slightly. FDI decreased marginally from 34,745 to 34,207 US billion dollars in the 2018-2019 period. However, red flags were raised the second year in office when GDP decreased drastically in 2019. To make it worse, in 2020 the growth severely decreased to -8.31% due to the economic crisis brought by the health crisis. Thus, a more pragmatic stance in foreign policy could be necessary. Despite AMLO was anti-neoliberal, he was aware that foreign trade and investments were needed to encourage economic growth. Therefore, he had to continue with a neoliberal policy to set the economy back in the track of growth, whether he liked it or not.

In domestic terms, the political system was stable. However, violence did not cease. There were many killings in several parts of the country. Besides, corruption was still a huge problem in Mexico's politics. López Obrador was willing to fight it at the federal level, but at local level the problem persisted. Poverty was still a social issue. Social differences also persisted. In a related subject, polarization was low at the beginning of the administration because of the overwhelming victory in the election. However, in 2019, AMLO's policies generated high social and political polarization. While leftist-wing sectors supported the President, right-wing groups and the middle class severely criticized him. This divergence could also affect foreign policy because external decisions could be attached to social division.

The international context was not highly complicated in 2018. The big issue was that Trump wanted to be reelected and he insisted on criticizing Mexican migrants and building the wall. However, after Obrador won the election, he expressed a positive opinion about the new president. Thus, bilateral tension was reduced between both governments. In 2020, Joe Biden won the presidential election and he advocated a close relation with Mexico to face bilateral challenges. In Canada, Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister and his government canceled the visa requirement for Mexicans. Thus, the bilateral interaction with Canada also improved. Besides, Canada agreed to negotiate the new NAFTA, along with Mexico. This alliance helped Mexico achieve a new trade treaty in North America. In 2021, Biden reactivated the North American Leaders' Summit. Then, the three presidents met in Washington and they opened a trilateral dialogue to discuss key issues of the region and find mechanisms to cooperate. Therefore, in North America, the situation was favorable.

Nevertheless, in Central America broke out a trend that would certainly impact AMLO's foreign policy. Several caravans of migrants crossed Mexico's southern border to travel to the United States, seeking political asylum. Donald Trump was eager to apply restrictive policies to halt the flow. The issue would complicate US-Mexican relations since AMLO had promised to protect migrants' human rights and Trump perceived migration as a serious threat to national security. In other topic that could complicate the bilateral nexus, Trump had initiated a trade war with China. His administration wanted to elevate trade taxes even to Canada and Mexico. The idea was to protect US national economy and create more jobs at home. This policy also became a foreign policy challenge for Mexico since the tariff increase could affect national economy.

Between 2020 and 2022, the international system was complex. First, the United Kingdom finally withdrew from the European Union. The fact was a backward process to globalization. Besides, in several countries extreme right-wing political parties had won elections. Thus, the world was taking a conservative tone. Besides, Trump's diplomacy aggravated problems with Iran and Cuba. His administration had left the TPP and the Paris accord on environment. There were humanitarian crises in Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. But the most important and urgent international issue was in the health sector. At the end of 2019, COVID-19 broke out and rapidly spread all around the world. The disease caused an economic crisis worldwide. Therefore, Mexico and the world faced a major challenge between 2020 and 2021.

At the beginning of 2022, the world became more complex when Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Since Vladimir Putin perceived a menace if that country joined NATO, he sent military troops and initiated a war in the heart of Europe. The objective was to get control of the Ukrainian government and defend pro-Russian territories. For Putin, the eastern part of that nation represents a "vital space" for national security. In response, the United States and its allies decided to apply unilateral sanctions. The situation got more complicated when Russia threatened to use nuclear arms in the conflict. Therefore, there was a risk that the war could escalate to a different level.

At the beginning of the AMLO administration, Mexico's national interest would focus on reducing violence, fighting corruption, and diminishing extreme poverty. However, once the pandemic and the economic crisis broke out, health and economy became a policy priority. In his first year, AMLO's loose triumph provided a democratic bonus that could be used as a soft-power instrument to spur foreign policy. However, polarization and the pandemic affected Mexico's bargaining power. Later, the economic turbulence, produced by the health crisis, could affect Mexico's performance in foreign affairs.

In 2018, all variables indicated that a principled foreign policy would be the first choice. First, AMLO came from a leftist-wing political party. Traditionally, leftist governments are prone to idealist foreign policy. Second, in his inauguration speech, he mentioned: "in foreign policy affairs, we will adhere to the constitutional principles of non-intervention, self-determination, peaceful settlement of disputes

and cooperation for development". Third, in the 2019-2024 PND, AMLO harshly criticized past governments and asserted: "submissive attitudes, incoherence, and extreme pragmatism were, in foreign policy, surrender, predatory and corrupt economic policy". Therefore, he emphasized that his administration's foreign policy would be guided by the constitutional tenets. Besides, there were no economic problems at the beginning of the administration. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed on November 30th, 2018, a day before AMLO's inauguration. Thus, pragmatism was not required for economic reasons at that moment. However, when the pan-demic and the economic crisis emerged and when Trump threatened to increase trade tariffs, a pragmatic policy would be needed.

Initially, AMLO was not highly interested in foreign affairs, so the democratic "bonus" was diluted. On several occasions, he declared that the "best foreign policy" was a "good domestic policy". As a president-elect, he did not travel abroad, as other presidents did. In the first part of his administration, he just made three international visits, all of them to the United States. The modest number of trips is also evidence of the low interest AMLO had in international affairs.

AMLO appointed Marcelo Ebrard as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He did not have ample diplomatic experience, but he had a major in International Relations and once was Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs during the Salinas de Gortari's administration. He was Mexico City's mayor, thus he had wide political experience. Politically, he was very close to AMLO and belonged to MORENA. By 2021, he was a possible candidate to run for the presidency in 2024. Hence, he was influential in the cabinet. At the meeting with Mexican ambassadors and consuls, he affirmed that "we aspire to participate in the global causes that animate us, the fight for human rights, the strengthening of democratic values, the concern about climate change, and the actions that we have to carry out to safeguard the future of the next generations".¹ Normally, in Mexico Foreign Affairs Secretaries are prone to idealism since they are in charge of the nation's foreign policy. However, they usually follow up Presidents' instructions in a disciplined manner.

In sum, the first assumption at the beginning of the administration could be that AMLO would guide Mexico's foreign policy by traditional precepts. His personal beliefs, the wide electoral result, the reduction of pressure from Trump, were three variables that indicated that hypothesis. However, once the economic crisis broke due to the pandemic, then a more pragmatic stance would be required.

Presidential Campaign and Foreign Policy Plan 2018-2024

During the 2018 campaign, foreign policy was not a relevant issue for the MORENA candidate. López Obrador paid more attention to domestic problems,

¹ SRE, "Inaugura el Canciller Marcelo Ebrard la XXX Reunión de Embajadores y Consules REC 2019", Press Release, January 7, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/articulos/inaugura-el-canciller-marcelo-ebrard-la-xxx-reunion-de-embajadores-y-consules-rec-2019>

such as violence, corruption, and poverty. In other words, diplomacy was not a priority. The only topic constantly mentioned in campaign was migration. AMLO pledged to protect and defend Mexicans' rights in the United States. He even harshly criticized Donald Trump for his comments about migrants and the wall. He also said that he would confront seriously the US president in favor of Mexico's national interest.²

In the political plan of the coalition that supported López Obrador, foreign affairs were not a key issue. For instance, one of the proposals was that Mexico would develop a "non-leading" and "prudent" foreign policy.³ In other words, the idea was to keep Mexico isolated from key world events. In the same document, the main objective was to maintain a foreign policy consistent with domestic policy and national interest.

In his campaign speeches, AMLO was in favor of respecting migrants' human rights; protecting the environment; establishing a long-term strategy with Latin America; identifying areas of opportunity with Europe; and facilitating trade with Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, among other proposals. He also suggested a new approach to the relationship with the United States, in which respect and cooperation would prevail. In this context, AMLO openly declared himself in favor of free trade and defended NAFTA against criticism from Trump. This declaration implied that, at least in the short term, López Obrador would have no intention of modifying Mexico's foreign economic policy. Therefore, a pragmatic continuity on this issue was predictable.

On the day he won the election, AMLO received several congratulations from different heads of state around the world for his overwhelming victory. Even the president of the United States, Donald Trump, congratulated him on his triumph, although he came from a left-wing party. Most of the Latin American leaders called him to extend a special recognition. As president-elect, AMLO met with high-profile representatives of foreign governments, such as Mike Pompeo, the United States Secretary of State, and many ambassadors from different countries. These meetings showed an outstanding world interest in the new leftist administration of Mexico.

In his inauguration message, AMLO proposed to the presidents of the United States and Canada "going beyond NAFTA and reaching an investment agreement between companies and the governments of the three nations". This declaration confirmed that López Obrador agreed with free trade, which could imply a pragmatic foreign policy if needed. On the inauguration day, several presidents from different nations attended AMLO's ceremony. The presence of various heads of state showed AMLO's strong convening power and the positive image generated by his unquestionable democratic victory.

² Beatriz Perez & Teresa Perez, "La política exterior en las plataformas electorales de 2018", in Mario Carrillo et al, *Reflexiones sobre México y su entorno internacional ante el cambio de gobierno en 2018*, (Mexico City, UAM, 2019), pp. 125-148.

³ Rafael Velazquez, "La política exterior de México en las campañas electorales a la presidencia de 2018", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, May 2018.

Initially, AMLO promised prominent changes in Mexico's foreign bonds. His main argument was that previous governments had projected an elitist foreign policy that only benefited one sector of the population. His commitment was to recuperate Mexico's international prestige and defend the interest of the nation in foreign affairs. In the 2019-2024 National Development Plan (PND), the leftist-wing administration emphasized the principles of Mexico's foreign policy. For the Latin American region, the president proposed a friendly relationship with each country due to cultural and historical similarities. Regarding North America, the PND accepted that the United States was the main foreign policy priority for Mexico and that AMLO government would conduct the relationship with "mutual respect", "cooperation", and "negotiated solutions to common problems". The PND also stated that the government would defend and protect Mexicans abroad, especially in the United States.⁴

As can be seen, AMLO's foreign policy plan implied the use of principles in Mexico's contacts, but also it indicated a certain degree of pragmatism. On the one hand, AMLO pledged to guide Mexico's diplomatic ties under constitutional precepts. On the second hand, after Trump's threats to increase tariffs and when the pandemic broke out, it seemed that his government would also lean towards a pragmatic stance.

Principled Pragmatism in the US-Mexican Relationship Under the AMLO Administration

For Mexico, the relation with the United States is a priority in foreign policy. The bilateral interaction is, by nature, highly complex, intense, and asymmetrically interdependent. There are three issues that dominate the bilateral agenda: trade, migration, and security. Before NAFTA, Mexico tried publicly to project a nationalistic foreign policy, which caused some tensions with Washington. The position was consistent with Mexico's nationalism and the import-substitute mode, which implied that Mexico was not open to free trade. It was also congruent with public opinion preferences. In this context, migration and security were sources of conflict because the Mexican government did not agree with US immigration policy and tried to avoid interference in security issues. After the trade agreement, both nations began openly cooperating, mainly in the economic sphere. During the government of Barack Obama, the bilateral connection did not have any significant complication. Nevertheless, when Donald Trump took power, some differences arose in the binational interaction. However, complications ceased slightly when Joe Biden won the presidency.

Conflict and Cooperation in the Migration Issue

A fundamental and permanent issue in the bilateral agenda between Mexico and the United States is migration. Some sources estimate that there are roughly

⁴Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5565599&fecha=12/07/2019

30 million people of Mexican origin living in the United States. Throughout time, different Mexican governments have focused on defending compatriots abroad. The SRE has 50 consulates in that country and their main function is to protect their rights. Mexico is the only nation in the world with this high number of diplomatic representations in other state. On one hand, since US society perceives migration as a threat to national security, the US government adopts restrictive measures to halt undocumented migrants. On the other, Mexico complains that US officials violate their human rights. These two realities have caused, several times, tension in the bilateral relationship in this topic.

When AMLO came to power in 2018, public opinion deemed that the new president would face Trump on the immigration issue. Many times, He had promised in his campaign that he would defend migrants and that he would vigorously face Trump's policies and critics. Nevertheless, López Obrador was very cautious on this issue at the beginning of his six-year term.⁵ Despite his campaign commitments, he declared that he would not defy Donald Trump to avoid damaging the bilateral relationship. However, political opponents interpreted that AMLO was doing little against Washington to defend Mexico's sovereignty. For example, in early March 2019, Donald Trump declared a "national emergency" at the border due to an uncontrolled flow of immigrants and drugs.⁶ Actually, his goal was to obtain funds needed to build the wall, since the Democratic-dominated US House of Representatives denied support. Political opposition criticized AMLO because there was no official statement from the president or the Secretary of Foreign Affairs defending migrants against Trump. It was clear that AMLO was unwilling to confront Trump to avoid unnecessary bilateral tension. Thus, he was adopting a pragmatic stance toward Washington. Later, Donald Trump declared that the López Obrador government was doing nothing to stop migrants crossing Mexican territory to reach the United States. Therefore, he threatened to close the border. AMLO's response was not strong because he said that "Trump has the legitimate right to make such statements".⁷ Opponents once again criticized him for taking a weak position on the subject.

The scenery got worse in May 2019 when Trump threatened to enforce new trade tariffs on Mexican products if the AMLO administration did not stop Central American caravans in the southern border.⁸ Almost immediately, López Obrador sent Marcelo Ebrard to Washington to negotiate with the Trump administration to avoid further taxes. In the end, both parties reached an agreement. The Mexican government decided to send in the National Guard to control the southern border, and Washington promised to postpone new tariffs on Mexican exports if Central American migration slowed down. This decision

⁵ Greg Weeks, "AMLO's cautious foreign policy", in *The Global Americans*, February 2019.

⁶ Amanda Mars, "Trump declara una emergencia nacional para construir el muro con Mexico", in *El País*, February 15, 2019.

⁷ "López Obrador calificó de 'legítimo' el reclamo de Trump a México por migrantes", in *The World News*, March 28, 2019.

⁸ Kevin Sieff and Mary Beth Sheridan, "Mexico is sending its new national guard to the Guatemala border. The mission is unclear", in *The Washington Post*, June 10, 2019.

possessed a high dose of pragmatism since AMLO was breaching his campaign promises to respect migrants' human rights. It was clear that the government did not want to affect the national economy with more US tariffs. Once again, opponents questioned AMLO's decision because it was a subordination to Trump's wills.

In this context, the Trump administration asked Mexico's government to adopt the figure of a "safe third country". In other words, the United States would initiate the asylum application procedures for Central American migrants, but applicants had to stay in Mexican territory to wait for the resolution of a judge. Under these conditions, the Mexican government had to take care of Central American migrants and cover the expenses. The SRE declared that the country would not adopt that figure, but in fact it was doing so because many of them were living in the national territory waiting for the decision on their asylum request.

In 2021, there was a fatal accident in the southern state of Chiapas, where almost 60 Central American migrants died in a trailer collision. The vehicle box had more than 500 people. The incident showed that human trafficking was a serious problem. The event had a strong impact on societies and governments of Mexico, the United States, and some Central American nations. Marcelo Ebrard even announced the creation of an immediate action group (comprised by Mexico, Guatemala, the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador) to carry out a thorough investigation of the tragedy and coordinate policies to avoid this type of fatalities.¹⁰

Threats and Cooperation within Security Issues

Bilateral cooperation does not only concentrate on economic topic. Security is also a field of collaboration since the two governments agree that they shared problems and that menaces could affect both. However, this kind of issues are also controversial items between Mexico and the United States. Many times, Washington pressures the southern neighbor to comply with US national interest, and Mexico complaints that the United States violates national sovereignty. In this context, between 2018 and 2021, there were events that produced bilateral friction, but both governments were willing to cooperate to cope with common problems.

At the end of 2019, two events affected the bilateral relationship. First, Mexican authorities arrested Ovidio Guzman, a son of the famous drug lord, "El Chapo Guzman". However, his accomplices took several streets in the city of Culiacan and started a confrontation with the army to demand his release. Local authorities released him "to avoid a bloodbath". Later, members of a US-Mexican family were murdered near the US border by drug gangs. Women and children were killed. These two incidents demonstrated Mexico's lack of control

¹⁰ Ariadna Garcia, "Ebrard anuncia grupo de acción internacional contra trata de personas, tras tragedia en Chiapas", in *El Universal*, December 10, 2021.

over security issues. Consequently, Donald Trump threatened to label the Mexican drug cartels as “terrorist groups”. The objective was to help AMLO government fight them.¹¹ The move would have had many implications. For example, US military force could be used against these cartels.¹² AMLO government and Mexican society did not agree with this proposal.

Once again, differences have arisen between both nations. But the two administrations were willing to cooperate. In late 2019, a senior US government official, William Barr, traveled to Mexico City to resolve disagreements directly with President López Obrador.¹³ After the talks, some arrangements were reached and cooperation prevailed. Donald Trump promised not to label cartels as terrorist groups and Mexico guaranteed greater collaboration on this matter. Days later, US authorities announced the arrest of Genaro García, former Secretary of Public Security in the Felipe Calderón administration. He was accused of having ties to drug cartels. The action was fruit of bilateral cooperation and AMLO was pleased since it favored his fight against corruption.

The bilateral security agenda complicated again when the United States government detained Salvador Cienfuegos in Los Angeles, in 2020. He was the former Mexican Secretary of National Defense. According to US authorities, the General had ties to drug cartels. The news had a great media impact due to the high profile of the official. At first, López Obrador government stated that the arrest reflected the fight against corruption, but also the Mexican government was annoyed because the US government did not inform in advance. Thus, the act was considered a breach of the nation’s sovereignty. Later, the AMLO administration asked Washington to liberalize the general to judge him in Mexico. The argument was that the United States did not inform Mexico previously about the investigation that the DEA was conducting. Surprisingly, Washington conceded and General Cienfuegos was released and sent to Mexico to continue the investigation. However, the defendant was released and later cleared of all charges. US agencies were surprised because Mexico argued that the investigation was unsubstantiated. Later, the Congress passed a bill that reformed Mexico’s National Security Act. The amendment implied that the government would limit the number of US officials in Mexican territory. The Cienfuegos incident and the new law caused some mistrust among US authorities and represented an obstacle to broader bilateral security cooperation.¹⁴

To solve these differences and negotiate a new agreement, high-level US officials visited Mexico City in October 2021. Both governments achieved a Bicentennial Understanding, which represented a new bilateral security deal. In

¹¹ Amanda Mars, “Trump anuncia que incluirá a 'los carteles' mexicanos en la lista terrorista de EE. UU.”, in *El País*, November 27, 2019.

¹² “¿Qué implicaría que Trump declare como terroristas los carteles de la droga?”, in *El Universal*, November 28, 2019.

¹³ Kevin Sieff, “Barr's meeting in Mexico could be prelude to greater U.S. involvement against drug cartels”, in *The Washington Post*, December 5, 2019.

¹⁴ Emir Olivares, “Visas a 13 miembros de la DEA; Mexico enviará a unos 20 agentes a EU”, in *La Jornada*, December 7, 2021.

this context, Mexico agreed to increase the number of US officials in national territory. In December, SRE announced that nine DEA agents and four directors will operate with corresponding visas to collaborate against organized crime, and drug and illicit arms trafficking. Washington accepted 20 agents in US territory to coordinate binational cooperation.

Regarding illicit arms trafficking, Mexico has always requested Washington a greater control in guns selling since highly powerful weapons end up in drug dealers' hands. According to Mexico, this phenomenon contributes to violence in the nation. In this context, SRE sued in August 2021 ten major gun companies of "lethal negligence" on a mass scale. Mexican government was expecting 10 billion in compensation. The argument was that the selling of those weapons is associated to thousands of deaths in Mexico.¹⁵ The decision had a pragmatic nature since it was made for national interest link to security. Nevertheless, it was expected a huge legal battle between Mexican government and these gun companies. By the end of 2021, the lawsuit was still in US tribunals.

In Trump's presidential term, some of his decisions towards Mexico were mainly for domestic consumption. In 2019, the President was extremely interested in being re-elected. Therefore, he used Mexico as a scapegoat to woo US voters. The issues of migration, trade and security were very important to US public opinion. Besides, it is necessary to understand that Trump used to intimidate first to obtain better political gains. For instance, he threatened AMLO to increase trade tariffs to get what he wanted: to stop migrant caravans in Mexico's southern border.

The pattern of conflict and cooperation was very clear in Mexico's foreign policy toward the United States. When conflict arose, both governments were ready to negotiate and reach satisfactory understandings and cooperate widely. Besides, AMLO had used a more pragmatic approach to Washington. His administration has surrendered on migration and security issues to ensure free trade. As he was convinced that free trade generates economic growth, AMLO made decisions based on that criterion. Economic indicators, such as GDP growth and foreign investment, were more important from AMLO's point of view.

Security is a priority for Mexico's foreign policy. In the international arena, the government has sought to establish collaboration mechanisms to combat this scourge. With the United States, there are approaches to cooperate bilaterally since both nations share the problem. By the end of 2021, Mexican authorities met with their US counterparts to strengthen binational ties in security issues. On the one hand, both governments announced the end of the Merida Initiative, a cooperation scheme to strengthen Mexican institutional capacities in the fight against drug trafficking that was established during the Felipe Calderón administration. But, on the other hand, they also announced the so-called United States-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Secure Communities. Therefore, the perspectives of bilateral collaboration in security issues were high at the end of 2021.

¹⁵ Natalie Kitroeff and Oscar Lopez, "México demanda a empresas de armas en EE. UU.; las acusa de avivar la violencia", in *The New York Times*, August 4, 2021.

Trade in the Bilateral Relation: Towards a New USMCA

Bilateral cooperation between Mexico and the United States basically centers on the economic sphere. The day before AMLO took power in 2018, Mexico, Canada and the United States had signed the USMCA, which replaced NAFTA.¹⁶ However, Democrats in the House did not fully agree with the first version and did not want to approve it because that could mean a triumph for Donald Trump. After almost a year of intense negotiations, both governments announced in December 2019 that they had reached a new understanding. This second version included new rules of origin and stricter standards to protect environment, as well as new labor standards. Cars made in Mexico now needed to have 70 percent of national content from North America. In addition, the Mexican government must provide employment benefits to Mexican workers in the automotive industry.¹⁷ Those new rules were a request from US workers. They deemed that the United States was losing jobs because US investors preferred to open companies abroad to get better labor conditions, such as low salaries. Therefore, Democrats supported those measures. This type of cooperation brought some conflicts. The agreement included "labor attaches" to oversee compliance with the new norms in Mexican factories. Some sectors of Mexican society did not agree with this decision because it represented a violation of Mexico's sovereignty. Anyway, AMLO administration applied pragmatism and accepted this clause. Mexico ceded to those demands in order to secure the approval of the trade agreement, which was vital to stimulate economic growth.

In July 2020, President López Obrador made his first international trip. The destination was Washington DC and the objective was to pay a visit Donald Trump in the White House to commemorate USMCA's entry into force. However, AMLO's opponents criticized him because, with the visit, he was endorsing Trump's re-election. The absence of Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, was evidence that AMLO was supporting Trump's ambitions. The Democratic Party and candidate Joe Biden also considered that AMLO was taking side in US politics. Somehow, this could be an intervention in domestic policy. But the Mexican President insisted that the only issue was to celebrate USMCA. Criticism was also centered on the fact that AMLO did not hold any meeting with migrants, nor did he approach other political actors to seek balance, such as congressmen. Therefore, the visit had a high component of pragmatism since, it seemed, AMLO was supporting Trump's re-election. It seemed that López Obrador would prefer to deal with Trump since they got along well.

With this visit, the President also wanted to send a message to certain interest groups. For instance, he could demonstrate to his followers that his administration could manage the bilateral relationship without any confrontation with Trump. He also wanted to send a positive signal to international financial

¹⁶ Sandro Pozzi, "Estados Unidos, Mexico y Canada firman la version final del TMEC", en *El País*, December 11, 2019.

¹⁷ Ivette Saldaña, "Reglas de origen y laborales los cambios", en *El Universal*, December 10, 2019.

markets. The idea was to show that Mexico's economy was strong thanks to USMCA. AMLO needed to attract investments and overcome the economic crisis generated by the pandemic. Pragmatism was also involved since his intention was to stop Trump criticizing migrants and no longer be tempted to impose more tariffs on Mexican exports.

Joe Biden: The Start of a New Relationship?

The 2020 electoral process in the United States was very complicated. First, because there was a close dispute between Democrats and Republicans. Second, President Donald Trump announced well in advance the existence of possible electoral fraud, which contaminated the process. In the day of the election, the count in some states was very slow and four days passed without knowing the result. However, on November 7, several media outlets announced that Joe Biden had obtained the necessary number of electoral colleges to win the presidency. The source of information came mainly from the counts made in every state. As there is no central body that organizes elections in that country, tradition has established that media announcement was enough to declare the winner when the candidate had gained more than 270 electoral colleges. Therefore, it was practically a fact that the Democratic candidate would take power on January 20, 2021.

Hours after the announcement, some heads of state began to congratulate Biden. The first to do so was Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Later, European, and Latin American leaders followed suit. In social networks, Mexicans began to ask when President López Obrador would issue an announcement about it. At noon, Marcelo Ebrard published a tweet in which he reported that in the afternoon the president would "set his position" on the matter. From Tabasco, at a press conference, the president stated that: "We are going to wait until all legal issues are resolved, we do not want to be reckless, we do not want to act lightly, and we want to be respectful of the self-determination principle". In addition, he added that "President Trump has been very respectful with us, and we have reached very good agreements and we thank him because he has respected us". He also pointed out that "I want to wait until electoral process finishes". Finally, he recalled that in 2006 "the Presidency was stolen from us. The votes had not yet been counted and some governments were already recognizing those who declared themselves winners".¹⁸

On Monday, November 9, the President insisted on not making any official statement on the matter. He mentioned that his administration wanted to "act prudently" and wait for the corresponding authorities to announce the result. Only then would the government speak out. The President justified his position by arguing that article 89 of the Constitution obliged him to follow the

¹⁸ Diego Caso, "AMLO 'se guarda' felicitación a Biden: 'Esperaremos a que se resuelvan todos los asuntos legales'", in *El Financiero*, November 7, 2020.

traditional principles of foreign policy, particularly Non-Intervention. In this regard, he said: "We cannot interfere in the affairs of other nations".¹⁹ AMLO's indecision generated polarization among public opinion. A sector of the population criticized him because it was a mistake not to recognize Biden's triumph as the United States is the most important relationship for Mexico. Another sector supported him for adhering to constitutional principles. In this particular case, principled policy prevailed. The possible explanation could fall into the individual level of analysis. AMLO was upset in 2006 when other presidents recognized Felipe Calderón's victory and legal institutions have not yet declared the legitimate winner. Thus, he waited to recognize Biden based on personal views and justified his decision through constitutional obligations.

Meantime, Biden's transition team was trying to establish contacts with AMLO administration. However, the President instructed the SRE to wait. There were even versions that Biden's team had requested a phone call, but AMLO did not accept it. For this reason, Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Martha Barcena, resigned. Later, López Obrador appointed Esteban Moctezuma as Ambassador. He did not have ample diplomatic experience, but he was a disciplined, effective, and a close politician to AMLO. In this case, it seemed that loyalty prevailed over diplomatic skills. On January 6, 2021, López Obrador did not send a message after Trump's supporters took the Capitol. Thus, before Biden's inauguration, there were not many positive signals from AMLO.

Finally, despite lawsuits filed by Trump alleging fraud, the Electoral College met in December and formally declared Joe Biden as president-elect. Immediately, President López Obrador sent Biden a letter to congratulate him on his victory. Once he took office in January 2021, Biden reached out AMLO by phone to discuss the most important issues of bilateral interest, such as the pandemic, economic recovery, and migration. Even Biden announced new measures for the regularization of thousands of undocumented migrants and mentioned an initiative to support financially Central America to avoid migration. On these points, there was a lot of agreement between Biden and AMLO. However, these initiatives should go through US Congress and there was no clarity on their possible approval. Later, both presidents met virtually to discuss these issues. At the meeting, there were signs of understanding and bilateral collaboration.

In May 2021, AMLO and Vice President Kamala Harris had a video-conference meeting to discuss bilateral issues. The idea was to prepare a physical visit to Mexico in June. Despite López Obrador's negative signals towards the Democrats before inauguration, the Biden administration sought to establish contacts with AMLO to encourage bilateral cooperation. In November 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden organized the North American Leaders' Summit for the first since 2016. López Obrador, Justin Trudeau, and Joe Biden and their teams discussed bilateral and trilateral topics, ranging from pandemic response to critical

¹⁹ "AMLO reitera que esperara para felicitar a Biden hasta resolucion de autoridades de EU", en *El Economista*, November 9, 2020.

North American supply chains. In this context, an important issue for Mexico and the United States was migration. Days later, both governments announced the “Sowing Opportunities” program, which will finance in 2022 social programs among El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala to address causes of irregular migration.²⁰ This project was an important diplomatic success for AMLO’s administrations since the President had been interested in financing programs in Central America to stop migration.

In summary, Mexico’s relationship with the United States, in the first three years of AMLO’s administration, showed patterns of principism and pragmatism. But, at the same, a combination of change and continuity. These two characteristics also lead to a pattern of bilateral conflict and cooperation. In other words, there are still sources of conflict such as migration and security issues, but both administrations are willing to open channels of dialogue for greater bilateral cooperation that would allow them to address common challenges. To do so, principled pragmatism would be required.

Mexico’s Foreign Policy towards Latin America: The Pragmatic Defense of Principles and Regional Cooperation

The Latin American region is a priority area for Mexico’s foreign agenda. Traditionally, the country has projected friendly relations and solidarity towards the nations of the region based on identity similarities. Mexico has even used Latin America as a counterbalance to the United States. In other words, Mexico has sought alliances with other nations of the region to improve its negotiating position regarding Washington.

Early in his administration, AMLO introduced a substantial change in Mexico’s foreign policy towards Venezuela compared to the former administration. When the Lima Group (LG) presented a resolution to disregard the Nicolas Maduro regime, Mexico abstained from supporting the resolution.²¹ It was a significant shift since the Peña Nieto government was pressing for sanctions to the southern nation. According to the LG, Maduro had been re-elected in 2018 in a “dubious” process. Based on a principled vision, SRE applied the nonintervention tenet and abstained. This action confirmed that AMLO was serious about his principled policy. In the past, Peña Nieto had supported the LG and had severely criticized Maduro. In his speech during the LG meeting, the Mexican representative stated that Venezuela would be a “priority” for Mexico’s foreign policy and suggested to find a negotiated formula for the Venezuelan crisis, as the LG had originally proposed. In addition, he mentioned that Mexico was committed to Non-Intervention, cooperation, and human rights.²² A fact

²⁰Emir Olivares, “Presentan México y EU plan de desarrollo para Centroamérica”, in *La Jornada*, December 2, 2021.

²¹Rafael Croda, “Subsecretario mexicano pide no aislar a Venezuela ni intervenir en sus asuntos internos”, in *Proceso*, January 4, 2019.

²²Jacqueline Fowks, “México evita firmar el acuerdo del Grupo de Lima que rechaza al nuevo Gobierno de Maduro”, in *El pais*, January 4, 2019.

that is important to highlight is that the LG became radicalized with the arrival of right-wing governments in Brazil and Colombia. Therefore, Mexico proposed a more idealist formula to resolve the conflict in Venezuela.

On January 10, 2019, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a resolution to declare Nicolas Maduro's regime illegitimate. Mexico also abstained on that occasion.²³ Later, the regional organization demanded "new elections" in Venezuela. The problem here was that the AMLO government was not paying too much attention to Resolution 1080 of the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which mandates American states to defend and promote democracy in the region. The AMLO government preferred to orient Mexico's foreign policy towards the constitutional principle of Non-Intervention. Days later, the domestic political situation in Venezuela worsened on January 23 when Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself interim president. In an official statement, the SRE declared that Mexico would not "ignore a government with which Mexico has diplomatic relations".²⁴ This statement produced some internal criticism. Some sectors of public opinion deemed that AMLO was taking Maduro's side and that Mexico implicitly was supporting a dictator who violated human rights and was not democratic.

With respect to Venezuela, AMLO opted for a principled foreign policy in congruence with his ideology. Besides, the Maduro government was a leftist regime. This political coincidence could have also motivated the use of idealism. It seemed that this policy was primarily for domestic consumption, aimed at satisfying the interests of nationalist groups, which supported him in the election. However, the decision increased polarization in Mexican society. Some groups were in favor, but a large sector of the population did not agree.

A similar situation emerged a few months later at the end of 2019. In Bolivia, Evo Morales resigned from after a suspected election. The Bolivian army and police recommended Morales leaving the country. The Mexican government interpreted the action as a coup and offered him political asylum to protect his life.²⁵ Morales accepted and went to Mexico. Once again, the decision caused polarization as public opinion considered Morales a dictator who tried to be reelected for the third time in a fraudulent election. The situation worsened when the Mexican embassy housed 9 officials from Morales' cabinet. The new Bolivian government organized a strict surveillance around the embassy and Mexico complained. After an incident involving Spanish bodyguards who went to pick up Spanish diplomats from the Mexican embassy, the Bolivian government declared the Mexican ambassador "*persona non-grata*" and expelled her

²³ "OEA aprueba resolución que declara ilegítimo gobierno de Maduro; México se abstiene", in *El Universal*, January 10, 2019.

²⁴ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, "México se apega a sus principios constitucionales y respalda llamado de las Naciones Unidas", *Press Release*, No. 012, January 23, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/156459>.

²⁵ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, "Position of the Government of Mexico on Granting Asylum to Evo Morales", *Press Release* 397, November 11, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/position-of-the-government-of-mexico-on-granting-asylum-to-evo-morales>.

from the country.²⁶ Now, the AMLO administration was going through a diplomatic crisis with Bolivia, as Fox had with Cuba and Venezuela. Later, the dispute was resolved and relations at Ambassador level were re-established. At the end of 2020, there were new elections in Bolivia. Luis Arce, who competed under Evo Morales' party, won the presidential election. López Obrador recognized his triumph immediately. In 2021, the Bolivian president even visited AMLO in Mexico City. By then, bilateral relationship with Bolivia had been normalized.

In the economic sphere, the leftist-wing administration also projected some continuity in foreign policy towards Latin America. For instance, AMLO supported the Pacific Alliance. This mechanism encourages free trade and cooperation in various areas among the members. The PA has become one of the most important integration instruments in the region due to its pragmatic stance and trade growth. For these reasons, many countries around the world are interested in the Pacific Alliance to be included as observers.

Traditionally, Mexico has also projected active participation at OAS. However, the administration has had some differences with the regional organization, particularly in the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia. AMLO's positions did not necessarily coincide with the organism and some tensions have arisen. For example, Mexico refused to support an OAS resolution to ignore Nicolas Maduro as the legitimate president in Venezuela. As for Bolivia, the OAS also classified the presidential elections, in which Evo Morales was re-elected, as fraudulent, but Mexico defended him when he was ousted. The conflict relation also centered on the OAS Secretary General, Luis Almagro. In 2020, he sought re-election. But Mexico openly supported another candidate, Maria Fernanda Espinosa, from Ecuador. Later, AMLO proposed to replace OAS with a new organization that includes all Latin American nations without the United States. The proposal was intrepid but there was not enough consensus among the members. This initiative also reflected the Mexican confrontation to OAS.

In this context, the Mexican government has resorted to having a more active participation in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC in Spanish). This multilateral mechanism was created in 2010 and aims at consolidating a multilateral forum to discuss regional and shared interests without the United States and Canada. In 2020, Mexico became the *pro tempore* president of CELAC and set out to present new initiatives to foster cooperation and economic understanding among members. In August 2021, Mexico hosted the CELAC summit in Mexico City. The meeting summoned 17 Latin American presidents. There, AMLO proposed the creation of a multilateral organization like the European Union to resolve conflicts in the region, promote unity, and negotiate with other regional economic blocs. In the final document, the members urged to democratize production and guarantee fair and equitable access to vaccines.²⁷

²⁶ Ariadna García *et al.*, “Expulsa Bolivia a embajadora mexicana”, in *El Universal*, December 30, 2019.

²⁷ <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/foreign-secretary-ebrard-presents-celac-summit-agreements-confirms-arrival-of-1-75-million-doses-of-moderna-vaccine?tab=>

By the end of 2021, political polarization increased in the region. On one hand, there were several right-wing governments in Latin America, such as the cases of Colombia and Brazil; but also, many leftist governments, like those in Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. In this perspective, López Obrador government has sought a close relationship with leftist administrations. Both the president of Bolivia and that of Argentina, Alberto Fernández, visited AMLO in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, which reflects the interest in establishing a close relationship between these governments. At the same time, AMLO has showed less interests in strengthening diplomatic links to right-wing regimes, such as Brazil and Colombia. In 2021, this polarization was also reflected in Mexico's domestic sphere. Some sectors in the society supported AMLO in his position towards the region, but others openly criticized him. Therefore, domestic polarization also prevailed.

In 2021, there were presidential elections in Peru. Pedro Castillo, a member of a leftist-wing party, won the vote and became President. AMLO immediately recognized him and established a close contact with the new administration. However, he experienced some problems by the end of 2021. The opposition in Congress raised a "vacancy"²⁸ request due to moral incapacity sent his treasury. Immediately, President López Obrador sent his Secretary of Treasury to advise Castillo. For some, the act represented a violation to the nonintervention principle. But AMLO was pleased to help his comrade in trouble. In November 2021, there were also presidential elections in Chile. Gabriel Boric, from a leftist-wing party won as well. In the same fashion, the AMLO administration promptly recognized him. It seemed that López Obrador was trying to construct a leftist alliance in the region.

Relations with Central America and the Caribbean

Nicaragua also held elections in 2021. Daniel Ortega, who is in power since 2007, was reelected. However, some Latin American nations saw him as a dictator. His administration had jailed several opponents who were planning to run in the election. After the election, Mexico called its ambassador in Managua for consultations to express disagreement with the process and the climate censorship. However, in November Mexico abstained, once again in an OAS declaration that determined that the elections in Nicaragua had no "democratic legitimacy".²⁹ By the end of 2021, the discussion in AMLO's cabinet was whether to send a Mexican delegation to the inauguration ceremony or not. However, López Obrador was criticized for his "silence" in Nicaragua's case. Mexican diplomats even argued that AMLO "uses the principle of non-intervention 'as he

²⁸ Vacancy is the possibility to impeach a President for moral incapacity to govern. The Congress can request it. If approved, the President leaves the post. See Jonathan Castro, "Destituir a Pedro Castillo solo significaría gobernar sobre cenizas", in *The Washington Post*, December 1, 2021.

²⁹ Blanche Petrich, "Abstención de México en la OEA no avala el gobierno de Daniel Ortega", in *La Jornada*, November 14, 2021.

wishes".³⁰ In other words, he is selective in its application. When it is convenient, then he defends the tenet. When it is not, he neglects it. This capricious use of principles can clearly be classified as principist pragmatism.

Mexico's relations with Panama were shaken up on January 17, 2022, generated unease after the President nominated Pedro Salmeron to lead the Embassy of Mexico in that country. Groups of students and feminists in Mexico, in Panama and on social networks, where the hashtag *#UnAcosadorNoDebeSer Embajador* became a trend, expressed their discontent over the candidacy.³¹ The president blamed the disagreement on the Panamanian Foreign Minister, Erika Mouynes and reiterated his support for the academic. He argued that there was no formal complaint against Salmeron before the authorities, but rather a "lynching campaign".³²

President Andres Manuel López Obrador broke diplomatic codes by stating that he would make known the letter sent to him by the government of Panama clarifying his position on Salmeron. In this case, the Panamanian government had the courtesy to send a letter to President AMLO explaining their position regarding the multiple accusations of sexual harassment carried out by the ambassadorship candidate. Among the cases in which Mexicans have not received approval, that of Porfirio Muñoz Ledo stands out. The United Kingdom did not give it to him because of his position during the Falklands War. The prime minister was Margaret Thatcher.

With Cuba, there has been a close a friendly relationship. For example, the president of the island, Miguel Diaz-Canel, was AMLO's special guest for the celebration of Independence Day in September 2021.³³ It was the third time that the Cuban president visited Mexico during the López Obrador administration. He was also invited for AMLO's inauguration and carried out an official visit in October 2019. The number of trips and meetings also reflected the high interaction between both nations. The PAN's diplomatic crises with the island were in the past. Thus, party ideology could be a persuasive variable that explains the type of foreign policy that a state carries out.

Mexico's most immediate neighbor in the region is Central America. Throughout history, the nation has sought to project hegemony in the subregion whether for geopolitical, security or economic reasons. There are several examples that illustrate this assumption. When Mexico was an oil power, together with Venezuela they instituted the San Jose Pact in early 1980s. This mechanism sought to offer petroleum to the Central American and Caribbean nations at preferential prices. Actually, the objective was to show hegemony in that region

³⁰ Gabriela Sotomayor, "AMLO usa 'a contentillo' el principio de no intervención", in *Proceso*, 2357, January 2, 2022, p. 45.

³¹ "#UnAcosadorNoDebeSerEmbajador: Protestan contra Designación de Pedro Salmerón", in *El Financiero*, January 18, 2022.

³² "Pedro Salmerón Declina al cargo de Embajador de México en Panamá, AFIRMA AMLO," in *El Financiero*, February 1, 2022.

³³ Francesco Manetto, "Mexico reafirma su 'vínculo especial' con Cuba con la visita de Diaz-Canel en el día de la Independencia", in *El País*, September 15, 2021.

based on the oil power. In the mid-eighties, Mexico created the Contadora Group to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region. The goal was relevant for Mexico's national interests and security since the conflict was affecting the southern Mexican states. Afterwards, Salinas de Gortari created the Tuxtla Gutierrez Mechanism to support the Central American countries. In his turn, Vicente Fox proposed a Puebla Panama Plan to promote development and greater economic integration. Later, this scheme became the Mesoamerica Project with the same objectives.

AMLO's administration was no exception. From the beginning, his government showed interest in neighboring countries. One objective was to promote development in the area to avoid migratory flows that cross Mexican territory to reach the United States. López Obrador invited several presidents of the region to his inauguration on December 1, 2018. That day, AMLO met with some of the Central American heads of state and signed an agreement to set up a Comprehensive Cooperation Plan (PIC in Spanish).³⁴ The idea was to invest in the region's poorest areas to trigger economic development and prevent migration. The deal was well received by the leaders. But the big problem was obtaining financial resources to consolidate it. One option was to involve the United States in the project, but that would be a difficult task since Trump was not eager to fund this type of projects, even though he was interested in halting illegal migration. Later, the SRE announced that Mexico had reached an agreement with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to establish a plan to finance the PIC.³⁵

In summary, Mexico's foreign policy toward the Latin American region in the first three years of a left-wing administration was also characterized by three patterns: continuity and change, pragmatism and idealism, conflict, and cooperation. There was continuity in foreign economic policy, but there were significant changes in the diplomatic sphere, such as the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia. There was also an oscillation between a policy based on traditional principles and one founded on a practical point of view. AMLO's international stance also produced some diplomatic conflicts (as in the case of Bolivia) but also projected cooperation ties, such as the Comprehensive Plan for Cooperation with Central America.

Mexico's relationship with other regions: the search for soft counterbalance and economic diversification

As can be seen in the paragraphs above, Latin America is a relevant region for Mexico's foreign policy. But other regions are important as well. They have not been a priority, especially under AMLO administration. Though they are strate-

³⁴ Mathieu Tourliere, "En primer día de gobierno de AMLO, pactan Plan de Desarrollo Integral para Centroamérica", en *Proceso*, December 1 2018.

³⁵ "Foreign Ministers of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico Presented Comprehensive Development Plan in the Framework of the Conference on the Global Compact for Migration", The

gic. Under this logic, there are two regions that reflect special interest, particularly for soft-counterbalance and diversification purposes. Indeed, the weight of the US relationship has made Europe and Asia a possible source of economic expansion. As Mexico exports almost 80 percent of its products to the United States and its autonomy in foreign policy is limited before Washington, different administrations have established, as a basic objective, the diversification of Mexican markets and the search for real counterbalance to improve the capacity to negotiate with the United States.

Europe: Diversification and Diplomatic Differences with Spain

Europe is an important region because Mexico has historical ties to the continent, particularly with Spain. Traditionally, Mexico's government has sought a close relationship with that continent to attract investments and find external markets for national products. In 2000, Mexico and the European Union signed a free trade agreement, which has become the core of the relationship ever since. In the Enrique Peña administration, both parties renegotiated the treaty to update it. In April 2020, Mexico and the European Union completed the process, which included measures regarding environment protection and government purchases. The negotiation had started in 2016 but was concluded until López Obrador's administration due to delays in the talks.

Despite the intention of maintaining friendly relations with European countries, the new government got involved in a diplomatic crisis with Spain in March 2019. On that occasion, AMLO sent a letter to the King of Spain to request an apology for the wrongs committed against the original peoples during the conquest 500 years ago. When the media published the content of the letter, there were negative reactions in both Mexico and Spain. The message was contradictory because when Pedro Sanchez, president of the Spanish government, visited Mexico, AMLO declared that both countries had a "relationship of friendship and mutual affection".³⁶ Later, AMLO revealed the letter he sent to the King of Spain in which he demanded an apology. For AMLO, the apology was the "only possible way to achieve a full reconciliation between the two countries". The Spanish government answered categorically that Spain rejected "with all firmness"³⁷ the request because the conquest "cannot be judged in the light of contemporary considerations".³⁸

It is possible that the correspondence may have been primarily for domestic consumption. For AMLO, it was convenient to seek compensation to woo

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Press Release, December 10, 2018, available at: <https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/foreign-ministers-salvador-guatemala-honduras-and-mexico-presented-comprehensive>.

³⁶ Misael Zavala & Alberto Morales, "Méjico refrenda su amistad y afecto a España: AMLO", in *El Universal*, Mexico, January 30, 2019.

³⁷ Javier Lafuente & Lucia Abellan, "López Obrador pide al Rey que España se disculpe por los abusos de la conquista", in *El País*, March 25, 2019.

³⁸ "España rechaza 'con toda firmeza' carta de AMLO sobre disculpa por la conquista", in *El Universal*, March 25, 2019.

indigenous groups. The message was in the context of the proximity of the 500th anniversary of Hernan Cortez's triumph in Tenochtitlan. The problem was that the request strained the bilateral relationship, which was not convenient because both governments came from leftist political parties.

Another incident emerged in early February 2022, the Mexican president spoke about the energy reform promoted by his government, which privileges the generation of national electricity over private and foreign investment. This bill seeks to repair a damage caused to the nation by agreements that existed in previous governments with private companies. AMLO iterated a proposal to distance Mexico from investments by Spanish companies in projects with public capital. President López Obrador even said that Mexico would set a "pause" to the bilateral relation with Spain.³⁹ This criticism was extended to the banking and hotel business and to any Spanish company with operations in Mexico in general to reinforce his point of view on alleged corruption and patronage of the last two decades. According to a 2020 report by Banco Santander, Spain is Mexico's second largest investor with 7,000 companies situated in Mexico and the investment rises above 70,000 million euros.⁴⁰

AMLO administration also sought close ties with Russia. In February 2020, the Russian Foreign Minister paid a visit to Mexico City to meet with Secretary Marcelo Ebrard. As a result of the meeting, the SRE announced that Mexico would purchase Russian helicopters.⁴¹ However, days later some media sources raised the possibility that Washington could impose sanctions.⁴² Later, the SRE denied the version that Mexico would buy that equipment.⁴³ In the framework of the pandemic, the Mexican government also approached Russia to buy its vaccine. At the end of April 2021, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, visited Moscow to explore the possibility that Mexican laboratories could produce the Russian vaccine.

In 2020, Beatriz Gutierrez Müller, first lady of Mexico, delivered a letter to the Austrian president, Alexander Van der Bellen, in which his government requested the loan of the Moctezuma headdress to exhibit in Mexico. The request was denied. This act by the Austrian government was described as anticultural, since it was only a loan that they asked for from the relic, not its return. The negative response pushed AMLO to exclaim that the Mexican government would consider going to the United Nations Organization in order to get the nations that have Mexican archaeological pieces to return them to their place of origin.

³⁹ The declaration was a surprise among Mexico's public opinion. There is not such a concept in diplomatic relations. See "AMLO plantea hacer una pausa en las relaciones de México con España", in *El Economista*, February 9, 2022.

⁴⁰ CAMESCOM, "La IED española ocupa el segundo lugar de generación de flujos de inversión hacia México con 5,511 MDD durante este sexenio", July 30, 2020, in <https://www.camescom.com.mx/la-ied-espanola-ocupa-el-segundo-lugar-de-generacion-de-flujos-de-inversion-hacia-mexico-con-5511-mdd-durante-este-sexenio/>

⁴¹ "México negocia compra de helicópteros militares con Rusia: Canciller ruso", in *El Universal*, February 7, 2020.

⁴² "EU adelanta que podría sancionar a México si compra helicópteros rusos", in *La Jornada*, February 13, 2020.

⁴³ "México niega posible compra de helicópteros rusos", in *El Universal*, February 14, 2020.

The matter took center stage when president AMLO gave his opinion on the case of a group of Mexican tourists who introduced to the Museum of Ethnology in Vienna their own audio guides with an alternative narrative that explained how Mexico lost the piece after the Spanish conquest in the 16th century. He went on to state that the letter given to the Austrian president would be made public. The last investigation carried out determined that the plume cannot be moved by air, sea or land, because the vibrations could cause serious and irreparable damage to its organic materials.

President López Obrador considered going to the United Nations Organization in order to get the nations that have Mexican archaeological pieces to return them to their place of origin. At the center of this paradox is the Mayan Train, one of the projects that the president of Mexico most stubbornly defends.

With the United Kingdom, Mexico sought to establish a mechanism to maintain bilateral trade after that nation withdrew from the European Union through BREXIT. With the other countries of the continent, the SRE has tried to keep open communication channels to take advantage of TLCUEM. These facts show that Mexico is seeking alliances with other regions to generate a soft counterbalance. But it also shows that the United States factor has a special weight even in Mexico's relations with other regions.

With Ukraine, President AMLO has rejected any scenario of sending military aid to Ukraine, a measure adopted by the United States and countries of the European Union sticking to a pacifist discourse. This came after on March 3, 2022, members of the Ukrainian Parliament addressed a letter to the president of the Mexican Senate requesting weapons and military equipment in large quantities to face the Russian invasion. In several occasions, Mexico has condemned the Kremlin's aggression but the government ruled out imposing unilateral economic or trade sanctions. This was the majority decision of its international allies but Mexico remains adamant on its principle-based decision. The official posture coming from the presidency states that the nation will attend to those affected on either side and offer protection and humanitarian aid to all.

The debate about sending weapons to the Ukrainian resistance takes place in Mexico in a specific context. Mexico is a nation that suffers from a serious security crisis due to the confrontation between criminal organizations. This ordeal has made the crusade against the circulation of weapons a central axis of its foreign policy. The Government's position on gun control jumped the border and Mexico denounced 11 manufacturers before a court in Massachusetts and is also pursuing new agreements with several European countries to prevent the trafficking of war material.⁴⁴

Putin is far from being an ally and that the White House is the main reference in their international relations. This official position has received criticism from the opposition. The president's proposal has the objective of expanding the commercial and productive alliance with Washington, in the first instance. Even

⁴⁴ The Associated Press, "Mexico sues U.S. gun manufacturers for contributing to arms trafficking deaths", in NPR, August 5, 2021.

so, it is true that within MORENA there are currents that are still anchored in the rhetoric of the Cold War and in the preventive rejection of the United States and NATO. An example was a statement from a youth group from the State of Mexico that reproduced the Kremlin's warmongering propaganda to justify the war that Putin started against Ukraine.⁴⁵ The national leadership disassociated itself from the writing. The outcome of this episode illustrated the complex balances of the Fourth Transformation in the face of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

The last lashing out by president AMLO was directed towards the European Parliament. The Euro Parliament expressed concern about the violent situation reporters and members of the media face in Mexico and asked the AMLO administration for protection for journalists and human rights advocates.⁴⁶ As a response to this action, president López Obrador doctored a response in the face of what he considered a defamatory resolution.⁴⁷ The European resolution was an unprecedented request from the institution in the face of a problem that is not exclusive to this government, because it has claimed the lives of more than 150 reporters in the last two decades and 68 activists have been murdered in the last four years, but to whom he asked to take the necessary measures so as not to put them at more risk. The author of the Resolution is Leopoldo Lopez Gil, Member of the European Parliament from Spain, and affiliate of the Popular Party (Spain).

Lopez Gil is a member of the Group of the European People's Party, a Christian Democratic alliance, categorized the Mexican response as unfortunate, "unworthy of the language of a head of state".⁴⁸ The European document has several repercussions after landing in Mexico. First, it comes in the final stretch of the April 10th referendum, star proposal of the government of López Obrador. On April 10, citizens will vote in a public consultation if they want the president to remain in office or not. Second, President López Obrador must show the Mexican public that he is a president willing to fight to defend the nations integrity. Third, the remarks made by European parliament members that are headed by a conservative argument of repression and lack of protection of human and civil rights in Mexico, which coincide with the parliamentary left-wing perspective. Fourth, the comments are seen as a threat to the president's popularity and a victory for the political opposition.

AMLO expressed that his administration holds a 66 per cent approval rating. Showing weakness in the eye of the Mexican vox populi and the international stage has a high political cost and low political benefit. The president went on the express that "Nobody is repressed here; freedom of expression and the work

⁴⁵ Barragan, S., "¿Jóvenes de Morena apoyan a Rusia? Esto dice la embajada, El Partido y la Delegación Edomex", in Aristegui Noticias, March 3, 2022.

⁴⁶ Leopoldo Lopez, "Joint Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of the Rules of Procedure on the situation of journalists and human rights defenders in Mexico (2022/2580(RSP)", in *Europarl.europa.eu*, March 9, 2022.

⁴⁷ Eliana Reina, "López Obrador Arremete Contra el Parlamento Europeo: 'Ya no somos colonia de nadie'", in *El País*, March 17, 2022.

⁴⁸ Escobar, E., "AMLO no respondió, sólo insultó y descalificó. -Eurodiputado", in *Reforma*, March 17, 2022.

of journalists are respected. The State does not violate human rights as it happened in previous governments, when you, by the way, kept a complicit silence".⁴⁹

Asia Pacific: Towards Greater Integration

For Mexico, Asia Pacific is also an important region for the same reasons discussed above. When the Mexican government opened its trade to the world in the 1980s, Asia became a strategic area for the goal of diversification. In the same logic, Several Asian nations are interested in Mexico because of its proximity to the United States. Their intention is to penetrate in the US market and, thus, Mexico represents an excellent platform to do so.

In this region, China plays a prominent role for diversification and soft counterbalance reasons. Chinese bilateral trade and investment have increased significantly in recent years. From a geopolitical perspective, China has long had a particular interest in getting involved in Latin America, and Mexico is an excellent option due to the weight of its economy and because it is next to the United States. Previously, there were some bilateral problems in Enrique Peña's period because his government canceled some infrastructure projects in which Chinese investors were involved. However, the AMLO administration has tried to reconcile matters with that country. When Donald Trump threatened to increase trade tariffs on Mexican exports, AMLO government saw China as an alternative to redirect trade and a possible ally regarding Trump's threats. If Trump would close the US market for Mexican manufactures and raw materials, then a possible alternative could be China.

In the context of the trade war between the United States and China, Mexico obtained some benefits as its international trade increased slightly. However, within the USMCA there is a clause that prevents Mexico from signing a free trade agreement with a "non-commercial country",⁵⁰ which was a direct reference to China. In other words, the United States government imposed an article that prohibits Mexico and Canada to sign a trade deal with China. Despite the clause, the AMLO government has tried to establish a closer relationship with China. The president did not travel to China, but sent his foreign minister, Marcelo Ebrard, to China to resolve issues with the Xi Jinping government.⁵¹ The idea was to guarantee more investment and promote free trade between both parties. Mexico has a trade deficit with China and wants to reduce it. For now, China is very interested in some new infrastructure projects in Mexico, such as a

⁴⁹ Article 32.10 requires three months' notice in advance if any member "attempts to start free trade negotiations with non-trading economies." See: *United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement*, Office of the US Trade Representative. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement>

⁵⁰ SRE, "Primer Informe de Labores SRE 2018-2019", September 2019. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/490401/SRE_Primer_Informe_de_Labores-2019_aconvertir_baja.pdf

⁵¹ The BRI is a key Chinese project that was adopted in 2013, which aims are to build a global infrastructure in different nations of the world. See Devonshire-Ellis, Chris, "The Belt & Road Initiative in Mexico & Central America", *Silk Road Briefing*, May 27, 2019.

new train route in the Yucatan peninsula and the construction of an oil refinery in Dos Bocas, Tabasco. Some Chinese banks revealed in early 2020 that they were interested in providing a loan for the refinery plan. Similarly, Chinese auto companies also announced that they planned to open a plant in Mexico to produce their cars. From a geopolitical perspective, China wants to export its "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) to Mexico and Central America.⁵² Their geographical position, close to the United States, makes them a strategic option for China to become a world hegemony. In the context of the pandemic, Mexico also had approaches with the Chinese government to guarantee necessary medical supplies to take care of sick people. China sent respirators, face masks and other medical instruments. In the absence of the United States to become the leading country to face the pandemic, China was trying to occupy that place by establishing ties with different countries in the world.

As for other regions, Africa is practically a forgotten area for Mexico's foreign policy. Trade is scarce with the continent and diplomatic ties are meager. With Africa, the country has only six embassies. Although AMLO promised to initiate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, interaction with that continent was limited during the first three years of his administration. Regarding the Middle East, in May 2021, a conflict broke out between Israel and Palestine with several fatalities. At first, the Mexican Foreign Affairs Secretary protested because the UN Security Council did not act on the matter.⁵³ Later, at the UN Human Rights Council, there was a proposal to create a commission to investigate violations by Israel. As it has done on previous occasions, Mexico voted in favor of the proposal and, days later, the Israeli government requested an explanation since the vote was inappropriate, according to them.⁵⁴ Israel's reaction was also natural. It is clear that the vision of both governments on the conflict is very different. Mexico observes human rights violations, while Jews argue a defense against terrorist attacks.

Humanitarian diplomacy and multilateral policy

As already mentioned, AMLO did not show high interest in international affairs at the beginning of his administration. For example, the president did not travel abroad during his first year. He did not attend the Pacific Alliance summit in 2019 and did not participate either in the G20 meeting in Osaka, Japan. He simply sent Marcelo Ebrard as his representative. AMLO also refused to participate in the UN General Assembly when the session opened in 2019. These decisions showed that the president was not interested in participating, directly, in world

⁵² The BRI is a key Chinese project that was adopted in 2013, which aims are to build a global infrastructure in different nations of the world. See Devonshire-Ellis, Chris, "The Belt & Road Initiative in Mexico & Central America", *Silk Road Briefing*, May 27, 2019.

⁵³ "Ebrard califica de aberración al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU por tema Israel-Hamas", in *El Universal*, May 20, 2021.

⁵⁴ Ariadna Garcia, "Israel expresa molestia con México por votación en la ONU", in *El Universal*, May 31, 2021.

affairs. In other words, he preferred to focus on domestic affairs and leave external issues to the SRE. For instance, Marcelo Ebrard participated in the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration that took place in December 2018 at the Intergovernmental Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco. He also represented AMLO in the G20 and the Pacific Alliance summits in 2019. However, pressure from the United States, conflicts with Bolivia, the situation in Venezuela, and the COVID-19 pandemic made him realize that the foreign factor is truly important for domestic policy. Consequently, AMLO began to have more interest in foreign affairs.

Once COVID was declared a worldwide pandemic in March 2020, Mexico began to project a greater international presence through a humanitarian diplomacy. First, the government established air bridges to rescue Mexicans who were stranded in different parts of the world. SRE also maintained open communication with international organizations and other countries to address the challenges posed by the epidemic. Once the vaccine was ready, SRE established contacts with other governments to acquire or purchase it to guarantee availability for Mexican population. AMLO even participated, virtually, in a G20 meeting. There, the president defended the idea that the vaccine could be widely distributed to reach all corners of the world. Based on an idealistic perspective, Mexico encouraged international cooperation and global governance to confront the health crisis. For instance, SRE prepared and promoted Resolution 74/274 among the UN member states to guarantee global access to medicines, vaccines, and other medical equipment that were necessary to face the pandemic.⁵⁵ As AMLO administration was adopting an idealistic perspective, it was also resorting to pragmatism to comply with national interest, which was at that moment to get vaccines for the population.

At the multilateral level, the AMLO government has tried to actively participate in different forums. In 2019, the SRE announced that Mexico would seek a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2021-2022 period. The proposal could be, in some way, contradictory to the principle of non-intervention since Mexico, if elected, would have to be involved in world events beyond its national interest. It is important to clarify that this proposal was not an original initiative from AMLO's administration. The government of Felipe Calderón had presented the candidacy since 2011. There is an agreement among Latin American countries to propose well in advance the regional bids to achieve unique candidacies and save the costs of a political campaign. What AMLO's administration simply did was to ratify the proposal. In June 2019, the Regional Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC in Spanish) endorsed Mexico's candidacy. According to Natalia Saltalamacchia, the decision to give continuity to the process was based on the search for a "State foreign policy"⁵⁶ to

⁵⁵ Martha Delgado, "La apuesta de México por la ONU en su 75º aniversario", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020.

⁵⁶ In the Latin American context, a "State" foreign policy means that the government applies national interest to the country's international relations, that the policy is continuous regardless the presidential administration changes, and other state and nonstate actors participate in the decision-making process.

guarantee a “recurring participation” of Mexico in the Security Council.⁵⁷ Or as Guadalupe Gonzalez points out, the government’s idea was to project a “participatory, deliberate and frequent attitude”⁵⁸. That is, members of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM), experts on the subject, pushed the initiative and Foreign Secretary Marcel Ebrard, who is more sensible to these issues, endorsed the decision. AMLO accepted the proposal and the subsequent diplomatic procedures began.

In this regard, there was no disagreement among political parties. Congress unanimously sponsored the decision. In July, the Permanent Commission voted in favor of supporting Mexico’s candidacy to occupy the non-permanent seat. Furthermore, there was no rejection by public opinion. According to the SRE, upon joining the Security Council, the government opted “for multilateralism and for the strengthening of international law as a way of establishing [...] rules to make the behavior of international actors more predictable”⁵⁹. Therefore, Mexico was projecting a principled perspective at the multilateral level. However, a dose of pragmatism would be required to confront the challenges posed by the pandemic and world conflicts.

In June 2020, Mexico was elected as a member of the UN Security Council for the period 2021-2022 with 187 votes. This represented 97 percent of the total votes cast by the member states of the United Nations and was the highest support Mexico has ever received.⁶⁰ This was the first time that Mexico had a seat on the Security Council and, simultaneously, was participating in peacekeeping operations. This represented greater challenges for the nation since it will be directly involved in issues that are not close to Mexico’s national interest, such as the crises in Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Ukraine, among others. But it also implied that the country would participate in the decision-making process to resolve and address issues that directly affect the national interest, such as the cases of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central American migrant caravans, the crisis in Nicaragua and Venezuela, the fight against drug trafficking, and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, in the participation at the Security Council, Mexico would have to combine some principism with a dose of pragmatism.

According to the SRE, Mexico’s objective in the Security Council would be “to put people at the center of the agenda”. In other words, the country would promote measures that lead to better quality of life. According to Eduardo Jaramillo and Juan Ramon de la Fuente, both in charge of Mexico’s participation at the Security Council, the country’s actions would be guided by traditional

⁵⁷ Natalia Saltalamacchia, “La postulación de México al Consejo de seguridad”, in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020, pp. 42-47.

⁵⁸ Guadalupe Gonzalez, “¿Que esperar del rol de México en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU?”, in *Nueva Sociedad*, November 2020, available at: <https://nuso.org/articulo/que-esperar-del-rol-de-mexico-en-el-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu/>

⁵⁹ Martha Delgado, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁰ SRE, “México recibe respaldo histórico para ser miembro no permanente del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU”, Press Release No. 172, June 18, 2020, available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-recibe-respaldo-histórico-para-ser-miembro-no-permanente-del-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu?idiom=es>

foreign policy principles and would seek to encourage “cooperation and dialogue schemes to prevent conflicts and achieve sustainable peace”.⁶¹ According to Guadalupe Gonzalez, Mexico joined the Security Council at a very complex international scenario. There were different conflicts and, in addition, the world was going through the worst pandemic of modern times.⁶²

In early 2020, President López Obrador and the UN office in Mexico City inaugurated a center to train Mexican military officers to participate in UN peace-keeping operations. Participation at the Security Council and Mexico's involvement in UN operations reflected a continuity with the foreign policy of former administrations since they previously proposed it. These cases proved that President López Obrador had already a greater interest in increasing Mexico's presence in different world forums and involving the nation in activities at a global scale.

In 2020, López Obrador sent a recorded message for the general debate of the 75th session of the General Assembly. This message evidenced the reality of Mexico's domestic and foreign policy in various senses. First, it showed that the president probably was not advised in the elaboration of the speech because it was dedicated basically to Mexico's domestic issues. In addition, the message showed a certain ignorance of international issues by not mentioning the 75th anniversary of the UN. Moreover, he focused his message on explaining his actions in public policy, omitting references to Mexico's foreign policy priorities at the time, such as the participation at the UN Security Council, the presidency of CELAC, the international cooperation actions promoted by his cabinet on the issue of COVID-19 and the vaccine.

In November 2021, López Obrador made his second trip abroad. This time, he participated in a session of a Security Council meeting. There, the President introduced a World Plan for Fraternity and Welfare, which would seek to reduce world poverty and improve the living conditions of the planet's population. From a critical perspective, the Russian representative commented that the Security Council was not the ideal forum to present such proposals. However, AMLO and Marcelo Ebrard commented that Mexico would present the initiative in the framework of the UN General Assembly.⁶³ AMLO's proposal was similar to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States that Luis Echeverría presented in the 1970s. Several social sectors have criticized AMLO for the idealistic nature of his initiative. However, it is not an idle exercise to advance this type of proposals. From the president's perspective, Mexico must position itself in the international field to influence a more balanced system in the social sphere. But it was highly probable that AMLO would have little response from world economic powers to accept his proposal.

⁶¹ Eduardo Jaramillo & Juan Ramon de la Fuente, “Prioridades de México en el Consejo de Seguridad”, in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020, p. 28.

⁶² Guadalupe Gonzalez, *op. cit.*

⁶³ “Anuncia AMLO Plan Mundial de Fraternidad y de Bienestar ante la ONU”, in *El Universal*, November 9, 2021.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented evidence that, in the first three years of AMLO's administration, Mexico's foreign policy oscillated between pragmatism and principism. On one hand, the President made decisions based on traditional precepts, such as Non-Intervention and Self-Determination, as were the case in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. On the other hand, his actions reflected a high degree of pragmatism. For example, the decision to stop Central American migrants at the southern border to avoid higher tariffs was clearly practical and realist. AMLO sought to maintain Mexican trade with the United States at the same level to generate economic certainty and growth.

The variables that best explain principism are mainly AMLO's personal views, the electoral result which granted him broad democratic legitimacy, the party's ideology since MORENA is basically prone to idealism, the region factor because there was political coincidence with some Latin American regimes, and the multilateral variable since Mexico traditionally adopts a principled policy in international organizations. The variables that explain pragmatism were pressures from the US government, economic trouble at home, and the pandemic. In this context, an important finding is that principism is deliberate while pragmatism is forced. In other words, AMLO planned to apply a policy based on principles from the beginning. However, domestic and external conjunctures, that suddenly emerged, compelled him towards pragmatism.

AMLO's foreign policy was also characterized by a pattern of change and continuity. In the economic field, the President upheld free trade policies as previous administrations had done. He also supported the renegotiation of USMCA and endorsed other regional integration mechanisms, such as the Pacific Alliance. On the other hand, López Obrador significantly changed Mexico's position on Venezuela. The government of Enrique Peña had criticized Maduro and demanded democratic reforms. AMLO preferred not to meddle and apply non-intervention. In period, there was also a pattern of cooperation and conflict in foreign policy, especially with the United States and some Latin American countries. With Washington, the bilateral agenda was marked by both realities, mainly on trade, migration, and security issues. With Bolivia, Mexico became involved in a diplomatic crisis after AMLO granted political asylum to Evo Morales. The Jeanine Añez administration expelled the Mexican Ambassador and generated some friction in the bilateral relationship.

Although AMLO obtained a democratic "bonus" due to his broad electoral victory, AMLO did not use it to generate soft power in foreign policy. In addition, there are other variables that limited Mexico's external performance. On one hand, AMLO's foreign policy generated domestic polarization. Supporters backed him up, but opponents criticized him for his foreign policy. The lack of social cohesion directly affects the effectiveness of any foreign policy. The pandemic and the economic crisis were also two factors that limited the scope of the country's international relations.

It is highly predictable that, in the remaining three years of his administration, AMLO's foreign policy will maintain a similar trend. In other words, Mexico's world position will combine patterns of pragmatism/principism, change/continuity, and conflict/cooperation. By 2021, AMLO was still convinced that the best foreign policy is a "good domestic policy". However, the experience of the first three years would probably change his mind. He needs to understand that foreign policy is a key instrument for economic, political, and social development. Therefore, he must pay more attention to the external factor and invest more time and resources in Mexico's diplomacy. This will be needed for a "good domestic policy".

It seemed that principled pragmatism did not pay off in economic indicators. For example, GDP plummeted to -8.3 %, external debt grew, and trade and foreign investments slightly diminished. Clearly, these indicators are the effect of the economic crisis brought by the pandemic. But it is possible to say that trade and investments did not collapse thanks to the pragmatism printed in the negotiation of USMCA.

Sources

"AMLO plantea hacer una pausa en las relaciones de México con España", in *El Economista*, February 9, 2022.

"AMLO reitera que esperara para felicitar a Biden hasta resolucion de autoridades de EU", in *El Economista*, November 9, 2020.

"Anuncia AMLO Plan Mundial de Fraternidad y de Bienestar ante la ONU", in *El Universal*, November 9, 2021.

Barragan, S., "¿Jóvenes de Morena apoyan a Rusia? Esto dice la embajada, El Partido y la Delegación Edomex", in *Aristegui Noticias*, March 3, 2022.

Caso, Diego, "AMLO 'se guarda' felicitación a Biden: 'Esperaremos a que se resuelvan todos los asuntos legales'", en *El Financiero*, November 7, 2020.

Castro, Jonathan, "Destituir a Pedro Castillo solo significaría gobernar sobre cenizas", in *The Washington Post*, December 1, 2021.

CAMESCOM, "La IED española ocupa el segundo lugar de generación de flujos de inversión hacia México con 5,511 MDD durante este sexenio", July 30, 2020, in <https://www.camescom.com.mx/la-ied-espanola-ocupa-el-segundo-lugar-de-generacion-de-flujos-de-inversion-hacia-mexico-con-5511-mdd-durante-este-sexenio/>

Croda, Rafael, "Subsecretario mexicano pide no aislar a Venezuela ni intervenir en sus asuntos internos", in *Proceso*, January 4, 2019.

Delgado, Martha, "La apuesta de México por la ONU en su 75º aniversario", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020.

Devonshire-Ellis, Chris, "The Belt & Road Initiative in Mexico & Central America", *Silk Road Briefing*, May 27, 2019.

Ebrard califica de aberración al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU por tema Israel-Hamas", in *El Universal*, May 20, 2021.

Escobar, E., "AMLO no respondió, solo insultó y descalificó. -Eurodiputado", in *Reforma*, March 17, 2022.

"España rechaza 'con toda firmeza' carta de AMLO sobre disculpa por la conquista", in *El Universal*, March 25, 2019.

"EU adelanta que podría sancionar a México si compra helicópteros rusos", in *La Jornada*, February 13, 2020.

"Foreign Ministers of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico Presented Comprehensive Development Plan in the Framework of the Conference on the Global Compact for Migration", The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Press Release, December 10, 2018, available at: <https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/foreign-ministers-salvador-guatemala-honduras-and-mexico-presented-comprehensive>.

Fowks, Jacqueline, "México evita firmar el acuerdo del Grupo de Lima que rechaza al nuevo Gobierno de Maduro", en *El pais*, January 4, 2019.

Garcia, Ariadna, "Israel expresa molestia con Mexico por votacion en la ONU", in *El Universal*, May 31, 2021.

Garcia, Ariadna, "Ebrard anuncia grupo de accion internacional contra trata de personas, tras tragedia en Chiapas", in *El Universal*, December 10, 2021.

Garcia, Ariadna et al, "Expulsa Bolivia a embajadora mexicana", in *El Universal*, December 30, 2019.

Gonzalez, Guadalupe, "¿Que esperar del rol de México en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU?", in *Nueva Sociedad*, November 2020, available at: <https://nuso.org/articulo/que-esperar-del-rol-de-mexico-en-el-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu/>

Jaramillo, Eduardo & Juan Ramon de la Fuente, "Prioridades de Mexico en el Consejo de Seguridad", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020, p. 28.

Kitroeff, Natalie and Oscar Lopez, "México demanda a empresas de armas en EE. UU.; las acusa de avivar la violencia", in *The New York Times*, August 4, 2021.

Lafuente, Javier & Lucia Abellan, "López Obrador pide al Rey que España se disculpe por los abusos de la conquista", in *El Pais*, March 25, 2019.

Lopez, Leopoldo, "Joint Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of the Rules of Procedure on the situation of journalists and human rights defenders in Mexico (2022/2580(RSP)", in *Europarl.europa.eu*, March 9, 2022.

"López Obrador calificó de 'legítimo' el reclamo de Trump a México por migrantes", in *The World News*, March 28, 2019.

Manetto, Francesco, "México reafirma su 'vínculo especial' con Cuba con la visita de Diaz-Canel en el dia de la Independencia", in *El Pais*, September 15, 2021.

Mars, Amanda, "Trump declara una emergencia nacional para construir el muro con Mexico", in *El Pais*, February 15, 2019.

Mars, Amanda, "Trump anuncia un arancel general del 5 por ciento a México como castigo por la inmigración irregular", in *El Pais*, May 31, 2019

Mars, Amanda, "Trump anuncia que incluirá a 'los cárteles' mexicanos en la lista terrorista de EE. UU.", in *El Pais*, November 27, 2019.

"Mexico negocia compra de helicópteros militares con Rusia: Canciller ruso", in *El Universal*, February 7, 2020.

“Mexico niega posible compra de helicopteros rusos”, in *El Universal*, February 14, 2020.

“OEA aprueba resolucion que declara ilegitimo gobierno de Maduro; Mexico se abstiene”, in *El Universal*, January 10, 2019.

Olivares, Emir, “Visas a 13 miembros de la DEA; Mexico enviara a unos 20 agentes a EU”, in *La Jornada*, December 7, 2021.

Olivares, Emir, “Presentan Mexico y EU plan de desarrollo para Centroamerica”, in *La Jornada*, December 2, 2021.

Pedro Salmerón Declina al cargo de Embajador de México en Panamá, afirma AMLO”, in *El Financiero*, February 1, 2022.

Perez, Beatriz & Teresa Perez, “La politica exterior en las plataformas electorales de 2018”, in Mario Carrillo et al, *Reflexiones sobre Mexico y su entorno internacional ante el cambio de gobierno en 2018*, (Mexico City, UAM, 2019), pp. 125-148.

Petrich, Blanche, “Abstencion de Mexico en la OEA no avala el gobierno de Daniel Ortega”, in *La Jornada*, November 14, 2021.

Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5565599&fecha=12/07/2019

“¿Por que respondio AMLO al Parlamento Europeo y no la cancillería? Esto dice el presidente”, in *El Financiero*, March 14, 2022.

Pozzi, Sandro, “Estados Unidos, Mexico y Canada firman la version final del TMEC”, en *El País*, December 11, 2019.

¿Que implicaría que Trump declare como terroristas los cárteles de la droga?”, in *El Universal*, November 28, 2019.

Reina, Eliana, “López Obrador Arremete Contra el Parlamento Europeo: 'Ya no somos colonia de nadie'”, in *El País*, March 17, 2022.

Saldaña, Ivette, “Reglas de origen y laborales los cambios”, en *El Universal*, December 10, 2019.

Saltalamacchia, Natalia, “La postulación de México al Consejo de seguridad”, in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October-December, 2020, pp. 42-47.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Mexico recibe respaldo historico para ser miembro no permanente del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU”, Press Release No. 172, June 18, 2020, available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-recibe-respaldo-historico-para-ser-miembro-no-permanente-del-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu?idiom=es>

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Mexico se apega a sus principios constitucionales y respalda llamado de las Naciones Unidas”, Press Release, No. 012, January 23, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/156459>.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Position of the Government of Mexico on Granting Asylum to Evo Morales”, Press Release 397, November 11, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/position-of-the-government-of-mexico-on-granting-asylum-to-evo-morales>.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Inaugura el Canciller Marcelo Ebrard la XXX Reunion de Embajadores y Consules REC 2019”, Press Release, January 7, 2019. Available at: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/articulos/inaugura-el-canciller-marcelo-ebrard-la-xxx-reunion-de-embajadores-y-consules-rec-2019>

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, "Primer Informe de Labores SRE 2018-2019", September 2019. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/490401/SRE_Primer_Informe_de_Labores-2019_aconvertir_baja.pdf

Sieff, Kevin and Mary Beth Sheridan, "Mexico is sending its new national guard to the Guatemala border. The mission is unclear", in *The Washington Post*, June 10, 2019.

Sieff, Kevin, "Barr's meeting in Mexico could be prelude to greater U.S. involvement against drug cartels", in *The Washington Post*, December 5, 2019.

Sotomayor, Gabriela, "AMLO usa 'a contentillo' el principio de no intervención", in *Proceso*, 2357, January 2, 2022, p. 45.

The Associated Press, "Mexico sues U.S. gun manufacturers for contributing to arms trafficking deaths", in *NPR*, August 5, 2021.

Tourliere, Mathieu, "En primer día de gobierno de AMLO, pactan Plan de Desarrollo Integral para Centroamérica", en *Proceso*, December 1, 2018.

"#UnAcosadorNoDebeSerEmbajador: Protestan contra Designación de Pedro Salmerón", in *El Financiero*, January 18, 2022.

United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Office of the US Trade Representative. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement>

Velázquez, Rafael, "La política exterior de México en las campañas electorales a la presidencia de 2018", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica*, May 2018.

Weeks, Greg, "AMLO's cautious foreign policy", in *The Global Americans*, February 2019.

Zavala, Misael & Alberto Morales, "Mexico refrenda su amistad y afecto a España: AMLO", in *El Universal*, Mexico, January 30, 2019.

About the authors

Martha Ardila

She holds a PhD. in Political Science and International Relations. She is a research professor at the Externado University in Colombia. Her areas of interest focus on the study of international relations in Latin America, Colombia's Foreign Policy, and regional security. She has been a visiting research professor at: the University of Guadalajara, Mexico; Ibero-American Institute of Berlin; University of Florida; Simon Bolivar Andean University, and Sorbonne University, IHEAL, Paris. She has several publications. Her latest are: *Historical, political, and military elements to understand Colombian-Venezuelan relations (1999-2018)*, 2022; *Digital Diplomacy of Colombia: A case study focused on Venezuelan migration*, 2021.

martha.ardila@uexternado.edu.co

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7440-9752>

Jose Briceño-Ruiz

He holds a PhD. in Political Science from the Institute of Political Studies (Aix-en-Provence, France) a master's degree in International Relations (Durham University, England), and a Diploma in Advanced Studies in Comparative Political Science (Institute of Political Studies of Aix-en-Provence – IEP Aix, France). He is a professor-researcher at the Center for Studies of Latin America and the Caribbean (CIALC) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He is a member of the National System of Researchers (SNI), level II in Mexico. He is regional editor of the journal *Latin American Policy*. His works have been published in various books, journals in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. His most recent book is: The Political Economy of New Regionalisms in the Pacific Rim (London, Routledge, 2019) edited with Philippe de Lombaerde.

Email: bricenoruiz@hotmail.com

Isabel Clemente

Isabel Clemente is PhD. at the University of London, Institute of Latin American studies, Magister in Political Science at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, and Professor of History at the Instituto Artigas, Montevideo, Uruguay. She is a Full time Professor at the Universidad de la República, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (Montevideo, Uruguay) where she is the coordinator of the International Studies program.

Email: isabel.clemente@cienciassociales.edu.uy

Miriam Gomes Saraiva

Miriam Gomes Saraiva (PhD. Universidad Complutense de Madrid) is full professor at the Department of International Relations at the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) and researcher of the CNPq (Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Research). She is coordinator of the UERJ's Graduate Program in International Relations (PPGRI/UERJ) (2009-2012, 2017-2018 and since-2019). She was a Postdoc Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute (Florence/Italy) from 2002 to 2003 and in 2013 she was appointed as the first Rio Branco Chair in International Relations in the University of Oxford. She was visiting researcher at Lisbon University, from Oct.2019 to Jan.2020. She is currently coordinator of the Laboratory of Studies in Regionalism and Foreign Policy (LeRPE-PPGRI/UERJ). Her main research interests include Brazilian Foreign Policy, South American Regionalism, Mercosur and Brazil-Argentina relations and European-Latin American relations.

Email: miriamsaraiva@uerj.br

Andrés Guzmán Escobari

Bolivian economist and diplomat. With studies in Economics at the Bolivian Catholic University (2004), International Relations and Diplomacy at the Bolivian Diplomatic Academy (2008) and Conflict Resolution and Governance at the University of Amsterdam (2015). He published two books: "A Sea of Unfulfilled Promises. The History of the Bolivian maritime problem, 1879 - 2015" (2015) and "On the other side of the Cordillera, the role of the master narratives of Bolivia and Chile in the formation of their national identities" (2020). He worked in the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations (2005 and 2009) and in the foreign service as commercial attache of Bolivia in Venezuela (2010 - 2011); in the private sector, as operations manager of Tradinter Bolivia (2011 - 2017); in the Autonomous Municipal Government of La Paz, as Head of International Relations (2017 - 2019); and, in the Port Services Administration - Bolivia (ASP-B), as Director of Operations. At present, he is a professor of international relations and diplomacy at Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.

Email: andriguzman@gmail.com

Felipe Leal Albuquerque

He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL, 2020), where he was a Marie Curie Fellow. He currently collaborates with the Master of Political Science at the University of Salamanca. In 2016, he was a visiting doctoral researcher at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and at the Stellenbosch University. He holds a master's degree in International Relations from the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ, 2013) and a post-graduation in Contemporary International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio, 2009). He worked as a lecturer at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), as a research assistant at Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and as a project coordinator at the International Organization for Migration (IOM-UN Migration Agency).

Email: felipelra@gmail.com

Alejandro Monjaraz Sandoval

He holds a PhD. in Global Development Studies from the Autonomous University of Baja California (UABC). He is full-time professor-researcher at the School of Economics and International Relations (FEyRI) of the UABC. His lines of research are foreign policy, Latin America, transnational political participation, international migration, and cross-border relations between Mexico and the United States.

Email: jmonjaraz@uabc.edu.mx

Alejandro Simonoff

He holds a PhD. in International Relations from the National University of La Plata (UNLP). He is Professor of General History at the Faculty of Humanities and Education Sciences (UNLP). He is also associate Professor of Argentine Foreign Policy at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the Universidad Católica de La Plata (UCALP). He is a Professor in the Master and Doctorate in International Relations and Social Sciences at UNLP. He has taught postgraduate courses at the University of Viña del Mar (Chile), the National University of Tucuman, the University of Buenos Aires, the Paulista State University (Brazil), the University of São Paulo (Brazil), the Catholic University of Santa Fe and the National University of Rosario. He has also been a visiting professor at the National Foreign Service Institute (ISEN). He is the coordinator of the Center for Reflection on International Politics of the Institute of International Relations of the UNLP and a researcher at the Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences Research (UNLP-CONICET).

Email: asimonoff2010@gmail.com

Alberto Van Klaveren

He is professor at the Institute of International Studies and Faculty of Law, University of Chile. Graduated in Law at the Universidad de Chile; MA, Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver; PhD. at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. In 2015 he was awarded a *honoris causa* Doctorate by the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso. He was Ambassador of Chile between 1996 and 2019; former agent of the Republic of Chile before the International Court of Justice in The Hague; former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile during the first term of President Michelle Bachelet; former Ambassador to the European Union, Belgium, and Luxembourg; former President of the Chilean Political Science Association (1995-1996). He was visiting professor or researcher at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, the Universidad Católica del Perú, the Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación of Argentina, and Heidelberg University. Editor and co-author of three books, he has written more than 70 articles and book chapters on European-Latin American relations, Comparative Politics, International Relations, International Law, and Chilean Foreign Policy, published in books and academic journals in Latin America, the United States and Europe.

Email: Avanklaveren@uchile.cl

Rafael Velázquez Flores

He is International Relations professor at the School of Economics and International Relations of the Autonomous University of Baja California, Mexico. He holds a PhD. in international studies from the University of Miami. He is a Fulbright fellow and past president of the Mexican International Studies Association (AMEI). He is a regular member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences (AMC) and he is part of the National System of Researchers (SNI), a governmental agency that promotes technology and sciences in Mexico. Dr. Velázquez is president of the Center for Teaching and Analyzing Mexican Foreign Policy (CESPEM), a Mexican *think tank* that studies Mexico's international interactions. He is a fellow at the Center for US-Mexican Studies of the University of California San Diego. His research interests focus on Mexican Foreign Policy, US-Mexican relationships, Geopolitics, and International Relations Theory. He has participated in different national and international conferences and has published several books and scientific articles on his research interests. He has been visiting professor at different universities in Mexico, the U.S., Argentina, Spain, and Germany.

Email: rafael.velazquez@uabc.edu.mx

Oscar Vidarte Arévalo

He is associate professor of the Department of Social Sciences of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), assistant professor at the School of Political Sciences of the Jesuit University Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, and coordinator of the Research Group on Peruvian Foreign Policy (GIPEP) of the School of Government and Public Policies of the PUCP. He studied Law at the PUCP, has a master's degree in International Relations from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Colombia), and is a PhD candidate in Political Science and Government from the PUCP. In addition, he has a postgraduate degree in International Security from the University of Delaware (US). He has also worked as a professor of various courses on international politics at the Diplomatic Academy of Peru, the Naval War College, the National Intelligence School, and the Center for High National Studies. He has also been a visiting professor and researcher at the Universidad Iberoamericana (México).

Email: ovidarte@pucp.pe

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES: Between Pragmatism, Principism and Neoliberalism. Editado por la Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales (AMEI), el Centro de Enseñanza y Análisis sobre la Política Exterior de México (CESPEM), la Universidad Externado de Colombia, la Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP), la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), y la Universidad Autónoma de Baja California (UABC). Se terminó de imprimir el 10 de junio 2022 en los talleres de BGB Producciones Gráficas/ Bernardo García Bravo, ubicados en Juan Lucas Lassaga No. 62, Col. Obrera, Alcaldía Cuauhtémoc, Ciudad de México. El tiraje consta de 300 ejemplares impresos en Offset en papel Cultural de 90 grs. y Forros impresos en Cartulina Sulfatada de 12 puntos con plastificado mate. En su composición se usó el tipo Book Antiqua de 10.7 puntos y Cambria de 17 puntos.

